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[I]ll health offers adventure; no one has a better chance to 
live dangerously than the ill who must take their medicine. 
—Roger Traynor1 
  
 †  Professor of Law, Univ. of Florida. My title alludes to a public service ad campaign 
(showing an egg in a frying pan) aired by the Partnership for a Drug-Free America in 1982. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Lawsuits against the manufacturers of drugs and medical devices 
have become increasingly important in the last few decades, both in their 
volume and in the conceptual challenges that they have presented,2 and 
courts have created a variety of special rules to accommodate products 
liability litigation against the sellers of medical technologies.3 The work 
of the American Law Institute (ALI) has played an important role in this 
process, though so far the special provisions of the Products Liability 
Restatement applicable to prescription drugs and devices have had little 
discernable impact. These provisions have, however, provoked a great 
deal of scholarly commentary, and the few courts to consider the issue 
have uncritically relied upon the published critiques. As explained at 
length herein, I find little merit in most of these negative assessments, 
though I point out a number of flaws, ambiguities, and arguable 
inconsistencies in the new Restatement’s special provisions that 
seemingly no one else has identified. 
This Article attempts to offer a comprehensive evaluation of the 
various facets of the Products Liability Restatement that relate to medical 
technologies, and it does so from a perspective rooted in the regulatory 
as opposed to the doctrinal challenges posed by these products. Part II 
addresses production defects, focusing on the heated debate over what 
standards to use in deciding whether a prescription drug suffers from a 
defective design. Part III considers defects related to the information that 
accompanies prescription drugs, especially those advertised directly to 
consumers. Finally, Part IV touches on some of the peculiar issues raised 
by investigational products, generic drugs, prescription medical devices, 
and the duties of non-manufacturing sellers. 
  
 1 Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 
32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 368 (1965). 
 2 See Alex Berenson, Drug Industry Braces for New Suits over Even More of Its 
Products, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2006, at C1 (“As Merck reels from 11,500 suits over Vioxx, its 
arthritis drug, the rest of the industry is girding for challenges over another half a dozen widely used 
[and still marketed] medications [including Seroquel, Ortho-Evra, Prempro, and Fosamax] that 
plaintiffs’ lawyers say have hidden and severe side effects or were improperly marketed.”); id. (“Eli 
Lilly agreed to spend $700 million to settle 8,000 lawsuits over Zyprexa . . . . Wyeth has spent $15 
billion since 1998 to resolve lawsuits over its fen-phen diet-drug combination . . . .”); Lisa Girion, 
State Vioxx Trial Is Set as Drug Suits Boom; An Explosion in Litigation Spurs Calls for Legal 
Reform and Regulatory Changes, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 2006, at C1 (calling “the pharmaceutical 
industry the nation’s No. 1 target of product liability lawsuits,” adding that “[m]ore than 71,000 drug 
lawsuits have been filed in federal courts since 2001 and . . . now account for more than a third of all 
product liability filings”); Julie Schmit, More Drugs Get Slapped with Lawsuits, USA TODAY, Aug. 
23, 2006, at 3B. 
 3 See LARS NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY chs. 5-8 (2d ed. 
2007); M. Stuart Madden, The Enduring Paradox of Products Liability Law Relating to Prescription 
Pharmaceuticals, 21 PACE L. REV. 313 (2001) (describing at length some of the older case law). 
Classic treatments of the subject include Richard A. Merrill, Compensation for Prescription Drug 
Injuries, 59 VA. L. REV. 1, 29-50, 87-120 (1973), and Paul D. Rheingold, Products Liability—The 
Ethical Drug Manufacturer’s Liability, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 947, 970-1018 (1964). 
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II. FLAWS IN PRODUCTION 
A product must have some sort of defect before an injured 
consumer may recover damages from the manufacturer or other member 
of the chain of distribution. This Part discusses, in turn, manufacturing 
and design defect claims against pharmaceutical manufacturers. It 
reviews several case studies that other commentators have offered, 
concluding that the most important potential design feature relates to the 
manner in which sellers restrict access to pharmaceutical products. 
A. Manufacturing Defects 
The Products Liability Restatement uses the same standard to 
define manufacturing defects in prescription drug and medical device 
cases as it does for other consumer goods.4 Thus, if a product falls out of 
specifications for any reason, then it has a defect (a true strict liability 
standard).5 Manufacturing defect claims involving pharmaceuticals, such 
as instances of product contamination, generally pose few difficulties for 
courts.6 As with other types of consumer goods, however, plaintiffs may 
have to rely on circumstantial evidence of such flaws, seeking an 
inference of defectiveness from the occurrence of an obvious 
malfunction.7 Although patients injured by medical devices may rely on 
a product malfunction approach,8 injuries associated with drug products 
  
 4 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(b)(1) (1998) (cross-
referencing § 2(a), which provides that a product “contains a manufacturing defect when the product 
departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and 
marketing of the product”). 
 5 See, e.g., Transue v. Aesthetech Corp., 341 F.3d 911, 917-20 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding 
that the trial judge erred in failing to use a strict liability instruction on a manufacturing defect claim 
involving silicone-gel breast implants); id. at 919 (quoting Products Liability Restatement § 6 
comment c as further support). 
 6 See, e.g., In re Copley Pharm., Inc., “Albuterol” Prods. Liab. Litig., 158 F.R.D. 485, 
487-88 (D. Wyo. 1994) (certifying a class action on behalf of patients who were injured by bacterial 
contamination of four batches of a bronchodilator drug later recalled by the manufacturer); see also 
Martin v. Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 116 F.3d 102, 103, 105 (4th Cir. 1997) (allowing a patient to pursue a 
breach of express warranty claim for an implant that was not sterile); Ferren v. Richards Mfg. Co., 
733 F.2d 526, 527-28, 530-31 (8th Cir. 1984) (affirming judgment for plaintiff where metal defect in 
hip implant caused injury). But cf. infra notes 332-34 and accompanying text (discussing questions 
about the line between manufacturing and design defects in connection with tainted blood products 
and contaminated heparin). 
 7 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 3 & cmt. b (1998). 
 8 See, e.g., McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1258-60 (11th Cir. 
2002) (balloon catheter burst); Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 111 F.3d 782, 792-93 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(reversing a directed verdict against a plaintiff’s manufacturing defect claim involving a hip 
implant); Parkinson v. Guidant Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 741, 750-51 (W.D. Pa. 2004) (allowing 
plaintiff to request res ipsa loquitur instruction to provide inference of manufacturing defect where a 
guidewire fractured during angioplasty); cf. Fane v. Zimmer, Inc., 927 F.2d 124, 129-32 (2d Cir. 
1991) (affirming a directed verdict for manufacturer where a metal brace may have broken because 
of patient misuse); Mozes v. Medtronic, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1128-29 (D. Minn. 1998) 
(rejecting res ipsa loquitur where a manufacturer of pacemaker leads offered numerous post-sale 
explanations for failure); Fulton v. Pfizer Hosp. Prods. Group, Inc., 872 S.W.2d 908, 910-12 (Tenn. 
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rarely lend themselves to this sort of an analysis: given the variability in 
patient response and the inevitably of unexpected adverse events, a 
seemingly inexplicable failure of a metabolized chemical hardly 
bespeaks some deviation from the manufacturer’s specifications. 
B. Design Defects 
As for claims of defective designs in pharmaceuticals, section 
6(c) of the Products Liability Restatement provides as follows: 
A prescription drug . . . is not reasonably safe due to defective design if the 
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the drug . . . are sufficiently great in relation 
to its foreseeable therapeutic benefits that reasonable health-care providers, 
knowing of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not prescribe 
the drug . . . for any class of patients.9 
As elaborated in the accompanying comment, this language sought to 
create a “very demanding objective standard, [and] liability is likely to be 
imposed only under unusual circumstances.”10 As the Reporters’ notes 
explained, “[s]ection 6(c) is a significant departure from the general 
defective design rules . . . , in recognition of the unique characteristics of 
prescription drugs.”11 
In adopting section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 
more than thirty years earlier, the ALI had attempted to address these 
issues in comment k (“unavoidably unsafe products”),12 which generated 
much confusion among courts and commentators.13 In resolving design 
  
Ct. App. 1993) (reversing judgment for a plaintiff because no evidence supported the inference that 
some manufacturing defect caused the pegs in a knee replacement to shear off). 
 9 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(c) (1998) (omitting parallel 
references to “medical device”). 
 10 Id. cmt. f (“[A]s long as a given drug . . . provides net benefits for a class of patients, it 
should be available to them, accompanied by appropriate warnings and instructions. Learned 
intermediaries must generally be relied upon to see that the right drugs . . . reach the right patients.”). 
 11 Id.  
 12 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965). As the Reporter later 
explained: 
The argument that industries producing potentially dangerous products should make good 
the harm, distribute it by liability insurance, and add the cost to the price of the product, 
encounters reason for pause, when we consider that two of the greatest medical boons to 
the human race, penicillin and cortisone, both have their dangerous side effects, and that 
drug companies might well have been deterred from producing and selling them. 
WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 661 (4th ed. 1971) (footnotes omitted). 
 13 Compare Hackett v. G.D. Searle & Co., 246 F. Supp. 2d 591, 595 (W.D. Tex. 2002) 
(exempting all FDA-approved prescription drugs from design defect scrutiny), Grundberg v. Upjohn 
Co., 813 P.2d 89, 92-99 (Utah 1991) (same), and Young v. Key Pharm., Inc., 922 P.2d 59, 64-65 
(Wash. 1996) (plurality), with Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1197-98 (Alaska 1992) 
(declining to adopt comment k). See generally Richard C. Ausness, Unavoidably Unsafe Products 
and Strict Products Liability: What Liability Rule Should Be Applied to the Sellers of 
Pharmaceutical Products?, 78 KY. L.J. 705 (1990); Victor E. Schwartz, Unavoidably Unsafe 
Products: Clarifying the Meaning and Policy Behind Comment k, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1139 
(1985). 
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defect claims against prescription (Rx) drug manufacturers, a few courts 
preferred to apply the warranty-inspired consumer expectations 
approach,14 which the Products Liability Restatement rejects as a 
freestanding test for any products other than foods.15 Other courts 
employed a risk-utility standard in such cases,16 which section 2(b) of the 
new Restatement endorses for all other types of consumer goods, 
including nonprescription drugs.17 
One year before getting underway with work on the Products 
Liability Restatement, the future Reporters summarized the problems 
with trying to make sense of comment k: “Case law that is unintelligible 
cannot be intelligently restated. There is a need in this area to clarify the 
issues and to provide direction to the courts as to how this very special 
genre of cases can be sensibly approached.”18 Instead of asking whether a 
  
 14 See, e.g., Allison v. Merck & Co., 878 P.2d 948, 951-56, 961 (Nev. 1994) (plurality) 
(rejecting comment k in a case where a vaccine allegedly caused encephalitis, opting instead for the 
consumer expectations test or a product malfunction theory); cf. Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 
Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 780-82 (R.I. 1988) (treating comment k as an affirmative defense that allows the 
manufacturer to respond to a consumer expectations based design defect claim with risk-utility 
balancing). But see Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 477-78 (Cal. 1988) (explaining that the 
consumer expectations test has no place in cases involving Rx drugs). 
 15 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) & cmts. f-h (1998); id. § 7. 
Because the Reporters put so much emphasis on differential marketing to justify section 6(c), one 
should note that physicians may “prescribe” nutritional (non-drug) products to treat patients with 
special dietary needs. See 21 U.S.C. § 360ee(b)(3) (2006) (defining “medical food” as “a food which 
is formulated to be consumed or administered enterally under the supervision of a physician and 
which is intended for the specific dietary management of a disease or condition for which distinctive 
nutritional requirements, based on recognized scientific principles, are established by medical 
evaluation”); 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(j)(8) (2008) (elaborating on the definition); Symposium, Medical 
Foods: Their Past, Present, and Future Regulation, 44 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 461 (1989); cf. 
Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 589-97 (1926) (upholding a Prohibition-era federal law that 
allowed for the medicinal use of certain liquors only when prescribed by a physician who had a 
special permit and only in strictly limited quantities). 
 16 See, e.g., Doe v. Solvay Pharm., Inc., 350 F. Supp. 2d 257, 266-68 (D. Me. 2004) 
(quoting Products Liability Restatement § 6, but retaining a risk-utility standard); Shanks, 835 P.2d 
at 1196-97; Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915, 925-27 (Kan. 1990). 
 17 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) & cmt. k (1998). Some 
courts have used the consumer expectations test in such cases. See Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, 
Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 741-55 (Wis. 2001) (rejecting the risk-utility standard on a design defect 
claim against the seller of latex gloves used by health care workers, and holding that the defendant 
would face liability even if it could not have known of the risk of allergic reactions at the time of 
sale); see also West v. Johnson & Johnson Prods., Inc., 220 Cal. Rptr. 437, 458 (Ct. App. 1985) 
(allowing a plaintiff to use the consumer expectations test in a design defect claim against the 
manufacturer of a tampon that caused toxic shock syndrome). In jurisdictions that continue to use 
both tests for design defect, some courts allow plaintiffs to use a risk-utility standard because 
otherwise an adequate warning might defeat a design claim based on consumer expectations. See 
Reece v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 953 P.2d 117, 122-23 (Wash. Ct. App. 1998); cf. Haddix v. Playtex 
Fam. Prods. Corp., 138 F.3d 681, 684-86 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming summary judgment for a tampon 
manufacturer because the plaintiff could not opt to use the risk-utility test for such a simple product 
and her design defect claim failed under the consumer expectations test where the labeling included 
a clear warning of the risk of toxic shock syndrome). 
 18 James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1545 (1992); see also id. at 1537 
(“[Comment k] is poorly drafted and inter[n]ally inconsistent. . . . To draw on comment k as 
authority to resolve problems that no one even contemplated at the time of its adoption is sheer 
foolishness.”). 
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reasonable alternative design (RAD) exists, the new test asks whether a 
fully-informed health care provider would ever select the product for any 
class of patients. Although a good deal clearer than its predecessor, 
section 6(c) of the Products Liability Restatement has proven to be no 
less controversial or subject to misunderstanding.19 
Insofar as the availability of safer substitutes undoubtedly would 
impact a reasonable physician’s decision, section 6(c) does not differ so 
terribly from the risk-utility test of section 2(b).20 In a subsequent article, 
the Reporters clarified that RADs would remain relevant in this limited 
fashion.21 They clearly meant, however, to avoid a test that focused on 
  
 19 See George W. Conk, Essay, Is There a Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Products Liability?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087, 1089 (2000) (arguing that section 6(c) “demands 
less than reasonable care from manufacturers of drugs” and that “the rule will create a dangerous 
chasm in the tort law and ultimately will undermine the credibility of the ALI”); id. at 1106 
(complaining that “the ALI adopted section 6(c) without benefit either of floor debate or of a solid 
bedrock of judicial decisions”); Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Rethinking Conscious Design Liability for 
Prescription Drugs: The Restatement (Third) Standard Versus a Negligence Approach, 63 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 76, 91-110 (1994); William A. Dreier, Manufacturers’ Liability for Drug and 
Medical Devices Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 30 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 258 (1999); Teresa Moran Schwartz, Prescription Products and the Proposed Restatement 
(Third), 61 TENN. L. REV. 1357, 1365-68, 1378-85 (1994); Dustin R. Marlowe, Note, A Dose of 
Reality for Section 6(c) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 39 GA. L. REV. 1445 
(2005); Jeffrey D. Winchester, Note, Section 8(c) of the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Is It 
Really What the Doctor Ordered?, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 644 (1997); see also Frank J. Vandall, The 
American Law Institute Is Dead in the Water, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 809-10 (1998) (complaining 
that section 6(c) “reads as if it were written by a lobbyist for the pharmaceutical companies”). This 
generally unflattering reception generated a pair of responses penned by the Reporters. See James A. 
Henderson, Jr., Prescription Drug Design Liability Under the Proposed Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: A Reporter’s Perspective, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 471 (1996); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron 
D. Twerski, Essay, Drug Designs Are Different, 111 YALE L.J. 151, 180 (2001) (noting that section 
6 “has become a lightning rod for criticism”); id. (“[W]e plead guilty to the charge that we did not 
restate existing case law. One could hardly be expected to restate gibberish. Instead, we opted for a 
fresh look at the question of design liability for prescription products . . . .”); see also Michael D. 
Green, Prescription Drugs, Alternative Designs, and the Restatement (Third): Preliminary 
Reflections, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 207 (1999) (staking out a middle ground in the debate). 
 20 In this sense, it also might align closely with the older case-by-case approach to 
deciding whether to apply section 402A comment k (or, for that matter, the retention of negligence 
claims for design defect in jurisdictions applying comment k across the board). See, e.g., Toner v. 
Lederle Labs., 732 P.2d 297, 306-11 (Idaho 1987). It might even align with the older consumer 
expectations test, at least insofar as the question gets asked from the perspective of a fully-informed 
health care professional. See Shanks, 835 P.2d at 1195; see also Henderson & Twerski, supra note 
19, at 177-78 (“[A] patient never actually expects to suffer a devastating side-effect from taking a 
drug that is supposed to be beneficial. . . . [and,] assuming adequate warnings have been given, a 
reasonable, intelligent prescribing physician always expects that, over the run of patients, warned-
against side-effects will occur.”). 
 21 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 19, at 155 (conceding that “some of the relevant 
language in both the blackletter of, and comments for, section 6(c) is ambiguous”); id. at 155-56 
(“Obviously, such a reasonable provider should consider available alternative drugs in deciding 
which drug, if any, to prescribe. Indeed, that may be said to be the essence of the healer’s craft—
assessing and comparing all available courses of medical treatment.”); id. at 152 (“Plaintiffs may 
establish defectiveness by showing that safer alternative drugs were available on the market that 
reasonable health care providers would have prescribed in place of a defendant’s drug for all classes 
of patients.”). In his rejoinder to their response to his essay, Mr. Conk cried foul. See George W. 
Conk, The True Test: Alternative Safer Designs for Drugs and Medical Devices in a Patent-
Constrained Market, 49 UCLA L. REV. 737, 739 (2002) (expressing “surpris[e]” at the “new, 
expansive construction of the rule”); id. at 740 (observing that no one else previously had interpreted 
section 6(c) in this way); id. at 744-45 (“If both prescription drugs and medical devices were 
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the availability of hypothetical RADs in part because full substitutability 
seemed far harder to predict in this context: the Reporters insisted that a 
purported RAD serve all potential classes of patients, and they rejected 
any reference to Rx drugs that had not yet received approval from the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA).22 
Taking a cue from the medical profession promised a firmer 
basis for making such tricky judgments,23 especially when coupled with 
an assumption of full information.24 The Reporters had in mind an 
aspirational rather than simply a custom-based standard,25 even though, 
in practice, a fully-informed health care provider represents a largely 
  
intended to be vetted for defective design by comparison to other products on the market—why 
doesn’t the Restatement say so plainly? A blackletter rule that leads careful observers to conclude 
that the Restatement rejects such analysis is defective . . . .”). Even before I read their dueling essays, 
this point struck me as fairly obvious: after all, two of the three decisions cited in the accompanying 
Reporters’ notes had engaged in precisely such a comparison (before finding that the purportedly 
safer available alternatives failed to serve the needs of all classes of patients), though the third 
decision (and the only one finding a defective design) had not done so. See infra Part II.C.1. 
Moreover, an article published in 1994 had seen this type of RAD analysis as one possible 
interpretation. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 19, at 1383 (doubting, however, that the Reporters had 
intended such a broad reading of the proposed standard that eventually became section 6(c)). 
 22 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 19, at 158. This led one persistent critic to assail 
their “endorsement of custom” as satisfying the industry’s standard of care. See Conk, supra note 21, 
at 746; see also id. at 746-49; id. at 751 (objecting to section 6(c)’s “cramped approach” to design 
defects); id. at 753-54 (arguing that a malpractice-inspired “lower standard is inconsistent with the 
thrust of modern products liability law”); id. at 755 (“The new Restatement’s lax standard for 
prescription drug and medical device design liability requires less than reasonable care.”). Mr. Conk 
preferred a test allowing a plaintiff to base a design defect claim on expert testimony that a 
“postulated alternative has a reasonably good chance of withstanding FDA review.” Id. at 761. 
 23 Commentators who worry about this approach leave me perplexed. See, e.g., 
Schwartz, supra note 19, at 1382 (“Clearly, medical practice should not be the basis for determining 
the safety of pharmaceutical products.”). Clearly, she would prefer that juries make these judgments 
without taking any cue from medical professionals (or regulatory officials)! See id. at 1383 (“[I]t 
would seem more straightforward and less confusing to ask [the fact finder] whether a reasonable 
manufacturer . . . would have put the product on the market. This approach, at least, would reduce 
the risk of the medical custom becoming the liability standard for design claims.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 24 If the labeling fails to fully inform physicians, then the plaintiff will have an 
inadequate warning claim. See Henderson, supra note 19, at 493 (“[M]assive misprescription of 
drugs and medical devices almost certainly must be caused by defendants’ providing inadequate 
warnings to medical care providers.”); see also id. at 483 (arguing that, under such circumstances, 
there should be “joint responsibility of the prescribing physicians, for misprescribing obsolete drugs, 
and of the drug industry for continuing to promote the prescription and consumption of such drugs”). 
Allowing a design defect claim under this standard would serve no independent purpose. See id. at 
493 (challenging critics “to try to compose a list of reported decisions in which defective design is 
the only basis for liability, not undercut by failure to warn”); see also Henderson & Twerski, supra 
note 19, at 171; cf. Neade v. Portes, 739 N.E.2d 496, 500-03 (Ill. 2000) (dismissing claims for 
breach of fiduciary duty as duplicative of malpractice claims). 
 25 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(c) cmt. f (1998) (“That some 
individual providers do, in fact, prescribe defendant’s product does not in itself suffice to defeat the 
plaintiff’s claim. Evidence regarding the actual conduct of health-care providers, while relevant and 
admissible, is not necessarily controlling.”). Thus, the mere fact of widespread (and perhaps 
misinformed usage) would not defeat testimony from an expert for the plaintiff that these patterns 
reflected irrational prescribing. Cf. Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Role of the Jury in Modern Malpractice 
Law, 87 IOWA L. REV. 909, 912-21 (2002) (describing the shift away from a custom-based standard 
of care); id. at 958-61, 966-69 (applauding the movement to a reasonable physician standard). See 
generally Symposium, Empirical Approaches to Proving the Standard of Care in Medical 
Malpractice Cases, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 663 (2002). 
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unattainable ideal.26 In cases involving genuinely—and, if properly 
labeled, unabashedly—worthless and dangerous drugs,27 plaintiffs should 
have no particular difficulty finding qualified experts willing to testify 
that no reasonable physician would have used such a drug in any class of 
patients,28 which, apart from a malpractice claim against the prescribing 
physician, would provide the basis for a design defect claim unless the 
manufacturer nonetheless managed to identify such a class.29 
  
 26 See Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of 
Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 376, 381-84, 391-95, 402-06, 421-
22, 432-33, 438-40, 465 (2002); see also Karen E. Lasser et al., Adherence to Black Box Warnings 
for Prescription Medications in Outpatients, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 338, 342 (2006); 
Andrea Petersen, How Drug Alerts Trickle Down to Your Doctor: Amid Flurry of Red Flags About 
Serious Side Effects, Prescribing Turns Trickier, WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2004, at D4 (“[R]esearch 
underscores how difficult it is for doctors to stay on top of the mass of drug information, and decide 
how or whether to act. The number of drugs has exploded in recent years, so there are simply more 
side effects and potential drug-to-drug interactions to keep track of.”); Jonathan D. Rockoff, Doctors 
Buried by Drug Data; Volume of Advisors from the FDA Has Some Seeking Clarity from Private 
Sources, BALT. SUN, Apr. 7, 2006, at D1. 
 27 See Harvey L. Kaplan et al., Third Restatement: New Prescription for Makers of 
Drugs and Medical Devices, 61 DEF. COUNS. J. 64, 73 (1994); Aaron D. Twerski, From a Reporter’s 
Perspective: A Proposed Agenda, 10 TOURO L. REV. 5, 17-18 (1993) (explaining that in the case of 
drugs with “no social utility for even a discreet group of patients[,] . . . the manufacturer clearly 
would have a duty to warn that the drug simply does not function or does not have a particularly 
good use”). Of course, it seems entirely implausible that the labeling for an FDA-approved drug 
would ever contraindicate use in all potential classes of patients. 
 28 In recent years, and putting aside the regular condemnations from Ralph Nader’s 
associates, see, e.g., Marilyn Chase, Consumer Crusader Sidney Wolfe, M.D., Causes Pain to FDA, 
AMA and the Health Industry, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 1992, at A18, a number of prominent physicians 
have assailed drug approval decisions by the FDA, see, e.g., Diedtra Henderson, Watchdog Draws 
Growls in Return: Cardiologist-FDA Adviser Says His Goal Is Drug Safety; Critics Say He’s 
Bucking to Run Agency, BOSTON GLOBE, June 5, 2007, at C1 (discussing Dr. Steven Nissen from the 
Cleveland Clinic). Indeed, it has become increasingly fashionable to berate the FDA and the drug 
industry in the pages of leading medical journals. See, e.g., Eric J. Topol, Failing the Public 
Health—Rofecoxib, Merck, and the FDA, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1707 (2004); see also Linda A. 
Johnson, Doctors Fed up with Drugmakers’ Tactics, STAR-LEDGER (NEWARK), Sept. 11, 2008, at 
Bus.26 (“Just about every segment of the medical community is piling on the pharmaceutical 
industry these days . . . . Recent articles and editorials in major medical journals blast the industry.”); 
Karl Stark, JAMA Articles Say Merck Used Vioxx Ghostwriters, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 16, 2008, at 
C1 (describing a pair of articles published in the Journal of the American Medical Association that 
lambasted Merck’s research, adding, however, that “[s]everal of the JAMA authors had consulted for 
plaintiffs’ attorneys”). 
 29 See Madsen v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1034, 1037 (E.D. Mo. 
2007) (assuming that, because the Iowa Supreme Court previously had adopted Products Liability 
Restatement §§ 1-2, it would use section 6 to resolve informational and design defect claims against 
the manufacturer of fenfluramine and dexfenfluramine, and granting the defendant summary 
judgment on the design defect claim in light of uncontested testimony that some physicians would 
have continued prescribing these withdrawn diet drugs to some of their obese patients even after 
learning of the risk of valvular heart disease); Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915, 926 (Kan. 
1990) (“Although Pantopaque was preferred by some radiologists for limited situations, the 
testimony of the experts established that Amipaque, containing metrizamide, was the preferred 
contrast agent at the time of plaintiff’s myelogram. Later, preference for metrizamide was replaced 
by other water-soluble contrast agents.”); id. at 927 (“[T]he testimony of all the radiologists indicates 
that, although Pantopaque may be utilized for some limited situations, the preferred contrast agent at 
the time of plaintiff’s myelogram was Amipaque. Thus, Pantopaque was not an alternative product 
that would have as effectively accomplished the full and intended purpose of metrizamide.”); cf. Sita 
v. Danek Med., Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 245, 256 & n.9 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that a manufacturer of 
pedicle screws used in spinal fixation had compiled supportive testimony from 270 surgeons). 
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By asking what a reasonable physician would select, the test 
presumably did not mean fully-informed only about the risks and 
benefits of the particular drug; instead, it imagined an expert with 
knowledge about the peculiar needs of the patient as well as perspective 
about the entire range of (drug and non-drug) options available for 
treatment.30 Thus, section 6(c) has less to do with reasonable alternative 
designs than with the broader (though related) question of 
substitutability.31 Indeed, manufacturers might fare better under section 
2(b) in cases where fully-informed physicians would prefer a surgical 
procedure over a prescription product with a challenged but unalterable 
design.32 So far, however, courts generally have not embraced this new 
approach. 
After noting that no precedent existed to support what it called 
the “reasonable physician test” for judging design defect claims, the 
Nebraska Supreme Court offered a number of reasons for rejecting 
section 6(c) based on criticisms that had appeared in the academic 
literature: it is difficult to apply (and premised on a misapprehension of 
what influences prescribing decisions), unjustifiably protects less 
essential drugs (including merely “cosmetic” drugs such as Accutane®), 
and would deny plaintiffs recovery even in cases where a RAD existed.33 
In 2003, an intermediate appellate court in Georgia likewise rejected the 
approach endorsed by the Products Liability Restatement: 
[Section] 6(c) has been criticized for its failure to reflect existing case law, its 
lack of flexibility with regard to drugs involving differing benefits and risks, its 
unprecedented application of a reasonable physician standard, and the fact that 
a consumer’s claim could easily be defeated by expert opinion that the drug had 
  
 30 See James A. Henderson, Jr. & John A. Siliciano, Universal Health Care and the 
Continued Reliance on Custom in Determining Medical Malpractice, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1382, 
1390 & n.32 (1994) (noting the proliferation of therapeutic options); Amy L. Wax, Technology 
Assessment and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 82 VA. L. REV. 1641, 1651 (1996). 
 31 On the difficulties in defining substitutability (and how that concept differs from the 
idea of a safer alternative design), see Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Defining the Boundaries of “Alternative 
Design” Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: The Nature and Role of Substitute Products in 
Design Defect Analysis, 63 TENN. L. REV. 329 (1996). 
 32 See Violette v. Smith & Nephew Dyonics, Inc., 62 F.3d 8, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(upholding a jury verdict that found an endoscopic device intended for the treatment of carpal tunnel 
syndrome defectively designed because a clearly safer surgical procedure existed); Hill v. Searle 
Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1069-70 (8th Cir. 1989) (rejecting comment k defense for intrauterine device 
(IUD) because safer non-IUD options existed to achieve contraception); see also Lars Noah, Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated Biomedical Innovation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 
603, 648 (2003) (suggesting that a “plaintiff might argue that—in light of the current state of the 
art—the older fertility drugs are defectively designed insofar as the risk of multifetal pregnancy now 
outweighs their limited benefits when compared with alternative, safer ARTs” including procedures 
such as in vitro fertilization). 
 33 See Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 839-40 (Neb. 2000); see 
also id. at 840 (instead applying the consumer expectations test, but allowing the manufacturer to 
respond by reference to risk-utility factors). Separately, and after an even more conclusory analysis, 
the court also rejected section 9 (relating to non-fraudulent misrepresentation), see id. at 844-45, but 
it adopted section 6(d) (the learned intermediary rule for defining the scope of the duty to warn for 
prescription products), see id. at 842, which is discussed more fully below in Part III. For more on 
the drug Accutane, see infra Part II.C.5. 
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some use for someone, despite potentially harmful effects on a large class of 
individuals.34 
The track record in medical device cases looks about the same so far.35 
To be sure, the older case law provided little direct support for 
the standard announced in section 6(c). Even so, as elaborated in the 
sections that follow, the substantive objections do not withstand close 
scrutiny: courts can manage any asserted difficulties (which seem no 
greater than problems one might encounter, for example, in resolving 
medical malpractice claims); adequately labeled prescription products 
leave contested questions of utility in the proper hands (namely, 
physicians and patients rather than judges and jurors); and, given 
unpredictable variability in patient response, it makes no sense to say that 
a RAD exists for a drug if a fully-informed health care professional 
would select it for some patients. In fact, if section 6(c) suffers from any 
flaws, I argue below that it may offer incomplete protection against 
inappropriate claims of defective design. 
1. MUDs and Child’s Play 
Section 6(c) shares important similarities with another 
contentious pocket of design defect scrutiny. Although elsewhere the 
Products Liability Restatement rejected the proposition that some types 
of products (e.g., cigarettes and handguns) may create such a high risk of 
injury and have so little social utility that they should be regarded as 
defective even without proof of a RAD,36 the Reporters conceded that 
some products, such as toy guns that shoot hard rubber pellets, may 
suffer from a “manifestly unreasonable” design (MUD) if courts defined 
the relevant product category (and substitutes) too narrowly.37 In short, if 
  
 34 Bryant v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723, 727 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); see also 
id. at 728 (instead adopting comment k as an affirmative defense); id. at 730 (concluding that the 
manufacturer had failed to establish that the drug’s utility outweighed its risks); cf. id. at 731-34 
(Andrews, J., concurring) (advocating adoption of section 6(c)). If the court had decided otherwise, 
one wonders how the standard might have operated in that case because the drug was withdrawn less 
than one year after approval: Posicor® (mibefradil), a calcium channel blocker (used to treat angina 
and hypertension), caused serious interactions with several other commonly prescribed drugs 
(including beta blockers, another class of antihypertensives) though seemed to be relatively safe and 
effective when reserved for patients not taking other drugs. See Robert Langreth, Recall of a Popular 
Roche Drug Raises Questions on Testing, Approval Process, WALL ST. J., June 10, 1998, at B16. It 
sounds to me like a failure-to-warn claim at most. 
 35 See infra notes 326-28 and accompanying text. 
 36 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d (1998). For proponents 
of such a view, see Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The Struggle at the Center of Products 
Liability, 60 MO. L. REV. 1, 59 (1995); Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in Their Eyes: Product 
Category Liability and Alternative Feasible Designs in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 
1429 (1994). See generally Symposium, Generic Products Liability, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1 (1996). 
 37 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. e (1998) (“The court 
would declare the product design to be defective and not reasonably safe because the extremely high 
degree of danger posed by its use or consumption so substantially outweighs its negligible social 
utility that no rational, reasonable person, fully aware of the relevant facts, would choose to use, or 
to allow children to use, the product.”); see also Michael J. Tõke, Note, Categorical Liability for 
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no parent in their right mind would purchase such a product, then a jury 
could conclude that the manufacturer should not have made it available 
in the first place (in effect, to protect children against the foolishness of 
their parents and their own lack of judgment).38 
Because prescription drugs often represent a class onto 
themselves without clear substitutes,39 and because their purchase 
requires assent from a person more sophisticated than the end user, 
section 6(c) created a similar standard for judging design defects.40 
  
Manifestly Unreasonable Designs: Why the Comment d Caveat Should Be Removed from the 
Restatement (Third), 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1201-02 (1996) (describing this concession as a 
response to objections lodged by members of the plaintiffs’ bar); id. at 1222-24 (warning that this 
exception to the design defect standard might swallow the rule). 
 38 See Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,727-28 (Oct. 31, 
1979) (“An example [of a case where liability should attach even without a RAD] is a product seller 
who markets a toy that is highly dangerous to children.”); see also Metzgar v. Playskool Inc., 30 
F.3d 459, 462-65 & n.6 (3d Cir. 1994) (allowing a design defect claim where a toddler choked on a 
small toy). See generally April A. Caso, Note, Unreasonably Dangerous Products from a Child’s 
Perspective: A Proposal for a Reasonable Child Consumer Expectation Test, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 433 
(1989); Sonja A. Soehnel, Annotation, Products Liability: Toys and Games, 95 A.L.R.3d 390 (1979 
& Supp. 2008). I want to thank my newborn daughter Sigrid for inspiring this line of thought. 
 39 See Frank R. Lichtenberg & Tomas J. Philipson, The Dual Effects of Intellectual 
Property Regulations: Within—and Between—Patent Competition in the U.S. Pharmaceuticals 
Industry, 45 J.L. & ECON. 643, 651-52 (2002) (identifying “five levels of the drug classification 
hierarchy” in descending order of specificity: class, subclass, drug, subdrug, and drug product); id. at 
652 (“For economic purposes, subdrugs may be close but not perfect substitutes, but drug products 
within the same subdrug are certainly close to perfect substitutes.”); see also id. at 655 (“Drugs are a 
very useful product market to study in this respect because the disease categories in which so-called 
therapeutic competition occurs are relatively well defined compared to other markets.”); id. at 668-
71 tbl.A1 (listing more than 150 recognized classes). Only generic versions of brand-name drugs 
serve as true substitutes, but they raise entirely separate liability issues discussed below in Part IV.B. 
In the context of insurance coverage for drugs, debates have arisen about therapeutic interchange or 
substitutability. See Council on Ethical & Judicial Aff., AMA, Managed Care Cost Containment 
Involving Prescription Drugs, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 25, 25 (1998) (“The needs of specific patients 
may be ignored in this framework because approved drugs are selected on the basis of average 
patient outcome, not individual effectiveness.”); Donald P. Hay & Linda K. Hay, Diagnosing and 
Treating Depression in a Managed Care World, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 55, 57-58 (1998) (criticizing 
formularies for excluding new generations of costly antidepressant drugs that pose fewer risks for 
some patients); Milt Freudenheim, Not Quite What Doctor Ordered; Drug Substitutions Add to 
Discord over Managed Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1996, at D1. Antitrust issues also may turn on 
drug substitutability. See Eric L. Cramer & Daniel Berger, The Superiority of Direct Proof of 
Monopoly Power and Anticompetitive Effects in Antitrust Cases Involving Delayed Entry of Generic 
Drugs, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 81, 117-18, 126-34 (2004); id. at 129 (“[D]ifferent drug molecules within 
the same therapeutic class, despite possible therapeutic similarities, tend not to be close economic 
substitutes for purposes of defining relevant markets in delayed generic entry cases.”); id. at 113 
(conceding that a broader product market definition may be appropriate in merger cases); M. 
Howard Morse, Product Market Definition in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 633, 
639-40, 643-52, 659-70, 676 (2003). 
 40 See Conk, supra note 19, at 1102, 1118-19; Victor E. Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, A 
Prescription for Drug Liability and Regulation, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 135, 153-54 (2005) (suggesting 
by way of illustration that the COX-2 inhibitors Vioxx® and Celebrex® “are each unique products, 
not alternative designs of each other”); id. at 154 n.137 (drawing a parallel to the MUD test); see 
also Green, supra note 19, at 227-28, 231; id. at 227 (noting “a certain irony” that section 6(c) 
“permits categorical liability (condemnation of a drug as not worthy of being on the market)” given 
the “pitched battle over categorical liability” with regard to other products). For a critique 
(purportedly grounded in “feminist theory”) that completely missed this parallel, see Dolly M. 
Trompeter, Comment, Sex, Drugs, and the Restatement (Third) of Torts, Section 6(c): Why 
Comment e Is the Answer to the Woman Question, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1139, 1151-52, 1171-76 
(1999) (advocating extension of the MUD standard to prescription products). 
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Although paternalism in medicine has acquired a bad reputation, patients 
seek out professional assistance precisely because they lack the expertise 
to make such choices unaided.41 The parallel to products that children 
may use also helps to explain other aspects of the special provisions 
governing design and informational defect claims involving prescription 
products.42 Similarly, section 2(b) imagines that the utility of some 
products may outweigh their risk only when used by a subset of potential 
consumers (e.g., adults or experts), which then requires that labeling 
define the appropriate subset.43 In short, rather than the “unprecedented” 
(even “radical”) new test assailed by critics, section 6(c) announces a 
blended standard drawn from entirely familiar tests for judging design 
defects in other contexts. 
  
 41 See Mark A. Hall, The Legal and Historical Foundations of Patients as Medical 
Consumers, 96 GEO. L.J. 583, 584-85, 596-97 (2008); Carl E. Schneider, After Autonomy, 41 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 411, 436-38 (2006) (explaining that many patients do not want to make decisions 
about their medical care); id. at 417-25, 432-36 (discussing the impossibility of truly informed 
consent); id. at 440 (concluding that “the central bioethical enterprise of confiding decisions to 
patients in some strong sense is doomed”); Jan Hoffman, Awash in Information: Patients Face a 
Lonely, Uncertain Road, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2005, § 1, at 1; see also Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda 
L. Emanuel, Four Models of the Physician-Patient Relationship, 267 JAMA 2221, 2226 (1992) 
(“Many have attacked physicians as paternalistic, urging the empowerment of patients to control 
their own care. . . . This model embodies a defective conception of patient autonomy, and it reduces 
the physician’s role to that of a technologist.”); id. (advocating instead a “deliberative” model). 
 42 See infra notes 194, 280-82 and accompanying text. Just as physicians choose 
treatments for use by their patients, parents must select products for their young children and then 
supervise the safe use of these products. Although the Reporters thought that the opportunity to 
engage in “differential marketing” (to ensure distribution only to appropriate users) was unique to 
prescription drugs and devices, see Henderson & Twerski, supra note 19, at 170-71, toys share 
similarities in this regard. If some toys (e.g., those with small pieces that can create a choking 
hazard) pose excessive dangers to one class of youngsters but not to another, then they must carry 
clear instructions and warnings (e.g., “not appropriate for children less than three years old”). See 
Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the “Right to Know” from the “Need to Know” 
About Consumer Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 333 (1994). In short, instructions and 
warnings directed to parents help to ensure that the right toys get to the right children. 
 43 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Tokai Corp., 2 S.W.3d 251, 260 (Tex. 1999) (“Products 
liability law does not force experienced carpenters to use only nail guns that are safe for the garage 
workshop. . . . To make such products safe for the least apt, and unintended, user would hold other 
users hostage to the lowest common denominator.”); see also Ruiz-Guzman v. Amvac Chem. Corp., 
7 P.3d 795, 796 n.2 (Wash. 2000) (noting that manufacturers of “restricted use” pesticides can only 
distribute these through licensed dealers for use by certified applicators); id. at 797 (explaining that 
the manufacturer of Phosdrin, an organophosphate pesticide, had created additional restrictions in 
advance of its proposed use in apple orchards); id. at 803-04 (extending § 402A comment k to such 
products, but only if their utility to society greatly outweighed their risks). See generally 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2, cmts. f-g, i & l (1998). In short, although risk 
will outweigh utility in many (e.g., inexpert) users, such a product would not fail the test for design 
defect simply because safer substitutes exist for most (but not all) uses. Instead, the issue becomes 
one of clear labeling and perhaps limited channels for marketing. Cf. Barnes v. Litton Indus. Prods., 
Inc., 555 F.2d 1184, 1185-88 & n.1 (4th Cir. 1977) (imposing a duty to warn against the misuse of a 
prescription product by laypersons even though the label had indicated “For Professional Dental Use 
Only”); infra Part II.D (discussing access restrictions). One critic of section 6(c) argued, however, 
that prescription products are not different from other consumer goods with designs that might 
appeal to one class of buyers while posing a risk of harm to another class. See Cupp, supra note 19, 
at 99-101 (discussing crashworthiness features of automobiles that particular users do not need and 
might prefer not to pay for); see also Green, supra note 19, at 215-16 (elaborating on this parallel). 
One difference, of course, lies in the fact that physicians control access to products in a way 
structured to help ensure that the right drugs get to the right patients. 
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Some commentators have criticized section 6(c) for insulating 
both lifesaving and lifestyle (read “trivial”) prescription products,44 but 
they make the same mistake as those who would call lawfully marketed 
products that appeal to some (wrong-headed?) consumers defectively 
designed even in the absence of a RAD (and in the face of an adequate 
warning).45 One central objection to the recognition of a broader form of 
“product category” liability is that it would allow courts to decide that 
lawfully marketed products should not be available to consumers. Of 
course, a jury verdict does not amount to an injunction against further 
sales of a product,46 and defenders of a more expansive standard of 
liability for design defects would say that it simply amounts to an 
obligation to pay for harm caused (and to spread those costs among all 
users who may derive utility from the product).47 If nothing else has 
  
 44 See, e.g., Richard L. Cupp, Jr., The Continuing Search for Proper Perspective: Whose 
Reasonableness Should Be at Issue in a Prescription Product Design Defect Analysis?, 30 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 233, 252-54 (1999) (focusing on “cosmetic” uses such as treating baldness); id. at 257 
(“[W]hen seeking to structure some well-deserved protection for extremely useful drugs, courts 
should note that prescription products are not all created equal, and that uses of prescription products 
are not all created equal.”); see also Green, supra note 19, at 214 (“[T]he vast majority of new drugs 
provide little therapeutic advantage. . . . Rogaine may be near and dear to the hearts of some, but it is 
not the social-welfare equivalent of antibiotics.”); infra note 343 (citing commentators who object to 
special protections for cosmetic devices such as silicone-gel breast implants). In contrast, as one 
commentator argued, “it is unexplained why such useful products as microchips, personal 
computers, telephones, trains, planes, and automobiles should always come in second to medical 
products in the calculus of social good.” Conk, supra note 19, at 1127 (“[W]hy should things that we 
hope will bring us pleasure be subject to a more stringent standard of products liability than products 
that we hope will restore or maintain our health?”). For more on the lifestyle drug point, see infra 
notes 105-19 and accompanying text. 
 45 See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products 
Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263 (1991); Tõke, 
supra note 37, at 1205-24. Of course, for those who criticize the MUD standard as anemic and 
would prefer a broader form of product category liability, see supra note 36, restricting design defect 
scrutiny for prescription products would have to find justification elsewhere. For the record, I have 
expressed similar qualms about agencies reaching beyond the limits of their delegated authority in 
pursuit of well-intentioned public health crusades. See Lars Noah, Regulating Cigarettes: 
(Non)sense and Sensibility, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J. 677, 689-90 (1998); see also Lars Noah, Interpreting 
Agency Enabling Acts: Misplaced Metaphors in Administrative Law, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1463, 1476-80, 1488, 1529-30 (2000). 
 46 Cf. In re Paxil Litig., No. CV 01-07937 MRP, 2002 WL 31375497, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 
2002) (declining to issue a preliminary injunction in a class action lawsuit brought on behalf of users 
of an antidepressant who requested an order barring the manufacturer from claiming in television ads 
that the drug was not habit-forming); Bernhardt v. Pfizer, Inc., 2000 WL 1738645, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000) (refusing to issue an injunction ordering a drug manufacturer to notify physicians and patients 
about the results of a study finding that its antihypertensive agent worked less well than diuretics 
because this presented an issue for the FDA to resolve). 
 47 See, e.g., Conk, supra note 21, at 783. A few commentators have gone still further, 
disputing the proposition that prescription pharmaceuticals differ fundamentally from other products 
and favoring the imposition of tort liability even on such high utility products (and even for entirely 
unknowable risks), which would mean a rule of absolute liability on sellers of all consumer products, 
dispensing with any need to establish a defect (though retaining a comparative negligence defense 
for instances of consumer misuse). See Barry R. Furrow, Enterprise Liability for Bad Outcomes from 
Drug Therapy: The Doctor, the Hospital, the Pharmacy, and the Drug Firm, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 377, 
415-33 (1996) (emphasizing both compensatory and deterrence rationales); Elizabeth C. Price, 
Toward a Unified Theory of Products Liability: Reviving the Causative Concept of Legal Fault, 61 
TENN. L. REV. 1277, 1329-37, 1353-55 (1994); Ellen Wertheimer, Unavoidably Unsafe Products: A 
Modest Proposal, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 189, 217 (1996) (emphasizing fairness and cost-spreading 
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emerged from the otherwise confused preemption jurisprudence of the 
last fifteen years, however, the Supreme Court has left little doubt about 
the potential regulatory effect of tort judgments.48 
A conclusion that a prescription drug has a design defect may 
well amount to a command that would deprive other patients of access to 
the product.49 If a manufacturer has provided an adequate warning to the 
health care providers responsible for selecting an intervention for a 
particular patient, a jury generally would have no basis for deciding that 
a drug had no legitimate use in any class of patients, even if a physician 
may have erred in selecting it for the plaintiff.50 As it did in recognizing 
MUDs in only the narrowest of circumstances, the Products Liability 
Restatement crafted a design defect standard for prescription products to 
guard against the risk of such judicial tunnel-vision.51 
When risks come to light after approval, some courts have 
allowed design defect claims framed by asking whether a reasonable 
  
rationales); id. at 200-06 (discussing vaccines); id. at 207 n.58 (prescription drugs); id. at 197 n.29 
(unknowable risks). 
 48 See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1007-10 (2008); Buckman Co. v. 
Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347-53 (2001) (holding that fraud-on-the-FDA claim 
involving medical device review was impliedly preempted); see also R.F. v. Abbott Labs., 745 A.2d 
1174, 1192-94 (N.J. 2000); Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human 
Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934-36 (Jan. 24, 2006) (codified at 
21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, 601) (announcing administrative preemption of failure-to-warn claims 
involving Rx drugs); Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit of Symmetry in 
Products Liability, 88 GEO. L.J. 2147, 2159 (2000); cf. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) 
(rejecting an implied preemption defense to a claim that the manufacturer of a prescription drug 
failed to supply an adequate warning, but failing to foreclose altogether the possibility that such a 
tort claim might conflict with a more clearly expressed FDA labeling requirement). 
 49 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 19, at 169 n.78. 
 50 Cf. Swayze v. McNeil Labs., Inc., 807 F.2d 464, 468, 471-72 (5th Cir. 1987) (rejecting 
the plaintiff’s claim that, if the manufacturer could not reduce the risk that health care professionals 
would act negligently and administer excessive doses of fentanyl, it should have withdrawn the drug 
from the market). In fact, when enhanced warnings fail to alter dangerous prescribing behavior (as 
happens far too often), pharmaceutical manufacturers may withdraw from the market products that 
continue to have legitimate uses. See Noah, supra note 26, at 438-40; see also Karen E. Lasser et al., 
Timing of New Black Box Warnings and Withdrawals for Prescription Medications, 287 JAMA 
2215 (2002) (explaining that the use of such warnings may not save a drug from eventual 
withdrawal). 
 51 See Henderson, supra note 19, at 493-94 (explaining that, “if a drug truly is the only 
one that can help a class of patients who otherwise are going to suffer serious medical injury, it 
would be unacceptable to deny them the drug just because doctors are misprescribing it to patients 
who should not be taking it,” and calling this a matter “of interpersonal fairness”); Henderson & 
Twerski, supra note 19, at 152-53 (defending their “refusal to sacrifice the welfare of one class of 
patients to enhance the welfare of another”); Noah, supra note 48, at 2163; Winchester, supra note 
19, at 657 (“One could easily imagine that a jury, faced with the tragic facts of the case before it, 
could be convinced that the act of marketing an injury-causing drug was inherently unreasonable, 
simply because the drug did indeed cause the injury its maker knew would occur in a certain 
percentage of the people who took it.”); see also Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L. 
REV. 1601, 1609, 1656-57 (2001). In this sense, we have the book-end to the longstanding idea that 
strict liability focuses on the nature of the product rather than the conduct of the seller (see Barker v. 
Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 447 (Cal. 1978); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 1 
cmt. a (1998)): it makes no more sense to say that a product was defectively designed for this 
particular user. Cf. Simeon v. Doe, 618 So. 2d 848, 851 (La. 1993) (suggesting that, in allergic 
reaction cases, the “‘defect’ is really found in the person rather than the product”). 
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drug manufacturer would have continued selling the product.52 A few 
critics of section 6(c) have expressed a preference for this standard,53 in 
part out of a concern that physicians often continue prescribing obsolete 
drugs because the FDA can withdraw a product only under the rarest of 
circumstances.54 This represents a serious misapprehension of the 
relevant legislation and agency practice. The statutory provision that they 
cite relates only to the power to withdraw a license summarily,55 while 
the immediately preceding clause of that subsection broadly authorizes 
withdrawal on any of a number of grounds but entitles the license holder 
to a hearing.56 Moreover, the FDA has the leverage to order nominally 
“voluntary” withdrawals, thereby avoiding the need to abide by any 
procedural niceties,57 and it has done so recently to remove prescription 
drugs once safer substitutes became available.58 
  
 52 See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 385 (N.J. 1984); see also Tobin v. 
Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528, 536-37, 540 (6th Cir. 1993) (same, but not involving 
postapproval discovery of risks). 
 53 See, e.g., Conk, supra note 19, at 1119-27; id. at 1126 (“Harm preventable by 
reasonable care or by reliance on practical, feasible, and available alternative designs is not 
‘unavoidable,’ and manufacturers should be held responsible for failing to prevent such harms.”); 
Conk, supra note 21, at 752 (“[T]he designer-manufacturer is in a position to make choices from a 
superior vantage point.”); id. at 761, 787-88; Cupp, supra note 44, at 241 (“The reasonable 
manufacturer test utilizes a broader perspective and is flexible enough to recognize that, even if there 
is a class of persons for whom the drug is acceptable when taken as designed, the manufacturer still 
might be unreasonable in marketing the drug if its social costs outweigh its benefits.”); id. at 257 
(“The broad perspective of the reasonable manufacturer test is needed to provide at least some tort 
accountability for defective prescription-product designs.”); Teresa Moran Schwartz, The Impact of 
the New Products Liability Restatement on Prescription Products, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 399, 409 
(1995); id. at 407 (calling an earlier version of section 6(c) “a kind of ‘super’ negligence standard 
that imposes liability only where . . . the drug or device should not have been on the market at all”); 
Winchester, supra note 19, at 663, 670-88, 693; see also Green, supra note 19, at 224-32 (agreeing 
with section 6(c)’s prohibition on “interdrug” risk-utility comparisons, but concluding that, “[t]o the 
extent that drugs can be manipulated to make them safer [e.g., changing combinations of ingredients 
or dosage], the case for an exemption from tort liability is hard to justify, even with FDA regulatory 
oversight”). Predicting the consequences of tweaking an existing drug product (to create a 
hypothesized superior version) may, however, pose greater difficulties than making comparisons 
among arguable therapeutic substitutes already approved for marketing. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 54 See Cupp, supra note 44, at 236 n.17 (“The inferior drug may continue to be 
prescribed because statutorily a drug may only be removed from the market when there is an 
‘imminent hazard to the public health.’” (citing Schwartz, supra note 19, at 1382)). 
 55 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (2006) (entitling the manufacturer to an “expedited hearing” 
after withdrawal); 21 C.F.R. § 2.5 (2008) (defining “imminent hazard”); see also Forsham v. 
Califano, 442 F. Supp. 203, 207-10 (D.D.C. 1977) (sustaining the FDA’s first and only attempted 
exercise of this authority). 
 56 See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 147, 150-51 (3d Cir. 1986). The agency 
may utilize a summary judgment procedure to deny hearing requests when it withdraws approval, 
see Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609, 620-22 (1973), and reviewing 
courts show tremendous deference to the FDA, see Schering Corp. v. FDA, 51 F.3d 390, 399-400 
(3d Cir. 1995). 
 57 See Lars Noah, The Little Agency That Could (Act with Indifference to Constitutional 
and Statutory Strictures), 93 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 906-10 & n.40, 913-14 & n.73 (2008). 
 58 See, e.g., Denise Grady, Doctors Call for Caution on Two More Diabetes Drugs, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 20, 2000, at A10 (Rezulin®); Gardiner Harris, Studies Lead to Withdrawal of Drug for 
Bowel Ailment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2007, at A12 (Zelnorm®); Parkinson’s Drug Pulled off the 
Market, WASH. POST, Mar. 30, 2007, at A8 (reporting that the FDA requested the withdrawal of 
pergolide, a dopamine agonist, because it had been associated with heart valve damage since 2002 
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Although a reasonable manufacturer test sounds like the other 
side of the same coin as the reasonable physician test,59 it may not 
provide a suitable safeguard for patient welfare. On the one hand, some 
manufacturers may persist in marketing drugs past the point of genuine 
obsolescence;60 on the other hand, overly conscientious pharmaceutical 
manufacturers may remove drugs from the marketplace even though 
reasonable physicians would have continued prescribing them for a 
subset of patients.61 Once serious risks with an approved drug become 
  
and “[t]here are other drugs in the same class that can be substituted”); see also Conk, supra note 21, 
at 754 (“The FDA may . . . withdraw permission to market because a new drug comes on the market 
that is of superior safety.”). 
 59 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 Reporters’ Note, cmt. f 
(1998) (“[W]hen a drug or device provides no net benefits to any ascertainable patient class—when 
reasonably informed medical providers would not prescribe the drug and no reasonable, informed 
manufacturer would place it on the market—then the product design is defective and the 
manufacturer should be liable for the harm caused by selling it.” (emphasis added)). But cf. Ray v. 
BIC Corp., 925 S.W.2d 527, 530-31 (Tenn. 1996) (rejecting suggestions that the consumer 
expectation test and prudent manufacturer test of design defect represented two sides of the same 
coin). The Reporters subsequently explained that their choice of perspective “was made to objectify 
the test and to cleanse it from any sense of partisanship. Reasonable health-care providers have no 
stake whatsoever in whether a drug should remain on the market.” Henderson & Twerski, supra note 
19, at 155-56 n.18 (adding that use of a reasonable manufacturer standard typically would give 
plaintiffs less protection). 
 60 See, e.g., FDA, Notice, Sandoz Pharmaceuticals Corp.; Bromocriptine Mesylate 
(Parlodel) for the Prevention of Physiological Lactation; Opportunity for a Hearing on a Proposal to 
Withdraw Approval of the Indication, 59 Fed. Reg. 43,347, 43,348 (Aug. 23, 1994) (recounting the 
manufacturer’s decade-long pattern of resisting agency requests to modify labeling for the drug); see 
also id. at 43,351 (“In light of the limited benefit of using bromocriptine for the prevention of 
lactation, and the effectiveness and lack of serious adverse effects of conservative treatments such as 
. . . mild analgesics, the risk that bromocriptine may cause a serious adverse effect in a postpartum 
woman is unacceptable.”); cf. Glastetter v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 252 F.3d 986, 991 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(“The FDA’s 1994 decision that Parlodel can cause strokes is unreliable proof of medical causation 
in the present case because the FDA employs a reduced standard (vis-a-vis tort liability) for gauging 
causation when it decides to rescind drug approval.”). In the end, Sandoz did not request a hearing to 
challenge the agency’s proposal to withdraw this indication. See FDA, Notice, Sandoz 
Pharmaceuticals Corp.; Bromociptine Mesylate (Parlodel); Withdrawal of Approval of the Indication 
for the Prevention of Physiological Lactation, 60 Fed. Reg. 3404 (Jan. 17, 1995); see also Kuhn v. 
Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 14 P.3d 1170, 1174-75 (Kan. 2000) (summarizing the FDA’s negotiations 
with the manufacturer); Rick Weiss, Drug Will No Longer Be Sold to Stop Breast Milk, WASH. 
POST, Aug. 23, 1994, at F7 (explaining that emerging tort litigation and a petition filed by Public 
Citizen had prompted the FDA’s action and the manufacturer’s decision, noting one specialist’s 
complaint that the withdrawal represented “another victory of legal intimidation over sound medical 
judgment”). Parlodel continues to have appropriate uses in other classes of patients, including those 
with Parkinson’s disease, so it would not face design defect claims under section 6(c), though 
plaintiffs might well pursue informational defect claims. 
 61 See supra note 50. Some commentators point to the withdrawn analgesic Vioxx® 
(rofecoxib) as an example of a defectively designed drug. Although informational defect claims may 
well have merit in this case, it makes no sense to call the product defective in any other sense. See 
Richard A. Epstein, Regulatory Paternalism in the Market for Drugs: Lessons from Vioxx and 
Celebrex, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 741, 751-54 (2005); id. at 768 (“Vioxx is better in 
some circumstances and worse in others. The only case in which the FDA should urge the ban is 
when some other drug dominates Vioxx on all relevant dimensions.”); Marc Kaufman, FDA Panel 
Opens Door for Return of Vioxx: Many Advisers Urge New Restrictions on Painkillers, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 19, 2005, at A1; see also Stephanie Saul, Pfizer in $894 Million Drug Settlement, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2008, at B2 (Bextra and Celebrex). For the latest on this unfolding litigation, see 
Heather Won Tesoriero, Vioxx Rulings Raise Bar for Suits Against Drug Firms—Decisions by 
Courts in Texas, New Jersey Boost Merck’s Strategy in Liability Cases, WALL ST. J., May 30, 2008, 
at B1. 
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known, risk-averse firms may not see much countervailing revenue in 
continuing to serve a narrow patient population,62 and patients deprived 
of a drug from which they derived therapeutic benefits would have no 
claim for continued access.63 Thus, framing the question from the 
perspective (or through the lens) of a reasonable health care provider 
better guards against the twin dangers of tunnel-vision (risk-utility 
judged solely from a plaintiff’s perspective) and preference aggregation 
(risk-utility evaluated from a societal perspective),64 both of which might 
unduly sacrifice the needs of a minority of patients for whom the risk-
utility balance differs from either the particular victim or the norm. 
2. Snowflakes (and Cost-Consciousness) in Medical Practice 
Section 6(c) appropriately recognizes the variability in patient 
response and the inadvisability of considering a particular product design 
as the best choice for treating a condition in every case.65 When it comes 
to pharmaceutical interventions, one size does not fit all.66 The 
  
 62 See Henderson, supra note 19, at 487-88 (“[T]he manufacturer’s perspective may 
invite a more global, and inappropriate, netting out of costs and benefits over different classes of 
patients.”); cf. Lars Noah, Triage in the Nation’s Medicine Cabinet: The Puzzling Scarcity of 
Vaccines and Other Drugs, 54 S.C. L. REV. 741, 747, 751-53, 758-61 (2003) (making a similar point 
in connection with vaccines). In unusual cases, physicians have taken the lead in resisting FDA 
efforts to restrict the use of an approved drug. See, e.g., Bradley v. Weinberger, 483 F.2d 410, 411-
15 & n.1 (1st Cir. 1973) (oral hypoglycemics). 
 63 Courts have rejected such claims when brought by subjects enrolled in halted clinical 
trials of investigational drugs. See, e.g., Abney v. Amgen, Inc., 443 F.3d 540, 550-53 (6th Cir. 
2006); cf. Dahl v. HEM Pharm. Corp., 7 F.3d 1399, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that the 
plaintiffs had a contract claim entitling them to an additional one-year supply); Michael M. 
Grynbaum, Judge Orders Drug Maker to Provide Experimental Treatment to Terminally Ill 
Teenager, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2008, at C3. 
 64 Selecting the correct frame of reference can make a tremendous difference in avoiding 
simple mistakes. See, e.g., Lars Noah, An Inventory of Mathematical Blunders in Applying the Loss-
of-a-Chance Doctrine, 24 REV. LITIG. 369, 393-404 (2005) (arguing that courts resolving these 
medical malpractice claims should convert estimated reductions in the odds of survival into relative 
risk figures); cf. Marcantonio v. Moen, 937 A.2d 861, 875-76 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007) (citing this 
article but still entirely missing the point), rev’d, 959 A.2d 764, 776 (Md. 2008) (getting the result 
right but for the wrong reason by focusing only on the antecedent chance of survival); id. at 881-85 
(Meredith, J., dissenting) (getting it right). 
 65 See Green, supra note 19, at 230-31; Henderson & Twerski, supra note 19, at 168-72; 
id. at 180 (“To deny one group of patients a beneficial drug merely because adequately—warned 
physicians may misprescribe the same drug for another group of patients would be unfair and 
inefficient . . . .”); see also Williams v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 686 F. Supp. 573, 577 (W.D. La.) 
(“Rather than simply permitting juries to apply, haphazardly and case-by-case, the risk-utility test 
whenever harm results, the court must require, as a part of the plaintiff’s burden of producing 
evidence, an articulable basis for disregarding the FDA’s determination that the drug should be 
available.”), aff’d mem., 864 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1988); id. at 578 (“The consequences of the 
nonavailability of Tegretol for those patients who suffer serious seizures, which can be fatal if not 
controlled, but who cannot take other anticonvulsants [because they “do not respond to, or are 
endangered by, more conventional anticonvulsants”], would be grave indeed.”). 
 66 See John C. Ballin, Editorial, Who Makes the Therapeutic Decisions?, 242 JAMA 
2875, 2875 (1979) (“As every physician recognizes, a drug may be the agent of choice for the 
majority of patients, but it is not necessarily the best therapy for all patients. Individual 
pharmacologic responses and idiosyncracies require that a variety of similar agents be available.”); 
Benjamin Freedman et al., Placebo Orthodoxy in Clinical Research I: Empirical and 
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requirements of patients vary widely, depending on factors such as the 
nature of their symptoms, progression of the underlying disease, 
presence of any concurrent conditions or use of other medications, and 
sensitivity to (or tolerance of) specific side effects. For example, 
differences in metabolic patterns depending on age, gender, and ethnic 
background may indicate selection of a drug for some patients even if its 
risk-utility balance is less favorable for most other persons in the 
population.67 
Physicians frequently must try different medications at different 
dosages until they find the one that seems to work best in a particular 
patient, and they may have to try various combinations.68 In some cases, 
a patient proves to be refractory to the “drug of choice” but responds 
well to a second- or third-line (often more dangerous) therapeutic agent.69 
This may happen, for instance, when a patient encounters a resistant 
strain of a common infectious agent.70 These characteristics make 
pharmaceutical products fundamentally unlike most consumer goods, 
which anyone equipped with basic information could select and use 
successfully to achieve the product’s intended purpose. 
  
Methodological Myths, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 243, 247 (1996) (“To paraphrase Abraham Lincoln, 
when it comes to drugs, you can treat all of the people some of the time, and some of the people all 
of the time, but you cannot treat all of the people all of the time.”); see also id. (“Side-effects are 
found in some who take a drug, but not in others; and even when the side-effects in two patients are 
by objective measure equivalent, one may find those side-effects tolerable and the other not. 
Heterogeneity of response is, in short, an unavoidable fact about drugs and disease . . . .”); Scott 
Sasjack, Demanding Individually Safe Drugs Today: Overcoming the Cross-labeling Legal Hurdle 
to Pharmacogenomics, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 8 (2008) (“[E]fficacy rates for drugs used to treat 
most diseases typically range between 50% and 75%.”). Thus, the FDA does not seek to approve 
only the single “best” drug to treat a particular condition. See Einer Elhauge, The Limited Regulatory 
Potential of Medical Technology Assessment, 82 VA. L. REV. 1525, 1593 (1996); Maxwell J. 
Mehlman, Health Care Cost Containment and Medical Technology: A Critique of Waste Theory, 36 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 778, 787-88 (1986) (explaining that the FDA “has occasionally, albeit rarely, 
denied approval to market a drug on the basis that it was less safe or less effective than an alternative 
already on the market”). 
 67 See Grant R. Wilkinson, Drug Metabolism and Variability Among Patients in Drug 
Response, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2211, 2211 (2005); infra Part IV.D.2 (discussing 
pharmacogenomics); see also Mark A. Hall, The Defensive Effect of Medical Practice Policies in 
Malpractice Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1991, at 119, 144 (referring to the 
“snowflake” theory, which posits that no two patients are exactly alike). 
 68 See Leila Abboud, Drug Cocktails Hit Psychiatry, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2004, at D1 
(drawing a parallel to the treatment of cancer and HIV). 
 69 See Robert M. Temple, Commentary on “The Architecture of Government Regulation 
of Medical Products,” 82 VA. L. REV. 1877, 1888 (1996) (“In some cases, a relatively toxic drug 
will be identified as a ‘second-line,’ a drug to be used only in people who cannot tolerate, or do not 
respond to, safer agents.”); Chris Adams, Trial Judge: At FDA, Approving Cancer Treatments Can 
Be an Ordeal, WALL ST. J., Dec. 11, 2002, at A1 (reporting that, after initially rejecting Eloxatin® as 
a “first line” therapy for colorectal cancer patients because the manufacturer had not shown extended 
survival, the FDA approved the drug as a “second line” treatment based on a trial demonstrating 
tumor shrinkage in 9% of patients who had not responded to chemotherapy); Andrew Pollack, After 
a Long Struggle, Cancer Drug Wins Approval, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2003, at C1 (reporting that the 
FDA approved Velcade® for multiple myeloma patients who have relapsed after trying at least two 
other treatments). 
 70 See, e.g., Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Warns of Liver Failure After Antibiotic, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 30, 2006, at A14; see also Alexandra Calmy et al., Letter, First-line and Second-line 
Antiretroviral Therapy, 364 LANCET 329, 329 (2004). 
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In theory, of course, there always might be at least one 
hypothetical patient who does not tolerate or mysteriously fails to 
respond to every other alternative treatment in whom a reasonable 
physician—at a loss for any other ideas—would try a particular drug.71 
The Reporters had made it clear, however, that this possibility would not 
suffice to demonstrate the existence of a class of patients for whom 
physicians appropriately might select a drug.72 Labeling helps in this 
connection: indications (and contraindications) may specify those 
subpopulations of patients with a condition in whom use of the drug 
would (or would not) be appropriate.73 Occasionally after drug 
withdrawal, the FDA permits continued use by an even more narrowly 
defined class of patients.74 Finally, courts could take a cue from the 
FDA’s orphan drug regulations, which require that manufacturers 
identify a “medically plausible” subset of patients with a relatively 
  
 71 See, e.g., Denise Grady, A Daring Treatment, a Little Girl’s Survival, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 18, 2008, at F5 (describing the apparently successful use of Celebrex and thalidomide with 
low-dose chemotherapy in treating a child’s otherwise incurable brain tumor). Separately, a 
surprising number of physicians report prescribing obviously ineffective (and largely benign) drugs 
to treat nonserious conditions in certain kinds of patients. See Gardiner Harris, Study Finds Many 
Doctors Often Give Placebos, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2008, at A12. 
 72 See Henderson, supra note 19, at 477 (explaining that the test “refers to more than a 
single patient, although the number necessary to constitute a class is not specified” (footnote 
omitted)); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. f (1998) (“That some 
individual providers do, in fact, prescribe defendant’s product does not in itself suffice to defeat the 
plaintiff’s claim. Evidence regarding the actual conduct of health-care providers, while relevant and 
admissible, is not necessarily controlling.”). The “respectable minority” rule in medical malpractice 
poses similar difficulties. See Noah, supra note 26, at 458 & nn.382-83. 
 73 See Richardson v. Miller, 44 S.W.3d 1, 8 n.2, 16-17 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). When 
clinical trials produce equivocal results, sponsors may engage in statistical analyses designed to 
stratify the subject population in the hopes of identifying some subset in which the investigational 
product worked without causing unacceptable side effects. See Jennifer Kulynych, Will FDA 
Relinquish the “Gold Standard” for New Drug Approval? Redefining “Substantial Evidence” in the 
FDA Modernization Act of 1997, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 127, 141-43 (1999) (discussing “post hoc 
subgroup analysis” and the FDA’s reluctance to consider it as proof of effectiveness); Aldo P. 
Maggioni et al., FDA and CPMP Rulings on Subgroup Analyses, 107 CARDIOLOGY 97, 98-101 
(2007) (explaining that labeling may describe the results of such analyses); Salim Yusuf et al., 
Analysis and Interpretation of Treatment Effects in Subgroups of Patients in Randomized Clinical 
Trials, 266 JAMA 93, 94 (1991) (“[T]rials adequate for detecting an overall treatment effect cannot 
be expected to detect effects within even relatively large subgroups . . . .”). 
 74 See, e.g., Forsham v. Califano, 442 F. Supp. 203, 205 (D.D.C. 1977) (upholding the 
FDA’s decision to withdraw phenformin, but allowing continued distribution to the limited class of 
diabetic patients for whom this oral hypoglycemic drug offered a greater therapeutic benefit than any 
alternative treatments); see also David A. Kessler, Regulating the Prescribing of Human Drugs for 
Nonapproved Uses Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 15 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 693, 737 
(1978) (“Withdrawal of a drug that has value to a certain patient population because the drug may be 
misused by a larger population in effect imposes an unfair hardship on those patients who could use 
the drug safely and profitably.”); Francesca Lunzer Kritz, FDA to Weigh New Controls on 
Problematic Drugs: Lotronex Will Be First for Consideration by New Panel, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 
2002, at F1 (Propulsid®); Francesca Lunzer Kritz, Still Irritable, Still Waiting: After Return to 
Market, Lotronex Can Be Hard to Get, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2003, at F1; Andrew Pollack, F.D.A. 
Restricts Access to Cancer Drug, Citing Ineffectiveness, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2005, at C2 (reporting 
that patients who had benefitted from Iressa® could continue to use it and that the sponsor could 
continue enrolling subjects in clinical trials); Some Women Can Get Zelnorm Again, L.A. TIMES, 
July 28, 2007, at A13. 
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common condition if they seek the incentives available for products 
designed to treat “rare” diseases.75 
In contrast to the multi-factor test of section 2(b) of the Products 
Liability Restatement, section 6(c), with its inquiry limited to 
“therapeutic benefits” and using a physician-based frame of reference, 
may fail to protect legitimate design choices and prescribing decisions. 
In particular, it may undervalue matters of patient convenience, even 
though in practice this may have genuine public health consequences.76 
For instance, simplified dosing or delivery may improve patient 
compliance with prescribed treatment.77 Changes in dosage forms may, 
however, present trade-offs between safety, efficacy, and convenience. In 
the early 1970s, scientists found that oral contraceptives containing high 
doses of estrogen posed a greater risk of cerebral thrombosis, and, even 
though it now appears that lower-dose versions did not work quite as 
well,78 at the time it seemed that high-dose products offered no advantage 
in preventing pregnancy. Nonetheless, doctors sometimes prescribed the 
higher-dose versions to patients who suffered “break-through bleeding” 
when using the lower-dose products, a bothersome side effect that may 
  
 75 See 21 C.F.R. § 316.20(b)(6) (2008); see also Marlene E. Haffner, Orphan Products—
Ten Years Later and Then Some, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 593, 596-98 (1994) (discussing the “salami 
slicing” problem, and explaining that “characteristics of the therapy (e.g., toxicity that limits the use 
of a drug)” may provide the basis for a medically plausible subset of patients, for instance if there is 
a drug with a property that “limits its use in some way to certain individuals”). Instead, one 
commentator has looked to the orphan drug regulations for entirely different purposes. See Conk, 
supra note 19, at 1107 n.86 (suggesting that these rules contemplate that different manufacturers 
could design competing versions of the “same” drug). Regulations that define notions of sameness in 
functional terms (and for purposes of awarding market exclusivity for orphan indications to sponsors 
of drugs no longer protected by patent), in this or any number of other FDA-related contexts (e.g., 
paper NDAs and generic bioequivalence), tell us nothing about whether it makes sense to imagine 
redesigning an approved drug. 
 76 See Amy Dockster Marcus, The Real Drug Problem: Forgetting to Take Them, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 21, 2003, at D1; Andrew Pollack, Take Your Pills, All Your Pills; Drug Makers Nag 
Patients to Stay the Course, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006, at C1; cf. Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 
1064, 1070-71 (8th Cir. 1989) (distinguishing, in a contraceptive failure-to-warn case, between 
“convenience or cost” and “medical necessity”). 
 77 See Justin Gillis, FDA Approves Inhalable Insulin, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2006, at A1 
(explaining that the agency’s “decision confronts millions of Americans—diabetics make up 7 
percent of the population—with a complicated new strategic problem, requiring them to figure out 
how much long-range risk they’re willing to incur for the convenience, and possibly greater disease 
control, of using inhaled insulin”); Ranit Mishori, Special Delivery; Coming Soon: New Ways to 
Take Drugs, Without Needles or Pills, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 2005, at F1; Shankar Vedantam, 
Implants May Reshape Schizophrenia Treatment; New Techniques Raise Fears of Coercion, WASH. 
POST, Nov. 16, 2002, at A1 (reporting that long-acting antipsychotics delivered by injection could 
reduce problems with patient non-compliance); see also Mary Duffy, Patch Raises New Hope for 
Beating Depression, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2002, at F7 (explaining that alternatives to oral 
formulations avoid the digestive track, which may allow for lower dosages and fewer side effects). 
 78 See Anna Wilde Mathews, FDA Mulls Birth-Control Standards, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 
2007, at B5; see also Michael Mason, Pressing to Look Closer at Blood Clots and the Pill, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 13, 2007, at F5 (reporting that “third-generation” low-dose contraceptives also may 
pose heightened risks). 
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reduce patient compliance with daily dosing directions and, thereby, 
reduce effectiveness in practice.79 
Moreover, in judging the design of older prescription drugs, the 
reasonable physician standard (and section 6(c)’s emphasis on 
“therapeutic benefits”) might make manufacturers more vulnerable to 
defect claims than the risk-utility test that governs other consumer 
products and takes cost into account.80 Consider this the flipside of the 
more typical cost-related criticism of section 6(c),81 with a few 
commentators worrying that the sole supplier of a prescription drug 
would have no incentive (at least not mediated by the tort system) to 
adopt an even slightly more costly but much improved design insofar as 
reasonable physicians would have no choice but to continue demanding 
the cheaper and more dangerous product in the absence of substitutes.82 
Such a scenario would, of course, provide a golden opportunity for a 
competitor to enter this market.83 One commentator responded by 
  
 79 Courts typically, and I think inappropriately, left an analysis of this trade-off to juries. 
See Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 654-55 & n.4 (1st Cir. 1981); Ortho Pharm. Corp. 
v. Heath, 722 P.2d 410, 414-16 (Colo. 1986); Glassman v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 606 N.E.2d 338, 340-
41, 343 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). Nowadays some products halt the menstrual cycle altogether. See Shari 
Roan, Now, a Birth Control Bonanza, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 2006, at F1 (describing continuous 
dosing schedules and implants having the same effect); see also Anne Marie Chaker, Doctors Back 
off Birth-Control Patch, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2005, at D1 (reporting that the FDA has added a 
warning about elevated estrogen levels associated with a once-a-week transdermal product); Dawn 
Fallik, Experts: Patches + Heat = Danger, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 5, 2006, at A18 (describing some 
of the resulting litigation). 
 80 See, e.g., Banks v. ICI Am., Inc., 450 S.E.2d 671, 675 n.6 (Ga. 1994). If the reasonable 
physician standard governed design defect claims against automobile manufacturers, would vehicles 
that sacrificed some amount of passenger safety for greater affordability (or merely aesthetics) get 
driven from the marketplace? Cf. Linegar v. Armour of Am., Inc., 909 F.2d 1150, 1154 (8th Cir. 
1990) (“A manufacturer is not obliged to market only one version of a product, that being the very 
safest design possible. If that were so, automobile manufacturers could not offer consumers sports 
cars, convertibles, jeeps, or compact cars.”); id. at 1154-55 (explaining the lower cost and other 
utilities of less-protective bullet proof vests). 
 81 See Cupp, supra note 19, at 103 (“Failing to make a design alteration that would save 
the lives of ninety percent of a prescription product’s users but not affect the other ten percent would 
apparently be justified if the alternative design would raise the product’s price by one pe[n]ny.”). 
Putting aside the obvious implausibility of the one cent differential (and the assumption that 
competitors would not respond to such an obvious opportunity to capture a large share of this 
market), this hypothetical incorrectly assumes that one can predict that the redesign would not 
sacrifice any therapeutic utility to the ten percent of patients who benefit from the existing design. 
Cf. infra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing adverse consequences of attempts to reduce 
OxyContin’s abuse potential). Furthermore, as argued in the text, added expense may excuse a 
failure to adopt a safer alternative design under section 2(b) but play essentially no role under section 
6(c). 
 82 See, e.g., Dreier, supra note 19, at 261-62 (suggesting that the duty to test might take 
care of this problem); Winchester, supra note 19, at 686 (“[W]hat about the case in which there is 
only one drug available on the market for an identifiable group of patients, yet . . . the manufacturer 
had in fact determined how to make the product safer, but decided not to?”); id. at 685-88 
(suggesting that adoption of a reasonable manufacturer standard might obviate this problem). 
 83 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 19, at 179; infra note 85; see also Matt Richtel, 
Warding off Diseases, Many Vaccines at a Time, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2007, at H5 (describing “a 
broad renaissance in vaccine research and development”); Daniel Costello, Vaccine Industry Is 
Being Revived, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2007, at A1 (same). 
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emphasizing that the patent system creates barriers to entry,84 but those 
relate primarily to delayed price competition from generic (“knock off”) 
versions rather than genuinely safer alternative designs.85 
Imagine a new biotechnology drug that is safer and more 
effective in every type of patient with a certain condition, but it costs 
$50,000 annually as compared to $500 for the old standby;86 from a 
purely medical standpoint, no reasonable physician would prescribe the 
older product,87 at least not unless affordability got factored into the 
equation.88 With time, older medical technologies will fade from the 
  
 84 See Conk, supra note 21, at 757-61; id. at 787 (“The patent system’s limits on 
competitive development of safer and more effective designs makes the tort system’s functions of 
deterrence and compensation of particular importance in regard to the designs of drugs . . . .”). For a 
more detailed response to this point, see infra notes 176-81 and accompanying text. 
 85 See Lichtenberg & Philipson, supra note 39, at 644 (“A patent protects an innovator 
only from others who produce the same product, but it does not protect him from others who 
produce better products under new patents.”); id. at 651 (“[W]ithin-patent competition after patent 
expiration is from so-called generic manufacturers and between-patent competition is from so-called 
brand-name manufacturers engaging in therapeutic competition within a given disease class.”); id. at 
646-47 (“[C]reative destruction through between-patent competition accounts for at least as much 
erosion of innovator returns as within-patent competition caused by patent expiration, and often 
considerably more.”); Kevin Outterson, The Vanishing Public Domain: Antibiotic Resistance, 
Pharmaceutical Innovation and Intellectual Property Law, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 67, 95 n.159 (2005) 
(“Within a particular class, many drugs may reach the market, very frequently with different patent 
holders.”); id. at 95 n.162 (“The average time before a second member of a therapeutic class is 
marketed is about 1.2 years.”). 
 86 See Denise Gellene, New Cancer Drugs Are Driving up Cost of Care, L.A. TIMES, 
May 14, 2005, at C1 (reporting that the switch from standard chemotherapy agents to “targeted” 
drugs has, for instance, doubled the average life expectancy of patients with inoperable colon cancer 
(to 22 months), while treatment costs increased 500-fold (to $250,000)); Rachel Zimmerman, Drug 
Slows a Deadly Cancer, Study Finds, but Price Is Steep, WALL ST. J., June 16, 2005, at D2 
(reporting that Velcade®, a newly approved proteasome inhibitor that costs more than $45,000 for a 
nine month course of treatment, allowed multiple myeloma patients to live an average of three 
months longer than those given the standard treatment of dexamethasone, a generic corticosteroid 
that costs $170 and causes fewer serious side effects); see also Thomas H. Lee & Ezekiel J. 
Emanuel, Tier 4 Drugs and the Fraying of the Social Compact, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 333 (2008); 
Deborah Schrag, The Price Tag on Progress: Chemotherapy for Colorectal Cancer, 351 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 317 (2004); Marilyn Chase, Cancer Tab: Pricey Drugs Put Squeeze on Doctors, WALL ST. 
J., July 8, 2008, at A1. 
 87 Unlike some other industries (e.g., consumer electronics), technological advance in 
medicine brings with it increasing rather than declining costs. See David M. Kent et al., New and 
Dis-improved: On the Evaluation and Use of Less Effective, Less Expensive Medical Interventions, 
24 MED. DECISION MAKING 281, 282 (2004) (“Although lower quality, lower cost products are 
ubiquitous in most consumer markets, barriers remain for . . . cost-saving medical technologies.”); 
id. at 285 (“Clinical medicine is perhaps unique as a consumer market for the absence of innovations 
promoted for being less costly, albeit less effective, than the best standard.”). 
 88 Cf. Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915, 924 (Kan. 1990) (explaining that other 
courts included cost as a risk-utility factor in resolving pharmaceutical design defect claims); Peter 
D. Jacobson & C. John Rosenquist, The Use of Low-Osmolar Contrast Agents: Technological 
Change and Defensive Medicine, 21 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 243, 250-54 (1996); Laura Landro, 
The Informed Patient: Weighing Which Babies Get a Costly Drug—Small Numbers Who Benefit 
May Not Justify $6,000 Price of Preventive RSV Therapy, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16, 2008, at D1 
(Synagis®). Perhaps physicians would worry that some patients would not comply with a treatment 
regimen because of the expense. Cf. Cupp, supra note 44, at 237 (suggesting “that physicians are 
acting reasonably in prescribing the cheaper Proscar to the subclass planning to cut the pills to use 
safely for baldness”). For the most part, however, they know little about the prices of drugs or how 
these may impact their patients. See Michael E. Ernst et al., Prescription Medication Costs: A Study 
of Physician Familiarity, 9 ARCHIVES FAM. MED. 1002, 1004-06 (2000); Alex D. Federman, 
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scene, but manufacturers may persist in marketing them, especially if 
cost-conscious purchasers continue to demand “safe enough” 
prescription drugs.89 Section 6(c) appropriately discourages the continued 
marketing of genuinely obsolete prescription products that pose undue 
risks to patients when the FDA has not acted to withdraw these 
products,90 but it also should incorporate section 2(b)’s willingness to 
factor affordability and convenience into the equation. 
3. Myths About Designer (and “Lifestyle”) Drugs 
Section 6(c) recognizes that pharmaceuticals are not designed in 
the same sense as other consumer goods; instead, new drugs are 
discovered.91 The advent of new techniques of “rational drug design,”92 
which some commentators point to when disputing the supposed 
distinctiveness of pharmaceutical products,93 will not fundamentally 
change things anytime soon.94 A pharmaceutical manufacturer cannot 
  
Editorial, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: The Status of Doctor-Patient Communication About Health Care 
Costs, 164 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1723 (2004). 
 89 See supra note 39 (discussing restricted formularies); see also Scott Gottlieb, Op-Ed, 
Congress Wants to Restrict Drug Access, WALL ST. J., Jan. 20, 2009, at A15. Thus, an insurer might 
defend a policy that covered only generic drugs in the sense that it ensured payment for the state-of-
the-art as it had existed approximately one decade earlier (and as it still exists in many industrialized 
countries where price controls have slowed the introduction of expensive innovations). Cf. 
Outterson, supra note 85, at 73 (“Rich consumers pay for and receive the latest innovations (2005 
medicine), while the poor might well be satisfied with the less effective, but much less expensive, 
1991 all-generic pharmacopoeia.”); Daniel Yi, Savings Ahead in Generic Medicines: Patents Are 
Expiring on Four Big Brand Names, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 2006, at A1. 
 90 See Conk, supra note 21, at 749-50 (conceding that section 6(c) would impose liability 
on a prescription product if it “became obsolete as a result of other subsequently developed and 
approved drugs of superior safety and equivalent efficacy that have entered the market, without the 
challenged drug being removed from the marketplace” (footnote omitted)). For instance, the 
approval of recombinant growth hormone (rhGH) entirely displaced the form derived from cadavers, 
which suppliers had withdrawn after reports that it transmitted Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. See Lars 
Noah, Managing Biotechnology’s [R]evolution: Has Guarded Enthusiasm Become Benign Neglect?, 
11 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 21 (2006). 
 91 Even today, drug discovery depends to a large extent on dumb luck. See Thomas M. 
Burton, Flop Factor: By Learning from Failures, Lilly Keeps Drug Pipeline Full, WALL ST. J., Apr. 
21, 2004, at A1; Gina Kolata, Drugs That Deliver More Than Originally Promised, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 5, 1998, § 4, at 3; Peter Landers, Stalking Cholesterol: How One Scientist Intrigued by Molds 
Found First Statin, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9, 2006, at A1. 
 92 Green, supra note 19, at 200; see also Naomi Aoki, Inventing Designer Drugs: By 
Moving to Cambridge, Novartis Bets $4 Billion It Can Revamp the Science of the Pharmaceutical 
Industry, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 13, 2003, at D1; Denise Grady & Lawrence K. Altman, 
Experimental Drug May Fight SARS, Researchers Say, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2003, at A6. 
 93 See, e.g., Green, supra note 19, at 220; id. at 213 (conceding that this remains 
“generally more theoretical than contemporaneously real,” but predicting that it will become more 
significant in the future); see also Conk, supra note 19, at 1107 (arguing that a RAD-based standard 
“could prove increasingly useful as genetic engineering and microbiology advance and the range of 
design choices for pharmaceutical product designers becomes broader and less opaque”); Conk, 
supra note 21, at 756 (same). Advances in genetics may, instead, make pharmaceutical cases even 
more challenging to resolve under existing products liability doctrine. See infra Part IV.D.2. 
 94 See Peter Landers, Human Element: Drug Industry’s Big Push into Technology Falls 
Short, Wall St. J., Feb. 24, 2004, at A1 (reporting that combinatorial chemistry and high-throughput 
screening have not panned out); see also John Markoff, Herculean Device for Molecular Mysteries, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2008, at F2 (“Experimentation in the use of supercomputers to model molecular 
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market a theoretical redesign until it discovers this allegedly superior 
drug, subjects it to the full battery of preclinical and clinical testing over 
a period of several years, and then patiently waits for the FDA’s 
blessing.95 Hypothesized redesigns have unpredictable safety and 
efficacy profiles, which makes it impossible for an expert to predict 
whether it would pass muster with the FDA.96 
In some cases, a design defect may relate to the proportions of 
(or interactions between) ingredients used in a combination drug product 
rather than the design of the separately approved chemicals themselves.97 
  
interactions has been going on for more than a decade, but the field is still largely in its infancy.”). 
Even if improved genetic information and enhanced computing power allow for greater initial 
precision in the identification of promising agents, testing in animals and humans will have to 
continue for the foreseeable future. See Helen M. Berman & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Reflections on 
the Science and Law of Structural Biology, Genomics, and Drug Development, 53 UCLA L. REV. 
871, 883-86 (2006). 
 95 See Ackley v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 919 F.2d 397, 398-404 (6th Cir. 1990); id. at 401 
(“Without an FDA license to produce another design, Wyeth was legally prohibited from distributing 
either a fractionated cell or an acellular [pertussis] vaccine . . . .”); Pease v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 795 
F. Supp. 755, 757, 760 (D. Md. 1992) (explaining that the FDA did not approve an acellular version 
until 1991, and then only as a booster because of doubts about its effectiveness in infants); Jones v. 
Lederle Labs., 785 F. Supp. 1123, 1127-28 (E.D.N.Y.) (granting a JNOV to the manufacturer), aff’d, 
982 F.2d 63, 64 (2d Cir. 1992); White v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 533 N.E.2d 748, 753 (Ohio 1988) 
(describing evidence concerning the relative safety and effectiveness of alternative vaccine designs 
as “speculative at best”); see also Henderson & Twerski, supra note 19, at 175 (“[A]s long as 
marketing of such safer drugs requires FDA approval, in-court replication of the formal approval 
process will continue to exceed the limits of adjudication.”). But see Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 666 F. 
Supp. 1483, 1496-98 (D. Kan. 1987); Toner v. Lederle Labs., 732 P.2d 297, 308 (Idaho 1987). 
 96 See Stephanie Saul, Drug Makers Race to Cash in on Fight Against Fat, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 3, 2005, § 1, at 1; see also Robert J. Mayer, Editorial, Targeted Therapy for Advanced 
Colorectal Cancer—More Is Not Always Better, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 623 (2009) (describing 
entirely unexpected efficacy problems encountered when using a pair of approved drugs in 
combination). If any such experts actually existed, then they could make a killing in the stock 
market! Cf. John Russell, Which Way, FDA?: Is Lilly’s Promising Blood Thinner Effient Destined to 
Move Ahead with FDA Approval Next Week, or Could It Stall Because of Concerns over Its Health 
Risks?, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Sept. 21, 2008, at Bus. 1 (reporting disagreement among investment 
analysts, even after the completion of all testing, about the approval odds for prasugrel as the 
deadline neared for a final agency decision); Jeanne Whalen, FDA Setback for New Drug from 
Roche, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2008, at B10 (actrema). 
 97 See, e.g., Ezagui v. Dow Chem. Corp., 598 F.2d 727, 731-32 (2d Cir. 1979) (alleged 
defect related to the use of a different inactive ingredient that caused endotoxins to leak from the 
pertussis component of a combination vaccine); id. at 733-36 (finding sufficient evidence in the 
record to present a jury question); see also Green, supra note 19, at 211-12, 219 (using other 
illustrations to make these points). Along similar lines, consider the following hypothetical: 
Suppose the vaccine causes a mild auto-immune reaction—a rash that lasts for a week—
in one out of a million persons who take the vaccine. The side effect can be eliminated by 
changing one of the inert ingredients with which the vaccine is coated to another inert 
ingredient, no more expensive and equally adept at serving its purpose. The vaccine is 
defectively designed despite its enormous social utility. 
Michael D. Green, The Schizophrenia of Risk-Benefit Analysis in Design Defect Litigation, 48 
VAND. L. REV. 609, 619 (1995) (“Risk-benefit operates at the margin—the utility of the existing 
design compared to the alternative—not at the level of the entire product.”); see also Green, supra 
note 19, at 225 (“At the margin, we should always be willing to examine whether we can improve 
the overall benefit-to-risk ratio of a product.”). In support of the argument that design defects may 
relate to the relative portions of different active ingredients in combination drugs, critics often cite 
Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1981), but the claims against the manufacturer 
of the oral contraceptive at issue in that case had more to do with the risks and benefits of just one of 
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Design issues also may relate to fixed dosage levels.98 Even minor 
changes in formulation (e.g., different inactive ingredients) would, 
however, require the submission of a new drug approval (NDA) 
supplement to the FDA with supporting data to demonstrate 
bioavailability of the active ingredient.99 For instance, OxyContin® 
caused deaths among abusers who had managed to defeat the delayed-
release mechanism by crushing or dissolving the pills.100 After the filing 
of several lawsuits, the manufacturer announced plans to add an 
ingredient that could deactivate the oxycodone when crushed, but the 
changed formulation would have to await FDA approval.101 In fact, these 
reformulation efforts have encountered roadblocks.102 
Apart from laboring under misimpressions about the ease of 
redesigning prescription drugs, critics of efforts to constrain design 
defect scrutiny point out that pharmaceutical products do not all have 
equally high utility. In making product approval decisions, the FDA 
routinely struggles with such questions.103 Obviously, the agency will 
  
the active ingredients as compared to lower-dose versions used in competing products, see id. at 
654-55 & nn.1&4. 
 98 See Green, supra note 19, at 212-13; see also Suz Redfearn, Low-Dose Hormone 
Approved, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2003, at F1 (reporting that the manufacturer of Prempro® had 
responded to new risk information by securing approval for a lower-dose (and presumably safer) 
version, and noting a similar response many years earlier by sellers of oral contraceptives); Andrew 
Schneider, Banned Pesticide Allowed as Medicine: U.S. Bars Lindane, Except to Treat Lice, BALT. 
SUN, Aug. 14, 2006, at 1A (reporting that the FDA sought to limit the number of doses dispensed at 
a time). Changes in dosing instructions, however, relate more to questions of labeling than design. 
Cf. Abigail Zuger, Caution: That Dose May Be Too High, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2002, at F1 
(reporting that manufacturers often reduce recommended dosages in response to postapproval safety 
concerns).  
 99 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 (2008) (distinguishing—for purpose of requiring NDA 
supplements—between “major,” “moderate,” and “minor” changes); see also Mead Johnson Pharm. 
Group v. Bowen, 838 F.2d 1332, 1334-35 & n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (explaining that lower-level 
agency reviewers have the authority to approve NDA supplements but not NDAs). Perhaps 
hypothetical redesigns that would require only an NDA supplement (especially for changes that did 
not qualify as “major”) might provide fair game for design defect claims while those that would 
require the filing of a new (full blown) NDA should remain off limits. 
 100 See Barry Meier, U.S. Asks Painkiller Maker to Help Curb Wide Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 1, 2001, at A16. OxyContin is an extended-release formulation of oxycodone, a synthetic form 
of morphine effective in relieving severe or chronic pain such as that experienced by cancer patients. 
 101 See Lars Noah, Challenges in the Federal Regulation of Pain Management 
Technologies, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 55, 62 (2003) (discussing the use of naltrexone); see also 
Sandra Blakeslee, Drug Makers Hope to Kill the Kick in Pain Relief, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2004, at 
F1 (reporting that another approach involves adding a chemical irritant such as capsaicin). 
 102 See Andrew Pollack, Company Said to Develop Substitute for Painkiller, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 5, 2003, at C4; see also Marc Kaufman, Drug Firms Trying to Make Painkillers Less Abusable, 
WASH. POST, June 14, 2004, at A7 (reporting that “some combination drugs that might reduce the 
abuse potential of painkillers are also likely to reduce their effectiveness”). 
 103 See, e.g., E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Bowen, 870 F.2d 678, 681-86 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(upholding the FDA’s decision to withdraw approval of drugs where the agency found no “medical 
significance” to the use of antifungal ingredients intended to reduce candidal overgrowth after a 
course of antibiotics); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 147, 154-56 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that “‘effectiveness’ as used in the Act means only that the drug will 
have the effect the manufacturer claims for it,” and concluding that the demonstration of 
effectiveness must include evidence of a therapeutic level of action compared with placebo); see also 
Rob Stein, Medication Under a Microscope: Studies Raise Questions About Drugs’ Efficacy Against 
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tolerate substantial risks for drugs that may save lives,104 while products 
that treat minor conditions or offer only symptomatic relief will not get 
approved unless fairly benign.105 Between these two extremes lie difficult 
and increasingly contested judgments about the nature of the condition 
intended for treatment,106 as illustrated by recent debates over the use of 
psychotropic drugs,107 stimulants in children with behavioral disorders,108 
  
Disease, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2008, at A2. FDA regulations define “effectiveness” in terms of 
“clinically significant” outcomes. See 21 C.F.R. § 330.10(a)(4)(ii) (2008) (nonprescription drugs); 
id. § 601.25(d)(2) (biologics); id. § 860.7(e)(1) (devices). 
 104 See Temple, supra note 69, at 1888 (“For serious diseases, especially those poorly 
treated by available therapy, considerable toxicity is acceptable, and labeling is used to attempt to 
guide physicians in detecting and mitigating harm.”); Ron Winslow, What Makes a Drug Too Risky? 
There’s No Easy Answer, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2005, at B1. In reviewing high priority (potentially 
lifesaving) drugs, the agency has become more willing to accept “surrogate markers” for clinical 
endpoints. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.510, 601.41. For example, in the case of new cancer treatments, 
tumor shrinkage might substitute for evidence of extended survival times. See Anna Wilde Mathews, 
Are Long Trials Always Needed for New Drugs?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 2004, at B1; cf. Andrew 
Pollack, F.D.A. Restricts Access to Cancer Drug, Citing Ineffectiveness, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2005, 
at C2 (reporting that the FDA approved Iressa® for lung cancer based on a fairly small clinical trial 
that showed tumor shrinkage in 10% of patients who had not responded to chemotherapy but 
rescinded its approval two years later after the sponsor submitted postapproval clinical trials that 
showed no improvement in survival). 
 105 See Scott Allen, In Fat War, Doctors Have Few Weapons, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 1, 
2004, at A1 (reporting that, according to some critics, FDA reviewers “subject weight-loss drugs to 
tougher safety standards than other drugs because they do not regard obesity as a true disease”); 
Laura Johannes & Steve Stecklow, Dire Warnings About Obesity Rely on Slippery Statistic, WALL 
ST. J., Feb. 9, 1998, at B1 (“[T]he FDA’s bar for approving new drugs is lower for disease 
treatments than for other problems, such as baldness or skin wrinkles. The agency is less likely to 
approve a drug for a nondisease condition when it is shown to have serious side effects—such as 
those that diet drugs produce.”); see also Christopher Rowland, FDA Chief Looks to Speed Diabetes, 
Obesity Drugs, BOSTON GLOBE, June 4, 2003, at A1; Rob Stein, Is Obesity a Disease?: Insurance, 
Drug Access May Hinge on Answer, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2003, at A1. 
 106 See Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical Diagnosis as a Legal Construct, 50 
HASTINGS L.J. 241, 259-63, 290-92 (1999). Thus, commentators have criticized the drug industry for 
promoting the medicalization of normal or relatively minor conditions. See Ray Moynihan et al., 
Selling Sickness: The Pharmaceutical Industry and Disease Mongering, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 886 
(2002); Rob Stein, Marketing the Illness and the Cure? Drug Ads May Sell People on the Idea That 
They Are Sick, WASH. POST, May 30, 2006, at A3; Fiona Walsh, Glaxo Denies Pushing “Lifestyle” 
Treatments, GUARDIAN (LONDON), Apr. 28, 2006, at 28 (GSK “defended itself against accusations 
that it is turning healthy people into patients by ‘disease mongering’ and pushing ‘lifestyle’ 
treatments for little-known ailments [e.g., restless leg syndrome]. Studies published in a respected 
medical journal . . . accused the big pharmaceutical companies of ‘medicalising’ problems such as 
high cholesterol and sexual dysfunction.”); see also Marc Kaufman, Hormone Replacement Gets 
New Scrutiny: Finding of Increased Risks Prompts Federal Effort, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 2002, at 
A1 (reporting that “federal officials want to explore whether hormone therapies and their producers 
have encouraged women to believe menopause is a condition to be treated, rather than an inevitable 
and natural set of changes to be managed,” noting “the FDA’s discomfort with the way that hormone 
treatments have been widely presented as an antidote to menopause”). 
 107 See Colleen Cebuliak, Life as a Blonde: The Use of Prozac in the ‘90s, 33 ALTA. L. 
REV. 611 (1995) (discussing emotional enhancement and cosmetic pharmacology); Jeff Donn, Are 
We Taking Too Many Drugs?, NEWSDAY, Apr. 19, 2005, at B13 (“[T]he Centers for Disease Control 
voiced concern about huge off-label growth of antidepressants to treat such loosely defined 
syndromes as compulsion, panic or anxiety and PMS. Drug makers, doctors and patients have all 
been quick to medicate some conditions once accepted simply as part of the human condition.”); 
Shankar Vedantam, Drug Ads Hyping Anxiety Make Some Uneasy, WASH. POST, July 16, 2001, at 
A1 (describing the successful marketing of Paxil® (paroxetine), and noting that “pharmaceutical 
companies, traditionally in the business of finding new drugs for existing disorders, are increasingly 
in the business of seeking new disorders for existing drugs”); see also Lars Noah, Comfortably 
 
2009] RESTATING DRUG PRODUCTS LIABILITY 865 
the abortifacient drug Mifeprex® (mifepristone),109 and the vaccine 
Gardasil® (designed to prevent a sexually transmitted disease, human 
papillomavirus (HPV), linked to cervical cancer).110 
Some commentators would hold manufacturers of “lifestyle” 
drugs to a higher standard. One laundry list of such products included 
treatments for erectile dysfunction (ED), arthritis, obesity, and urinary 
incontinence,111 but it failed to explain the reasons for lumping these 
disparate drugs together: was it that they offered primarily symptomatic 
relief (or targeted a mere risk factor112) and required chronic use? Aside 
from problems of recreational abuse, are powerful analgesics properly 
dismissed as merely “lifestyle” drugs? Contraceptives sometimes get 
trivialized in this fashion.113 
  
Numb: Medicalizing (and Mitigating) Pain-and-Suffering Damages, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 431, 
463-64 (2009). 
 108 See Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Strengthens Warnings on Stimulants’ Risks, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 22, 2006, at A14; Shankar Vedantam, Debate over Drugs for ADHD Reignites: Long-Term 
Benefit for Children at Issue, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2009, at A1 (reporting that prescriptions for 
ADHD drugs have reached almost 40 million annually); see also Gardiner Harris, Use of 
Antipsychotics in Children Is Criticized, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2008, at A20. 
 109 See Lars Noah, A Miscarriage in the Drug Approval Process?: Mifepristone Embroils 
the FDA in Abortion Politics, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 571, 593 (2001) (“Some opponents have 
suggested that the agency might . . . recast mifepristone’s intended use in terminating pregnancy as a 
risk to the fetus rather than (or perhaps in addition to) a benefit to the mother, which might then 
justify summary withdrawal of the drug as an imminent hazard to public health.”); see also id. at 580 
(“[T]he clinical utility of a drug that can terminate pregnancy must lie in the fact that it provides a 
safer (or more convenient) alternative to a surgical abortion.”); id. at 581-82 (questioning the 
product’s eligibility for accelerated FDA approval as a treatment for “serious illness”). 
 110 See Charlotte J. Haug, Editorial, Human Papillomavirus Vaccination: Reasons for 
Caution, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 861, 861-62 (2008); Sylvia Law, Human Papillomavirus 
Vaccination, Private Choice, and Public Health, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1731, 1733-42, 1755-64 
(2008); see also Note, Toward a Twenty-first Century Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 121 HARV. L. 
REV. 1820, 1838-41 (2008) (suggesting a distinction, for purposes of evaluating the constitutionality 
of compulsory immunization programs, between “medically necessary” vaccines, which offer the 
only real means of protection against infectious diseases, and “practically necessary” vaccines that 
protect, for instance, against STDs (e.g., HPV and hepatitis B), which could be avoided through 
other means). 
 111 See Joseph Weber & Amy Barrett, The New Era of Lifestyle Drugs: Viagra and Other 
Blockbusters Are Transforming the $300 Billion Industry, BUS. WK., May 11, 1998, at 92; see also 
David Gilbert et al., Lifestyle Medicines, 321 BRIT. MED. J. 1341, 1342 (2000) (offering a similar 
list, and focusing on payment issues); Cindy Parks Thomas, Incentive-Based Formularies, 349 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 2186, 2188 (2003) (“Some insurers have created a fourth, ‘lifestyle,’ tier for more 
discretionary or ‘cosmetic’ drugs . . . .”). 
 112 What once qualified as mere risk factors may, over time, get recharacterized as 
diseases in their own right, as in the case of hypertension. See, e.g., Denise Grady, As Silent Killer 
Returns, Doctors Rethink Tactics to Lower Blood Pressure, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1998, at F1 
(reporting that “it is not known whether all drugs that lower blood pressure also protect against heart 
attack and stroke”). Thereupon, physicians began diagnosing patients with pre-hypertension. See 
Elizabeth Agnvall, Making Us (Nearly) Sick: A Majority of Americans Are Now Considered to Have 
at Least One “Pre-Disease” or “Borderline” Condition. Is This Any Way to Treat Us?, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 10, 2004, at F1; see also January W. Payne, Forever Pregnant—Guidelines: Treat Nearly 
All Women as Pre-Pregnant, WASH. POST, May 16, 2006, at F1. 
 113 See, e.g., Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1069-70 & n.9 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding 
that IUDs do not serve an “exceptional social need” in part because many alternative forms of 
contraception exist, including abstention); see also MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 
65, 69-70 (Mass. 1985) (emphasizing the elective nature of contraceptives). But see Kociemba v. 
G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 1305-06 (D. Minn. 1988) (disagreeing). Contraceptives may, 
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Even if not elevated to the vaunted status of a genuine “disease,” 
bothersome conditions (e.g., irritable bowel syndrome) and disfiguring 
ailments (e.g., cystic acne) undoubtedly have adverse effects on the 
sufferers’ quality of life, which can take an emotional and financial toll 
on them.114 If not unduly dangerous, the FDA does permit marketing of 
prescription products that presumably everyone would label as “lifestyle” 
drugs (e.g., wrinkle reducers),115 though even unmistakably cosmetic 
products such as Botox® may have secondary therapeutic uses.116 In the 
final analysis, all drugs are, to one degree or another, lifestyle drugs.117 
In theory, section 6(c)’s reference to “therapeutic benefits” and 
use of a physician-based standard might expose “lifestyle” drugs to 
unforgiving design defect scrutiny.118 Although it appears that the 
  
however, have unmistakable medical justifications, see Steven R. Bayer & Alan H. DeCherney, 
Clinical Manifestations and Treatment of Dysfunctional Uterine Bleeding, 269 JAMA 1823, 1826-
28 (1993), including for women in whom pregnancy would present dangers to themselves or their 
children (indeed, the labeling for prescription drugs that treat other conditions may insist that 
patients use contraceptives in order to guard against the risk of birth defects). 
 114 See, e.g., Denise Grady, F.D.A. Pulls a Drug, and Patients Despair, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
30, 2001, at F1 (reporting that those who favored withdrawing Lotronex® (alosetron), a drug 
indicated for use in patients with irritable bowel syndrome, had argued that its risks of severe 
constipation or ischemic colitis were unacceptable because it only treated a non-life-threatening 
condition, while the majority of patients on the drug who had suffered no serious side effects 
protested the withdrawal because the drug had helped them to cope with a condition that 
significantly interfered with their daily life activities). 
 115 See Natasha Singer, Injecting Silicone, and Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2006, at G1. 
 116 See Lisa Girion, Concern Raised on Botox Safety, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2008, at C1; 
Rhonda L. Rundle, Botox Use on Migraines Gains Support, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2008, at B3; 
Shankar Vedantam, Botox Appears to Ease Depression Symptoms, WASH. POST, May 21, 2006, at 
A9; see also Liz Kowalczyk, Doctors Seek a Viagra Variant for Lung Ailment, BOSTON GLOBE, 
Aug. 3, 2001, at A1 (reporting that physicians have used the ED drug sildenafil to treat pulmonary 
hypertension in infants); Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Cosmetic Saves a Cure for Sleeping Sickness, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at A1. 
 117 Cf. Anita Bernstein & Joseph Bernstein, An Information Prescription for Drug 
Regulation, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 569, 608-11 (2006) (conceding that “lifestyle” drugs lie along a 
continuum, though suggesting a distinction based on the exercise of patient choice). A similarly 
vague dividing line exists with regard to medical procedures, treating “elective” surgeries as non-
essential (or, at least, non-emergency). See FDA, General and Plastic Surgery Devices; Effective 
Date of Requirement for Premarket Approval of Silicone Inflatable Breast Prosthesis, 58 Fed. Reg. 
3436, 3439 (Jan. 8, 1993) (“Whether performed for reconstruction or augmentation purposes, breast 
implantation is a discretionary elective surgical procedure performed for its psychological 
benefits.”); see also Zalazar v. Vercimak, 633 N.E.2d 1223, 1225-27 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (adopting a 
subjective standard of decision causation for informed consent claims involving elective cosmetic 
surgery); Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 955 (1994) (proposing 
a heightened consent duty in the case of elective treatments); cf. Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 637 F. 
Supp. 1463, 1470-71 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (concluding that the degree of required risk disclosure is 
higher in the context of non-therapeutic research), aff’d, 829 F.2d 1340 (4th Cir. 1987). But see 
Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355, 359-61 (Iowa 1987) (declining to draw 
such a distinction). Even so, unmistakably lifesaving procedures technically also should qualify as 
elective insofar as respect for autonomy means that patients have a right to decline treatment. See 
Dan W. Brock & Steven A. Wartman, When Competent Patients Make Irrational Choices, 322 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1595 (1990). 
 118 See Henderson, supra note 19, at 492 (“[W]hen defendant’s drug is the only one of its 
kind on the market and serves what members of the medical profession ostensibly believe to be a 
useful purpose, plaintiff should not reach the trier of fact.”). A subsequent article co-authored by one 
of the Reporters (but unrelated to section 6) repeatedly drew a distinction between “lifestyle” and 
“therapeutic” drugs. See Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed 
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Reporters meant to include even “cosmetic” products that required the 
intervention of a health care provider,119 courts may refuse to credit these 
separately published glosses on the blackletter formulation. If taken at 
face value, section 6(c) could have the effect of delegating judgments 
about the utilities of prescription products to reasonable physicians 
whose professional training presumably would give us a far narrower 
range of legitimate clinical endpoints, which would make some 
pharmaceutical manufacturers more vulnerable to design defect claims 
than they would have been under the more flexible and consumer-
oriented standard of section 2(b). 
Aside from questions about the special utility of prescription 
drugs, some commentators have argued that, unlike other consumer 
goods, these products rarely cause third-party effects,120 but this claim of 
distinctiveness strikes me as clearly incorrect. It disregards, for instance, 
recurring litigation over birth defects (including cases where the drug has 
no intended use related to pregnancy),121 sedation (as it relates to 
  
Choice: Unmasking Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REV. 257, 259, 272, 288 & n.148 (2005) [hereinafter 
Informed Choice]; id. at 279 (imagining a drug that “has little therapeutic value and provides only 
aesthetic or palliative relief”); see also id. at 269-70 (using Parlodel, which allegedly “created 
gratuitous risk with very little benefit” in lactation suppression, especially compared to the use of 
OTC analgesics for this same purpose, to justify the recognition of a new type of failure-to-warn 
claim that would not require proof of causation); cf. David E. Bernstein, Correspondence, Learning 
the Wrong Lessons from “An American Tragedy”: A Critique of the Berger-Twerski Informed 
Choice Proposal, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1961, 1967-68 (2006) (disputing their suggestion that the 
morning sickness remedy Bendectin qualified as a lifestyle drug, explaining that, in severe cases, it 
could reduce dehydration and the accompanying need for hospitalization and risks of fetal harm). 
Their rejoinder never attempted to respond to the point that Bendectin served genuine therapeutic 
purposes, opting instead for rhetorical flourishes to underscore their thesis. See Margaret A. Berger 
& Aaron D. Twerski, Correspondence, From the Wrong End of the Telescope: A Response to 
Professor David Bernstein, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1983, 1989 (2006) (“When one seeks to huckster 
drugs as if they were M&M’s, brutal honesty is called for.”); id. at 1992 (referring to decisions “to 
imbibe non-therapeutic drugs,” as if these amounted to alcoholic beverages); see also id. at 1991-92 
(suggesting that Vioxx “offer[ed] little or no therapeutic benefits”). 
 119 See Henderson, supra note 19, at 484-86 (discussing a hypothetical choice between 
different breast implant designs, and arguing that fully-informed patients should be allowed to opt 
for a riskier version on aesthetic grounds); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 19, at 176-77 (noting 
that “there exists a class of patients who benefit emotionally and psychologically,” even if not 
physically, from such products, and recognizing that “prescription drugs and devices [with] aesthetic 
properties can have profoundly beneficial effects on an individual’s psychic well-being”); cf. Savina 
v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915, 927 (Kan. 1990) (“The policy considerations underlying strict 
liability and Comment k would apply to a diagnostic drug as well as to a drug used for treatment.”). 
It remains unclear how they would evaluate secondary utilities such as convenience and cost that 
seemingly have no therapeutic benefit broadly conceived. See supra notes 76-90 and accompanying 
text. 
 120 See Green, supra note 19, at 216 (“Only in the rarest situation is there any potential for 
third-party effects from drugs.”); Henderson, supra note 19, at 494 (referring to “the substantial 
absence of third-party effects”); see also id. at 480-81 (“[W]hen negative third party effects are 
minimal, courts should hesitate before imposing the added costs of greater safety on users or 
consumers who do not volunteer to pay for additional safeguards when choosing which product 
designs to buy in the marketplace.” (footnote omitted)); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 19, at 177 
(noting that cosmetic drugs and devices “rarely have adverse third-party effects”). 
 121 See infra Part II.C.2 (thalidomide and methotrexate); infra Part II.C.5 (isotretinoin); 
infra notes 313-14 and accompanying text (diethylstilbestrol); see also David B. Brushwood, Drug 
Induced Birth Defects: Difficult Decisions and Shared Responsibilities, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 51 
(1988).  
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automobile accidents and the like),122 and psychosis.123 It also seemingly 
disregards claims related to abuse and diversion.124 Finally, though not so 
far as I know litigated, efficacy failures may permit contagious diseases 
to spread to others,125 pharmaceuticals may cause harm to health care 
workers,126 and medical technologies may have deleterious 
environmental consequences.127 Prescription products have many 
distinctive characteristics, but an absence of third-party effects is not one 
of them. 
C. Case Studies 
The operation of section 6(c) becomes more concrete when 
applied to particular fact patterns, real or imagined (as I note repeatedly 
  
 122 See, e.g., McKenzie v. Hawai’i Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 47 P.3d 1209, 1210-11, 
1218-22 (Haw. 2002); Coombes v. Florio, 877 N.E.2d 567, 572-75 (Mass. 2007) (plurality) 
(addressing the duty of physicians to warn in such cases); Osborne v. United States, 567 S.E.2d 677, 
679 (W. Va. 2002); see also Stephanie Saul, Some Sleeping Pill Users Range Far Beyond Bed, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 8, 2006, at C1 (reporting that Ambien® has been linked to sleepwalking and impaired 
driving). 
 123 See, e.g., Potter v. Eli Lilly & Co., 926 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Ky. 1996) (Prozac®), 
abrogated on other grounds by Hoskins v. Maricle, 150 S.W.3d 1 (Ky. 2004); Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1234 (D.N.M. 2008) (same); Upjohn Co. v. Freeman, 885 S.W.2d 538, 
540, 548-50 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (reversing a judgment for plaintiffs in a Halcion® psychosis case); 
Emily Heller, Drug Maker Hit with $8M Verdict: Jury Finds Maker of Paxil Mainly Responsible for 
Multiple Shooting Deaths, NAT’L L.J., June 25, 2001, at A5. 
 124 See, e.g., Erony v. Alza Corp., 913 F. Supp. 195, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (allowing an 
inadequate warning claim to proceed on behalf of a teenager who died after sucking on his father’s 
discarded Duragesic® patches); see also Joseph B. Prater, Comment, West Virginia’s Painful 
Settlement: How the OxyContin Phenomenon and Unconventional Theories of Tort Liability May 
Make Pharmaceutical Companies Liable for Black Markets, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1409 (2006); cf. 
Gipson v. Kasey, 150 P.3d 228, 229, 233-34 (Ariz. 2007) (holding that a patient who gave away 
oxycodone owed a duty to others injured by misuse). On this score, the Reporters only imagined a 
minor possibility that friends or family of patients would borrow their unused prescription drugs. See 
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 19, at 171 n.81. 
 125 Cf. Dave Murphy, 92 Patients Told of Possible Exposure to TB: Medical Devices in 
Hospital Surgeries Weren’t Sterilized, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 11, 2005, at B4 (reporting that a sterilizing 
device had failed to function). The flipside of this argument appears frequently (as justifying limits 
on liability in order to reduce disincentives to R&D): vaccines and antibiotics, for example, resemble 
public goods because, when they work, both the patient and third parties benefit; conversely, when 
antibiotics are used inappropriately, the patient derives no benefit and third parties eventually may 
suffer harm due to the emergence of bacterial resistance. See David Brown, Drug-Resistant Cases of 
TB in U.S. Increase, WASH. POST, Mar. 24, 2006, at A10; Justin Gillis & Ceci Connolly, Emphasis 
on Cipro Worries Officials, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2001, at A17 (reporting that drug-resistant 
bacteria contribute to 70,000 deaths each year in the United States); Anita Manning, “Superbugs” 
Spread Fear Far and Wide: Drug-Resistant Staph Infections No Longer Threaten Just Hospital 
Patients, USA TODAY, May 11, 2006, at 1A (reporting outbreaks of community-acquired 
methicillin-resistant staph aureus (MRSA)); see also Outterson, supra note 85, at 67-68, 73-86, 94-
114, 119-123 (elaborating on problems of resistance to antibiotics and antivirals, and discussing 
various proposed solutions). 
 126 See Jim Morris, What If the Cure Is Also a Cause?: The Same Chemo Drugs That Save 
Some Cancer Patients’ Lives Put Health Workers at Risk, WASH. POST, Feb. 15, 2005, at F1. 
 127 See Christopher T. Nidel, Regulating the Fate of Pharmaceutical Drugs: A New 
Prescription for the Environment, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 81 (2003); Martha Mendoza, Drugs Found 
in More Cities’ Water, ORLANDO SENT., Sept. 12, 2008, at A12; Frank D. Roylance, “Rescue” 
Inhaler Costs to Climb: Supplies Tighten Ahead of Ban of Ozone-Destroying CFC Propellants in 
Devices, BALT. SUN, Feb. 19, 2006, at 1A. 
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below, these turn out to be far more imagined than real, but that alone 
does not defeat the effort to draw relevant insights from these case 
studies).128 The sections that follow discuss various illustrations offered 
by both proponents and critics: ritodrine, thalidomide, finasteride, polio 
vaccines, and isotretinoin. In the subpart that follows immediately after 
these case studies, I draw some broader lessons and suggest a centrally 
important design feature of pharmaceutical products that has escaped the 
attention of commentators. 
1. Ritodrine 
The Reporters offered an illustration of a successful design 
defect claim under section 6(c),129 which they had based on the decision 
Tobin v. Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc.130 Commentators have 
debated whether or not Tobin’s holding aligns with section 6(c), but 
nearly everyone has taken the opinion at face value.131 In fact, the court’s 
analysis in that case seemed emblematic of precisely the sort of mischief 
  
 128 Pure hypotheticals offered by critics of section 6(c) suffer from acontextuality. See, 
e.g., Cupp, supra note 19, at 100 n.147 (imagining a drug that provides “a slight benefit to” 10% of 
users, while causing a lethal allergic reaction in the other 90%, and that it was not possible to specify 
the subgroup of users for whom the drug worked without harm); id. at 97 (arguing, even more 
implausibly, that, “if the prescription product could reasonably be prescribed to a single person—
even if it were fatal as to all other persons to whom it is prescribed—the product would be immune 
from design liability”). In terminally-ill patients who have exhausted alternative treatments, I would 
expect reasonable physicians (and their desperate patients) to opt for a 10% chance of slight benefit 
even in the face of a 90% chance of death; while, in non-serious conditions (or life-threatening 
conditions amenable to other treatments), I trust that no reasonable health care provider supplied 
with an adequate warning would use such a product (in the highly unlikely event that the FDA 
would have allowed its marketing in the first place). See id. at 100 n.147 (conceding as much). In a 
subsequent article, this same commentator offered a different hypothetical based only loosely on 
reality. See Cupp, supra note 44, at 234-38 (discussing finasteride); id. at 237 n.26 (conceding the 
hypothetical nature of the facts presented); see also infra Part II.C.3 (critiquing this case study). 
 129 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. f & illus. 1 (1998). 
 130 993 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1993). 
 131 Strangely, a feminist critique of section 6(c) dismissed Tobin as atypical because it 
seemed to involve a drug marketed without having secured FDA approval. See Trompeter, supra 
note 40, at 1154-55; see also id. at 1156 (suggesting that the case really involved a product 
malfunction, which would allow an inference of a manufacturing defect, even though from all 
appearances the drug had worked to halt the plaintiff’s premature labor). Contrary to this 
commentator’s interpretation, see id. (“Thus, section 6(c) is a ‘super’ res ipsa loquitur standard, 
forcing the plaintiff to shoulder the difficult burden of establishing comprehensive product failure 
not just for her, but for every class of users.”); id. at 1172 (reiterating that “inefficacy is the basis of 
liability”), effective drugs could fail the test if equally effective interventions posed lower risks in all 
classes of patients. She also badly misunderstood the one judicial opinion that offered the clearest 
support for the protective standard announced in section 6(c). See id. at 1159-60 (focusing on 
language in Williams v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 686 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. La.), aff’d, 864 F.2d 789 (5th 
Cir. 1988), that discussed matters of safety, entirely ignoring other language in the opinion that 
explained, even if the risk were higher than established, the anticonvulsant would have been 
appropriate for epileptics unresponsive to other less dangerous drugs and was the only treatment 
available for patients with trigeminal neuralgia); see also Cupp, supra note 44, at 242 (making the 
same mistake). 
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that the Reporters had sought to guard against,132 and it also poses 
important questions about the operation of their blackletter formulation. 
In Tobin, a woman pregnant with twins received a prescription 
for Yutopar® (ritodrine) to prevent premature labor. She developed 
serious cardiac problems while taking the drug and, after a successful 
delivery, required a heart transplant. The plaintiff prevailed at trial on her 
design defect and failure-to-warn claims, after her experts identified 
numerous methodological flaws in the clinical trials submitted to the 
FDA, which members of the agency’s advisory committee also had 
criticized. The federal appellate court in Tobin affirmed, concluding that, 
notwithstanding the fact of FDA approval (or any evidence of fraud in 
securing that approval or contrary postapproval data),133 the jury could 
have concluded that the manufacturer should never have marketed the 
drug because it had no good evidence of effectiveness in improving 
neonatal outcomes, though the court did concede that the drug appeared 
to reduce the need for maternal hospitalization.134 In short, if the jury 
found that the drug lacked all utility (because it simply did not work), 
then any risk would render it defectively designed. The drug’s labeling 
had contraindicated its use in patients with pre-existing cardiac disease 
(which, it turns out, this patient had, though her doctors did not know 
that at the time), but the court concluded that the drug also should not 
have been available for use in any other types of patients. 
Tobin suffers from numerous shortcomings. First, the court 
allowed the jury to conclude (with the assistance, of course, of the 
  
 132 See Henderson, supra note 19, at 492 (conceding that section 6(c) “allows courts to 
second-guess the FDA on the . . . question of whether a drug approved by the FDA and marketed by 
a defendant should not have been approved and marketed,” though trusting that that would occur 
“only in relatively rare cases”); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 19, at 174 (“By countenancing a 
finding that a defendant’s drug is, essentially, worthless, section 6(c) tacitly assumes that the FDA 
will occasionally approve (or fail to order withdrawal of) a drug that should not be allowed on the 
market.”). I fail to see how this involves any less an exercise in “rank speculation” than trying to 
decide whether the FDA might approve a hypothesized alternative design, id. at 167; see also id. at 
162-64; indeed, absent some confession of error by the agency, cf. supra note 60 (discussing the 
FDA’s decision to withdraw bromocriptine for the suppression of lactation based on postapproval 
risk information and reconsideration of its relative efficacy), it seems even less appropriate to invite 
a jury to engage in this sort of reassessment, see Green, supra note 19, at 231 (“The FDA performs a 
risk-benefit analysis when it approves a new drug and, as long as the FDA is provided accurate and 
complete study data from the drug’s sponsor, only a regulatory skeptic or a jury exalter would 
suggest that such a determination be reconsidered de novo in a civil case.”); see also id. at 222-23, 
232 (explaining the importance of insisting on full regulatory compliance and not simply the fact of 
agency approval); cf. Kaplan et al., supra note 27, at 70-75 (favoring the complete elimination of 
design defect claims). 
 133 Even skeptics of a regulatory compliance defense seem to concede that it ought to 
cover those rare cases where plaintiffs allege defectiveness at the time of FDA approval without 
suggesting that the manufacturer misled the agency. See Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance 
and Tort Liability: Examining the Strongest Case, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 461, 477-78, 495 
(1997); see also id. at 490-92 (explaining the difficulties that courts would encounter if asked to 
revisit approval decisions that plaintiffs allege the applicant tainted by some violation of agency 
requirements); id. at 472-73, 495-96 (explaining that most cases involve risks discovered after 
approval and, for that reason, should proceed as failure-to-warn rather than design defect claims). 
 134 See Tobin, 993 F.2d at 537-40 & n.8. 
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parties’ experts) that the FDA should have accepted neither a surrogate 
marker (i.e., gestational age) for a clinical end-point (i.e., neonatal 
health), nor a sub-group analysis of clinical trials that the agency’s 
advisory committee had viewed as methodologically flawed.135 Second, 
the court failed to consider the fact that the FDA had not approved any 
other tocolytic agents as of 1993 or that neonatal intensive care was more 
primitive when it approved ritodrine in 1980.136 Third, the court 
marginalized ritodrine’s evident effectiveness in reducing the need for 
repeated hospitalizations during pregnancy.137 In effect, it turned a 
complex risk-utility judgment, using data from less than ideal clinical 
trials, into a no-brainer by allowing the jury to conclude that the drug 
was totally ineffective.138 In short, Tobin offers a poor illustration of 
section 6(c)’s intended scope and operation. 
  
 135 The court gave exaggerated significance to the comments of the advisory committee, 
disregarding the fact that the FDA had undertaken a lengthy internal review (and had no obligation 
to abide by the committee’s recommendations) and that the committee had in the end recommended 
approval. In 1992, based on newly published research, another FDA advisory committee concluded 
that oral ritodrine lacked effectiveness at current dosages. See F-D-C REP. (“The Pink Sheet”), Nov. 
2, 1992, at 4; see also Kenneth J. Leveno & F. Gary Cunningham, Editorial, β-Adrenergic Agonists 
for Preterm Labor, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 349, 349-51 (1992). The drug remains available in the 
United States, though only in an injectable form (oral dosage forms are still marketed in Canada). 
 136 Cf. Niels H. Lauersen et al., Inhibition of Premature Labor: A Multicenter 
Comparison of Ritodrine and Ethanol, 127 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 837, 844-45 (1977); Sandra 
G. Boodman, Labor Drug Assailed: Article Challenges Mag Sulfate Use, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 
2006, at F1. The court noted that extended bed rest worked in half of all preterm labor cases. See 
Tobin, 993 F.2d at 540 n.9. In fact, no research supports this still widespread assumption. See 
Valerie Ulene, Downside of Bed Rest Often Gets Overlooked, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2007, at F3. 
 137 The court’s evident indifference to the drug’s ability to reduce the need for maternal 
hospitalization reinforces previously discussed questions about section 6(c)’s emphasis on 
“therapeutic benefits.” See supra notes 76-90 and accompanying text. 
 138 Thus, I disagree with one commentator’s recent claim that judges resolving drug 
products liability cases focus unduly on questions of safety and “do not consider effectiveness.” 
Anita Bernstein, Enhancing Drug Effectiveness and Efficacy Through Personal Injury Litigation, 15 
J.L. & POL’Y 1051, 1072 (2007); see also id. at 1058 (calling effectiveness “the neglected and 
undertheorized younger sibling of prescription drug safety”); id. at 1060 (pointing out that “the 
danger of harmful effects can be named in a warning much more clearly than the danger of futility”); 
id. at 1061 (“explor[ing] the contrary thesis that effectiveness is, and ought to be, central to personal 
injury litigation related to prescription drugs”); id. at 1100. Elsewhere, however, she correctly 
recognized that effectiveness inevitably gets taken into account when judging prescription drug 
defectiveness. See id. at 1084. (In contrast, Bernstein’s repeated assertion that the federal regulatory 
“effectiveness” standard means nothing other than truth-in-labeling, see id. at 1066-68, 1082, 1098, 
and her passing suggestion that the FDA does not mandate labeling about comparative effectiveness, 
see id. at 1084-85, have no foundation, see supra notes 69 & 103.) If a therapeutic failure occurs 
because of subpotency in a particular dose, an injured patient clearly could allege a manufacturing 
defect, and, if it occurs because a properly manufactured product does not work at all (as found in 
Tobin), then the patient could allege a design defect (but, if the drug only happens to fail in a 
particular patient, then, at most, the patient might have an informational defect claim in the event 
that the manufacturer exaggerated effectiveness or failed to specify known limitations on use in 
certain patient subgroups). The tricky issues in therapeutic failure (as opposed to adverse side effect) 
cases relate to causation and damages, but, apart from a brief discussion of emotional distress, see 
Bernstein, supra, at 1080-82, she never mentions (much less grapples with) these complexities, see, 
e.g., Willis v. Wu, 607 S.E.2d 63, 66 (S.C. 2004) (“A ‘wrongful pregnancy’ or ‘wrongful 
contraception’ action is brought by the parent of a healthy but unplanned child, seeking damages 
from [inter alia] a . . . pharmaceutical manufacturer who allegedly was negligent in . . . 
manufacturing a contraceptive prescription or device.”); Noah, supra note 64, at 377-78 & n.32 
(explaining that only in medical malpractice cases do courts recognize claims for the loss of a less-
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2. Thalidomide 
Similarly, one cannot say that the infamous teratogen 
thalidomide suffers from a design defect. Currently approved by the 
FDA for the treatment of skin lesions associated with Hansen’s disease 
(leprosy), though contraindicated for use in pregnancy (and accompanied 
by various other mechanisms designed to help ensure that physicians and 
patients take this limitation on use seriously),139 this drug appropriately 
passes the section 6(c) test.140 One wonders whether thalidomide would 
fare as well under a less structured risk-utility balancing approach in a 
case where a pregnant leprosy patient had used the drug: (1) from the 
perspective of her terribly deformed child, the risk clearly outweighs the 
utility; (2) from the perspective of the mother, the risk to her offspring 
also undoubtedly outweighs the drug’s utility to her (after all, less 
effective and more dangerous, but non-teratogenic, options such as 
glucocorticoids might have worked for her);141 and (3) from a societal 
  
than-even chance for a better outcome); see also Rivera v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 283 F.3d 315, 319-
21 (5th Cir. 2002) (dismissing, for lack of standing, a nationwide class action lawsuit brought on 
behalf of healthy users and insurers seeking only to recover their economic losses after the 
withdrawal of Duract® prompted by safety concerns); New Jersey Citizen Action v. Schering-Plough 
Corp., 842 A.2d 174, 177-78 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (similar conclusion on claims based 
on direct-to-consumer advertising for Claritin®). See generally Moin A. Yahya, Can I Sue Without 
Being Injured?: Why the Benefit of the Bargain Theory for Product Liability Is Bad Law and Bad 
Economics, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 83 (2005). 
 139 See Rochelle Sharpe, FDA Approves the Use of Thalidomide to Treat Lesions Caused 
by Leprosy, WALL ST. J., July 17, 1998, at B6; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Thalidomide Approved to Treat 
Leprosy, with Other Uses Seen, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1998, at A1; see also Michael E. Franks et al., 
Thalidomide, 363 LANCET 1802, 1806-08 (2004) (identifying numerous other therapeutic uses under 
investigation). 
 140 See Dreier, supra note 19, at 260-61; Green, supra note 19, at 228 (calling thalidomide 
“the horror drug of all time,” but explaining that it would pass muster under section 6(c) now that the 
FDA has approved it for treating a serious skin condition associated with leprosy); cf. Brown v. 
Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 481 (Cal. 1988) (“It seems unjust to grant the same protection from 
liability to those who gave us thalidomide as to the producers of penicillin.”). One can say much the 
same of diethylstilbestrol (DES), the drug at issue in Brown. Although the discovery of risks from in 
utero exposure rendered its continued use in the prevention of miscarriages unjustified (especially in 
light of doubts that it ever worked for that purpose), see Leef Smith, The DES Legacy: Children of 
Women Given the Hormone DES Decades Ago Now Cope with Their Own—and Even Their 
Children’s—Health Problems, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2003, at F1, the drug had other legitimate 
uses, see FDA, Diethylstilbestrol as Postcoital Oral Contraceptive; Patient Labeling, 40 Fed. Reg. 
5351, 5354-55 (Feb. 5, 1975) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 310.501(b) (1988)), revoked, 54 Fed. Reg. 
22,585, 22,586 (May 25, 1989); cf. Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 776 n.1, 
781-82 (R.I. 1988) (recognizing other uses, but nonetheless allowing a jury to find a design defect). 
 141 Cf. Harbeson v. Parke Davis, Inc., 746 F.2d 517, 523-25 (9th Cir. 1984) (affirming 
judgment for plaintiffs on an informed consent claim where physicians failed to advise an epilepsy 
patient of the teratogenicity of Dilantin® after she specifically had inquired about such risks in order 
to decide whether to attempt to conceive); Gerber v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 392 F. Supp. 2d 907, 
920 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (“Mr. Gerber can only argue that Shirley Gerber would not have taken 
Accutane in the first place if Roche’s warning had been adequate.”); Hogle v. Hall, 916 P.2d 814, 
816-17 (Nev. 1996) (affirming a plaintiff’s judgment on an inadequate warning claim involving 
Accutane). If a physician had selected the drug to treat nausea during pregnancy rather than leprosy, 
then the patient and victim would have a clear malpractice claim but still not a design defect claim 
against the manufacturer. 
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perspective,142 the specter of a wave of birth defects arising from the very 
real possibility of the irresponsible use of this drug by physicians and 
patients might well outweigh the utility to the relatively small (and still 
stigmatized) community of leprosy sufferers.143 Section 6(c) does a better 
job of managing such cases than either a particularized or aggregate form 
of risk-utility balancing.144 
For another potent though far less notorious teratogen, consider 
methotrexate. It would make no sense to characterize this chemotherapy 
agent as defectively designed. As amply revealed in their labeling, 
cytotoxic agents have powerful and potentially lethal side effects. When 
used in cancer patients, often in various combinations and in conjunction 
with non-drug treatments such as surgery and radiation, the potential 
benefits may justify taking such risks. When a particular chemotherapy 
drug fails to slow cancer progression, it does not mean that the product 
  
 142 See Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1069 (8th Cir. 1989) (asking whether a 
prescription product serves an “exceptional social need”); see also W. Kip Viscusi, Wading Through 
the Muddle of Risk-Utility Analysis, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 573, 591-97 (1989) (noting that risk-utility 
analysis might proceed from the perspective of buyers, seller, or society); cf. David G. Owen, Risk-
Utility Balancing in Design Defect Cases, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 239, 239 (1997) (calling the 
global approach “balancing bedlam”); David G. Owen, Toward a Proper Test for Design 
Defectiveness: “Micro-Balancing” Costs and Benefits, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1661, 1670-86 (1997) 
(explaining the flaws with a “macro-balancing” approach). 
 143 See Calvin Sims, Japan Apologizes to Lepers and Declines to Fight Isolation Ruling, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2001, at A3; Sally Squires, A Scary Diagnosis Hits Home: When a Tiny Rash 
Turns out to be Leprosy, a Teen and Her Community Learn the Modern Reality of Living with the 
Biblical Disease, WASH. POST, May 27, 2008, at F1. Contrast this stigma with the continuing 
activism on behalf of thalidomide victims. See Sarah Boseley, Thalidomide Victims Launch Battle 
for More Compensation, GUARDIAN (LONDON), Apr. 4, 2008, at 15; Jamie Talan, Thalidomide’s 
Legacy, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2000, at F10. 
 144 Writing one year prior to its FDA approval for leprosy, one commentator used 
thalidomide to argue otherwise (on the assumption that agency had approved its use as an 
antinauseant during pregnancy and that the manufacturer marketed it as completely safe 
notwithstanding knowledge of reported birth defects in Europe). See Winchester, supra note 19, at 
677-78. First, his hypothetical clearly would provide the basis for an informational defect claim. 
Second, it mistakenly assumes that the reasonable health care provider standard would ask what a 
physician presented with this inaccurate information would do. Third, even if the physician knew 
everything that the hypothetical manufacturer knew but failed to reveal, this commentator concluded 
that a design defect could not exist in the absence of a substitute. See id. at 678 (“If thalidomide were 
in fact the only ‘available’ tranquilizer for pregnant women, then section [6](c) automatically confers 
immunity.”). I have no doubt that a fully-informed physician would advise the patient to tough it out 
(is that a substitute?) rather than assume a high risk of very serious birth defects in order to treat a 
non-life-threatening condition. See Henderson, supra note 19, at 492-93 (“It is theoretically possible 
under the proposed Restatement that a plaintiff might be able to show that, notwithstanding a drug’s 
exclusivity for treating a particular medical condition, no reasonable, knowledgeable provider would 
prescribe the drug for any class of patients.”). Writing one year after the FDA approved thalidomide 
for leprosy, another commentator conceded that it might not fail design defect scrutiny, so he 
imagined instead that it only had secured approval for treating baldness! See Cupp, supra note 44, at 
238 (concluding, even given full risk labeling and the admitted availability of substitutes, that such a 
product would survive design defect scrutiny under section 6(c)). I find this suggestion equally 
absurd. Even if only indicated for the treatment of male pattern baldness (rather than by women or 
during pregnancy), such a drug would present serious teratogenic risks because semen can carry 
residues of thalidomide. See Rita Rubin, Thalidomide Could Guide Use of Drugs That Risk Birth 
Defects, USA TODAY, July 22, 1998, at 7D. Given the availability of effective but non-teratogenic 
treatments, no reasonable physician would prescribe it for any class of balding patients (even if the 
FDA approved it). 
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suffers from any defect.145 Now what if a physician uses a cytotoxic agent 
for something other than cancer? For instance, doctors have used 
methotrexate off-label as an abortifacient.146 Could a patient who 
received this chemotherapy agent to terminate a pregnancy argue that the 
drug suffers from a design defect (especially now that the FDA has 
approved mifepristone for this purpose147)? Perhaps a jury engaging in 
aggregate risk-benefit analysis would reach the correct conclusion 
(treating it instead as a case of either a failure to warn or medical 
malpractice148), but again section 6(c) better guards against the possibility 
of an absurd outcome. 
3. Finasteride 
Richard Cupp offered an entirely different illustration designed 
to criticize the operation of section 6(c). He explained that, four years 
after the FDA approved Proscar® (finasteride) for the treatment of benign 
prostatic hyperplasia (BPH), one study found an additional risk and 
another study failed to confirm its effectiveness.149 A jury might well 
second-guess the agency on the basis of such sparse evidence (as 
happened in Tobin), but, one decade later, the totality of published 
  
 145 Similarly, when such a drug does arrest the cancer but causes the patient’s death, it 
also does not mean that the product suffers from a design flaw, and the availability of other 
(sometimes effective and less dangerous) interventions should not make any difference. 
 146 See Richard U. Hausknecht, Methotrexate and Misoprostol to Terminate Early 
Pregnancy, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 537 (1995); see also John Leland, Abortion Might Outgrow its 
Need for Roe v. Wade, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2005, § 4, at 14 (focusing on the off-label use of the 
ulcer drug misoprostol to induce a miscarriage). Methotrexate has other off-label uses. See Michael 
E. Weinblatt, Editorial, Methotrexate for Chronic Diseases in Adults, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 330, 
331 (1995) (explaining that low doses may help to treat autoimmune diseases); see also Sidney A. 
Shapiro, Limiting Physician Freedom to Prescribe a Drug for Any Purpose: The Need for FDA 
Regulation, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 819-20 (1978) (describing problems encountered with the off-
label uses of methotrexate). 
 147 See supra note 109. 
 148 See Sheppard-Mobley v. King, 830 N.E.2d 301, 303 (N.Y. 2005) (summarizing tort 
claims brought on behalf of an infant whose mother declined to undergo a surgical abortion after a 
nonsurgical abortion using methotrexate failed and caused serious birth defects). Off-label 
prescribing does not invariably amount to a deviation from the standard of care. See David C. Radley 
et al., Off-label Prescribing Among Office-Based Physicians, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1021 
(2006); Bernadette Tansey, Why Doctors Prescribe Off Label, S.F. CHRON., May 1, 2005, at A12; 
see also Bell v. Maricopa Med. Ctr., 755 P.2d 1180, 1182 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (alleging 
malpractice for the failure to use an approved drug for an off-label use); Bridges v. Shelby Women’s 
Clinic, 323 S.E.2d 372, 374-76 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (same). 
 149 See Cupp, supra note 44, at 235. In fact, the news article that he cited, though 
mentioning an earlier study that found no benefit over placebo, had focused on a newly published 
study that confirmed limited efficacy. See Laura Beil, Drug Shows Promise for Prostate Patients, 
DALLAS MORN. NEWS, Feb. 26, 1998, at 4A; see also Michelle I. Wilde & Karen L. Goa, 
Finasteride: An Update of Its Use in the Management of Symptomatic Benign Prostatic Hyperplasia, 
57 DRUGS 557 (1999). For a discussion of the debate over the unflattering earlier study, see 
Lawrence K. Altman, Common Drug for Prostrate Is Ineffective, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 
1996, at A18. 
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research continues to support the widespread use of this still-approved 
drug for treating BPH.150 
Cupp added that the FDA had approved Hytrin® (terazosin), 
another drug for treating this condition,151 and he even suggested that saw 
palmetto represented a safe and effective alternative for treating BPH.152 
Imagine jurors finding an FDA-approved prescription drug defectively 
designed because they agreed that a patient could have gone to his health 
food store and purchased a largely unregulated dietary supplement 
supported by some flimsy evidence of efficacy!153 Section 6(c), with its 
reasonable physician standard, helps guard against precisely such 
muddle-headedness. 
There is, however, more to Cupp’s story about Proscar: the FDA 
approved a low-dose version of finasteride (Propecia®) in 1998 for the 
treatment of baldness. Because, however, Proscar tablets offered five 
times the dose for less than one-third the price, physicians evidently 
prescribed it off-label (with instructions to split the pill) instead of 
prescribing Propecia.154 Cupp argued that, given this pattern of off-label 
usage,155 section 6(c) “might bar from recovery all of the men harmed by 
using Proscar for its primary, health-related purpose.”156 Assuming just 
  
 150 See Gina Kolata, New Take on a Prostate Drug, and a New Debate, N.Y. TIMES, June 
15, 2008, at A1 (reporting that finasteride also may have prophylactic value, and noting that Proscar 
now competes with half a dozen generic versions of the drug); see also E. Darracott Vaughan, Jr., 
Editorial, Medical Management of Benign Prostatic Hyperplasia—Are Two Drugs Better Than 
One?, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2449, 2449-53 (2003); Shankar Vedantam, More Men Are Urged to 
Take Drug Against Prostate Cancer, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2009, at A14. As explained previously, 
see supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text, there is no absolutely basis for Cupp’s suggestion that 
Proscar remains on the market only because the FDA lacks the authority to withdraw drugs except in 
extreme circumstances. 
 151 See Cupp, supra note 44, at 235. The latest entrant in this growing class has a 
wonderful moniker: Rapaflo. Watson Wins OK for Prostate Drug, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, at C5. 
 152 See Cupp, supra note 44, at 236 & n.15 (explaining that a “study reported that Saw 
Palmetto extract is more effective, far safer, and cheaper than Proscar,” citing a statement made by a 
member of Congress). I hear that another member of that august scientific body, Senator Tom 
Harkin, used to swear by bee pollen. 
 153 See Robert S. DiPaola & Ronald A. Morton, Editorial, Proven and Unproven Therapy 
for Benign Prostatic Hyperplasia, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 632, 632-33 (2006); Rob Stein, Vitamin 
Didn’t Lower Prostate Cancer Risk, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2008, at A9 (describing the early 
termination of NIH study of vitamin E and selenium); Lindsey Tanner, Many Go on Taking 
Discredited Remedies, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 27, 2006, at A5 (reporting that recent studies have 
found no therapeutic value to glucosamine, chondroitin, saw palmetto, echinacea, St. John’s wort, or 
shark cartilage); see also Whitaker v. Thompson, 353 F.3d 947, 948-49 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (upholding 
the FDA’s decision to reject a petition requesting permission to label saw palmetto products with a 
claim that they could treat BPH); Lars Noah, A Drug by Any Other Name . . . ?: Paradoxes in 
Dietary Supplement Risk Regulation, 17 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 165, 190 (2006) (urging the FDA to 
make fuller use of its limited statutory authority to crack down on unsafe herbal products). 
 154 See Cupp, supra note 44, at 236-37. 
 155 See id. at 237 (“It could be argued that physicians are acting reasonably in prescribing 
the cheaper Proscar to the subclass planning to cut the pills to use safely for baldness, even though 
Proscar’s primary use, treating prostate enlargement, would be unhelpful and unreasonably 
dangerous.”). 
 156 Id. at 237-38; see also id. at 238 (“Finding just one reasonable use, even if that use is 
ancillary and for purely cosmetic purposes, in effect immunizes the manufacturer regardless of how 
much harm a drug inflicts overall.”); id. at 241 (“Under the reasonable physician test, Proscar is 
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for the sake of argument (and very much contrary to reality) that 
finasteride would fail risk-utility analysis when used in the treatment of 
BPH, section 6(c) would do nothing to bar recovery for physician 
negligence (assuming that the manufacturer had fully warned) for using 
it in such patients. Moreover, I seriously doubt that any reasonable 
physicians would prescribe Proscar for their balding patients given the 
ready availability of Propecia,157 especially when coupled with the 
hazards associated with pill splitting.158 
4. Polio Vaccines 
Another commentator offered a case study that superficially 
seemed to pose a more serious challenge to section 6(c). George Conk 
contrasted the Sabin oral polio vaccine (OPV), which uses an attenuated 
form of the viral agent, with the Salk injected (inactivated) polio vaccine 
(IPV), which uses killed virus: according to his description, both forms 
offer equal efficacy in all classes of recipients (at least after the 
development of an enhanced-potency version of IPV), but OPV carries a 
one-in-2.4 million risk of causing vaccine-associated paralytic polio 
(VAPP) in either recipients or close contacts.159 Conk added that several 
  
immunized from liability because it can be used safely to treat the cosmetic problem of baldness and 
is cheaper than the lower dosage design.”). 
 157 As explained above, reasonable physicians guided solely by “therapeutic” 
considerations under section 6(c) would not take cost into account. See supra notes 86-89 and 
accompanying text. Moreover, the availability of Propecia seriously weakens this hypothetical as a 
critique of section 6(c); it would have worked better to pretend that the FDA had never approved 
Propecia and focus instead on the recognized off-label use of Proscar (for baldness), which would 
create a class of patients in whom reasonable health care providers might prescribe a drug that, on 
Cupp’s version of the record, has no legitimate use for its labeled (BPH) indication. If Propecia did 
not exist, then the tougher question becomes whether a reasonable physician would prescribe Proscar 
off-label for a class of “patients” with nothing other than a cosmetic condition. See supra notes 
118-19 and accompanying text. 
 158 See Nicolas G. Barzoukas, Pill Splitting Raises Issues of Safety and Patent Coverage, 
NAT’L L.J., May 22, 2000, at B9; see also Timmis v. Permanente, No. A102962, 2004 WL 2943993, 
at *1, *9 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (rejecting an unfair business practice claim against one HMO’s pill-
splitting program); Tara Parker-Pope, Health Insurers Push Pill Splitting as a Way to Save Money on 
Drugs, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2005, at D1. If nothing else, some fool will think that taking the full 
five milligram tablet would mean thicker and quicker hair growth notwithstanding the serious side 
effects reported at that dosage. Moreover, if Proscar did not work for BPH (and physicians preferred 
using other drugs to treat this condition), a profit-maximizing manufacturer would have withdrawn 
the drug so that physicians could not cut into its Propecia revenues. Cf. Denise Gellene, Avastin Use 
in Eyes Irks Genentech, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2005, at C1 (reporting that ophthalmologists have used 
a colon cancer drug off-label on more than 1,000 patients with macular degeneration because it costs 
far less than the same ingredient marketed by the manufacturer for that use, adding that the 
manufacturer “is in discussions with the [FDA] to modify the Avastin label to state that the drug is 
not for ophthalmic use”). 
 159 See Conk, supra note 19, at 1114-15. Notably, the resulting litigation focused almost 
entirely on inadequate warnings of this risk. See Fay F. Spence, Note, Alternatives to Manufacturer 
Liability for Injuries Caused by the Sabin-Type Oral Polio Vaccines, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711, 
716-35 (1987); see also Graham v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 350 F.3d 496, 514 (6th Cir. 2003) (rejecting 
a claim that OPV manufacturer had a duty to inform physicians that IPV represented the preferred 
choice); Johnson v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1326 (Kan. 1986) (same, though based on 
the fact that IPV was not commercially available at the relevant time). Conk’s essay actually had 
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other industrialized countries rely exclusively on IPV (and that U.S. 
authorities recommended the same in 1999),160 though he did note that 
professional and public health organizations had continued to favor OPV 
(except in infants with compromised immune systems or who may come 
in close contact with unvaccinated individuals) for a variety of reasons: 
expense (IPV costs almost twenty times as much per dose), ease of 
administration, an advantage in conferring intestinal immunity, and an 
opportunity for providing second-hand immunity by exposing 
unvaccinated individuals (in effect, the risk of VAPP may have a silver 
lining).161 
In dismissing the intestinal immunity advantage as disputed, 
Conk failed to recognize that only OPV can prevent infection (IPV keeps 
an infected person from becoming sick but does not prevent them from 
becoming carriers and transmitting the illness to others) and that 
questions about (and research into) the enhanced-potency form of IPV 
continued well into the mid-1980s.162 The delay in transitioning from 
OPV to IPV in this country had nothing to do with stalling by profit-
driven manufacturers (after all, officials had licensed the enhanced-
potency form of IPV in 1987); instead, it had everything to do with the 
continued circulation of the wild virus in the Western hemisphere (and 
the risk of importation into the United States) until the early 1990s.163 
Only after confirming its eradication did the Centers for Disease Control 
  
focused on blood factor concentrates, but, as explained below, see infra note 332, that case study did 
not as directly raise questions about section 6(c). The Reporters penned a detailed response to 
Conk’s arguments, but they largely ignored his polio vaccine illustration. See Henderson & Twerski, 
supra note 19, at 176 n.100 (noting simply that the FDA had not licensed the type of IPV used at the 
time in European countries); see also Conk, supra note 21, at 781-83 (conceding the same). They all 
failed to recognize that the FDA had licensed an enhanced-potency IPV product in 1987. See 
Recommendations of the Immunization Practices Advisory Comm., Poliomyelitis Prevention: 
Enhanced-Potency Inactivated Poliomyelitis Vaccine—Supplementary Statement, 36 MORBIDITY & 
MORALITY WKLY. REP. 795 (1987). 
 160 See Conk, supra note 19, at 1115; see also Recommendations of the Advisory Comm. 
on Immunization Practices, Poliomyelitis Prevention in the United States: Introduction of a 
Sequential Vaccination Schedule of Inactivated Poliovirus Vaccine Followed by Oral Poliovirus 
Vaccine, 46 MORBIDITY & MORALITY WKLY. REP. No. RR-3, at 7-8 (1997) [hereinafter ACIP 
Recommendations] (discussing enhanced-potency IPV). 
 161 See Conk, supra note 19, at 1116 n.132; see also Graham, 350 F.3d at 499, 514 
(summarizing the advantages); Johnson, 718 P.2d at 1321-22 (same); ACIP Recommendations, 
supra note 160, at 12 tbl.3; Samuel L. Katz, Conquering Polio: From Culture to Vaccine—Salk and 
Sabin, 351 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1485, 1487 (2004); David Brown, Global Polio Largely Fading: 
Stronger Vaccine Is Playing Key Role, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2005, at A1 (describing a shift to 
monovalent OPV). Even researchers from the companies that produce enhanced-potency IPV had to 
concede that OPV enjoyed an advantage (though they thought only a marginal one) in spreading 
immunity. See Andrew D. Murdin et al., Inactivated Poliovirus Vaccine: Past and Present 
Experience, 14 VACCINE 735, 740-41 (1996). 
 162 See ACIP Recommendations, supra note 160, at 7-8; id. at 13 (explaining that 
“continued use of OPV induces intestinal immunity among vaccine recipients, thereby enhancing 
community resistance to transmission of wild virus (should it be reintroduced)”); see also Kearl v. 
Lederle Labs., 218 Cal. Rptr. 453, 455 n.1 (Ct. App. 1985) (describing a series of efficacy failures 
with IPV reported in Finland), abrogated by Brown v. Superior Ct., 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988). 
 163 See CDC, Certification of Poliomyelitis Eradication—The Americas, 1994, 43 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 720 (1994). 
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(CDC) decide that the slightly safer but in fact somewhat less effective 
IPV gradually should displace OPV.164 
More so than other medical technologies, the use of childhood 
vaccines depends heavily on the recommendations of public health 
officials. Unlike the FDA (which lays things out in labeling and then 
leaves professionals to make sensible judgments), the CDC actively 
attempts to influence medical practice in the use of these products.165 In 
effect, a vaccine licensed by the FDA but not yet blessed by the CDC 
might as well not exist. In hindsight, perhaps the CDC acted too slowly 
in deciding to transition from OPV to IPV in the late 1990s, but the 
information available at the time did not favor IPV as clearly as Conk 
has suggested. Would he really have wanted the manufacturer of OPV to 
withdraw its product from the market in the early 1980s (even before the 
FDA had licensed a competitor’s enhanced-potency IPV in 1987, and 
long before the CDC dictated in 1999 that no reasonable health care 
professional should continue to use OPV except under unusual 
circumstances)? Alternatively, would he have expected health care 
professionals to switch from OPV to IPV in 1987 notwithstanding the 
CDC’s contrary (even if now arguably questionable) recommendations? 
In fact, even in the wake of the CDC’s revised recommendations, 
properly labeled OPV should not face design defect claims. 
Just for the sake of argument, let us take Conk’s story at face 
value (and entirely disregard the CDC’s role) but also assume that, 
during the 1990s, the labeling for OPV accurately disclosed the 
incredibly small risk of VAPP and that, somewhat implausibly, the 
labeling for the FDA-approved enhanced-potency IPV revealed 
absolutely no peculiar risks at all (e.g., injection site reactions).166 Conk 
  
 164 See ACIP Recommendations, supra note 160, at 2, 5. Thus, starting in 1997, the CDC 
recommended a gradual (3-5 year) transition to IPV (with OPV used as a booster in the interim). See 
id. at 2, 9. It also explained, however, that parents should have the choice of using IPV alone. See id. 
at 12-14. 
 165 See CDC, Recommended Immunization Schedules for Persons Aged 0-18 Years—
United States, 2007, 297 JAMA 691, 691-94 (2007). 
 166 See ACIP Recommendations, supra note 160, at 18-19 (noting sensitivity reactions to 
IPV). In addition, one would have to imagine away the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 
1986 (NCVIA), Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to 
-34 (2006)), which aimed to discourage the filing of tort claims by, among other things, codifying 
the comment k defense for covered vaccines (and, with regard to inadequate warning claims, 
codifying the learned intermediary doctrine coupled with an FDA compliance defense), see 42 
U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)&(c); cf. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d 236, 238-42 (Ga. 2008) 
(interpreting this provision as incorporating a case-by-case rather than blanket version of comment k, 
and allowing plaintiffs to pursue design defect claims against manufacturers of childhood vaccines 
for using the preservative thimerosal). See generally Lainie Rutkow et al., Balancing Consumer and 
Industry Interests in Public Health: The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program and Its 
Influence During the Last Two Decades, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 681 (2007). If, instead, one focused 
on the early 1980s, before the NCVIA (and while other countries used enhanced-potency IPV but it 
had not yet reached the United States), it would suffice to point out that IPV remained only a 
hypothetical RAD (not yet licensed domestically and still subject to open questions about 
effectiveness). For a parallel trajectory involving the design of the whole-cell pertussis vaccine, with 
plaintiffs pointing to fractionated and acellular versions used overseas but not yet licensed in this 
country, see supra note 95. 
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argued that section 6(c) inappropriately would have protected OPV’s 
manufacturer from design defect liability, while the risk-utility balancing 
of section 2(b) would lead to a conclusion that IPV represented a safer 
alternative design.167 Unlike section 6(c), however, section 2(b) allows 
considerations of non-therapeutic utilities such as cost and 
convenience,168 so it may not have treated IPV as a RAD for OPV.169 
As it happens, courts applying comment k on a case-by-case 
basis (which meant engaging in a form of risk-utility balancing) 
uniformly rejected design defect claims against the manufacturer of OPV 
during all relevant time periods.170 In fact, as Conk belatedly conceded, 
OPV continues to have a recognized but narrow use: “emergency mass 
administration to control polio outbreaks.”171 Thus, even with an FDA-
licensed and CDC-endorsed safer alternative available, reasonable health 
care providers clearly would continue to select OPV for some classes of 
patients, and section 6(c) appropriately would foreclose a design defect 
claim brought by a patient injured by its use, whether or not such use had 
been appropriate in that particular case. 
Undeterred, Conk finally revealed the premise underlying his 
opposition to the standard announced by the Products Liability 
Restatement: 
The fact that emergency circumstances can be defined in which the more 
dangerous drug might be indicated, despite risks, does not save the sole 
manufacturer of polio vaccine from liability to the injured for failure to adopt 
the safer design in the ordinary course of mandatory inoculation. Imposition of 
liability for failure to offer the alternative safer design in such circumstances 
  
 167 See Conk, supra note 19, at 1114 (“Section 6(c) would not permit, for example, a 
challenge to a live-virus vaccine that unnecessarily caused the disease it was designed to prevent, 
even if there had long been an equally effective killed-virus vaccine that does not cause infection.”); 
id. at 1115-16. 
 168 See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text. Indeed, if these get delivered in mass 
immunization settings, the learned intermediary rule may not apply, which would require warnings 
directed to recipients. See infra note 216 and accompanying text. It also makes one wonder whether 
the intermediary-linked design defect standard then should fall away. See infra notes 246-50 and 
accompanying text. 
 169 Cf. ACIP Recommendations, supra note 160, at 9, 12-15 (noting the absence of a 
licensed combination product that included IPV). Adding IPV to other routinely injected childhood 
vaccines eventually eliminated this disutility relative to OPV. See Rob Stein, Vaccine Promises 
More Protection, Fewer Shots: FDA Approves Round of Three Inoculations That Protects Infants 
Against Five Diseases, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2002, at A2. 
 170 Courts rejected design defect claims (1) before 1968, when OPV competed against an 
early version of IPV (which required three separate injections followed by booster shots), (2) 
between 1968 and 1987, when it lacked any commercial competition (though limited quantities of 
IPV were imported, see Philip M. Boffey, Polio: Salk Challenges Safety of Sabin’s Live-Virus 
Vaccine, 196 SCIENCE 35 (1977)), and (3) between 1987 and 2000, when it co-existed in the United 
States with the enhanced-potency IPV (but continued to have the CDC’s endorsement), see Spence, 
supra note 159, at 723 & n.81; see also id. at 715 n.32 (quoting from the Orimune’s package insert 
and consent forms used in the mid-1980s, which included references to the availability of IPV as an 
alternative). 
 171 Conk, supra note 21, at 782; see also Updated Recommendations of the Advisory 
Comm. on Immunization Practices, Poliomyelitis Prevention in the United States, 49 MORBIDITY & 
MORALITY WKLY. REP. No. RR-5, at 15-16 (2000). 
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does not bar production of the challenged product—which may have residual 
uses. A finding that a design is defective—for the foreseeable conditions of 
product use—does not make the challenged design contraband. The factual 
finding that the product design is defective for the conditions for which it is 
marketed is simply a legal predicate for the judgment that there is a fair basis 
on which to impose the obligation to compensate the avoidably injured.172 
Putting aside the mixing of entirely different time periods and 
counterfactual assumptions about inappropriate marketing (or the limited 
legitimate uses of OPV),173 the fact that only a “sole manufacturer” 
served the U.S. market had at least something to do with other sellers’ 
legitimate fears about the imposition of liability under just such 
circumstances.174 If OPV’s manufacturer faces design defect liability, 
  
 172 Conk, supra note 21, at 782-83. Like other commentators who find nothing distinctive 
about prescription products, see supra note 47, he appears ready to impose something approaching 
absolute liability. Section 6(c) does well to ensure that nothing of the sort will happen. His original 
essay concluded by summarizing and disputing the half dozen rationales typically offered in support 
of section 6(c). See Conk, supra note 19, at 1127-32. For instance, Conk argued that “[t]he designer 
should no more be freed from its duty to market safe products by the existence of an intermediary 
physician than a manufacturer of industrial equipment should be relieved of the duty to include 
safety devices merely because employers are obligated by law to provide a safe workplace.” Id. at 
1128. That parallel may, however, cut the other way. See, e.g., Scarangella v. Thomas Built Buses, 
Inc., 717 N.E.2d 679, 683-84 (N.Y. 1999); see also infra note 317 (discussing the “sophisticated 
purchaser” defense).  
 173 Conk made similar mistakes in suggesting elsewhere that the manufacturer of the sole 
vaccine against smallpox (Dryvax), which ceased production in the 1980s, might face design defect 
claims insofar as hypothetical RADs existed for this old—and, until remaining stockpiles were 
hurriedly pressed back into limited use in 2002, no longer used—vaccine, including a purportedly 
safer product used in Japan and licensed by VaxGen with plans to secure FDA approval. See George 
W. Conk, Reactions and Overreactions: Smallpox Vaccination, Complications, and Compensation, 
14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 439, 459-61 & n.55 (2003). It took almost five years for a different 
company to secure FDA approval of a new vaccine, though one that differs little from Dryvax except 
for its method of production. See John Heilprin, FDA Approves New, Easily Produced Smallpox 
Vaccine, ORLANDO SENT., Sept. 2, 2007, at A9; New Smallpox Vaccine to Be Reviewed by FDA, 
STAR-LEDGER (NEWARK), May 20, 2007, at 23; Original Smallpox Vaccine Shelved as Times 
Change: Dryvax Is Retired After Saving Many, STAR-LEDGER (NEWARK), Mar. 1, 2008, at 6. A 
genuinely safer version remains on the drawing board. See Renae Merle, Deal for Smallpox Vaccine 
Could Jump-Start BioShield, WASH. POST, June 7, 2007, at D1; see also Justin Gillis, Safer 
Smallpox Vaccines in Works: U.S. Preparing for Potential Bioterror Attack, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 
2005, at A1 (reporting that, in contrast to VaxGen’s less well studied but potentially more effective 
version, a modified version developed in Germany (licensed by Acambis and Bavarian Nordic) 
“essentially trades potency for safety”). Ultimately, VaxGen’s smallpox project stalled, while its 
anthrax vaccine efforts collapsed entirely. See Renae Merle, Anthrax Vaccine Contract Voided, 
Thwarting Administration, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2006, at A1. The more interesting question with 
Dryvax arose from earlier plans to extend (dilute) the limited existing stockpiles. See Sharon E. Frey 
et al., Clinical Responses to Undiluted and Diluted Smallpox Vaccine, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1265 
(2002). 
 174 See Noah, supra note 62, at 743 (discussing judicial recognition of price hikes and 
supply shortages that had coincided with dramatic increases in products liability litigation involving 
childhood vaccines); id. at 759-61, 763-64 (discussing the relationship between threatened tort 
liability and the removal of therapeutic products from the market); see also id. at 761-62, 764 
(explaining that legislative reforms also have attempted to respond to such concerns); Noah, supra 
note 48, at 2159 (“Critics of the regulatory compliance defense respond that a tort judgment does not 
dictate any alteration of primary conduct, but in the next breath they emphasize the need to retain the 
threat of liability to serve a deterrent function . . . . They can’t have it both ways.”). From 1977 to 
2000, only Lederle marketed OPV (as Orimune®); after 2000, no company in the U.S. produced a 
trivalent OPV product for the domestic market. 
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then it can continue producing the product (so long as it pays for any 
injuries that result), but why would it choose to do so (and, when it 
leaves the market, what will happen if polio makes a comeback)?! In 
what sense does a manufacturer that continues to market OPV after 1999 
(and properly labeled to indicate its use only in case of an emergency) 
act unreasonably—must it also offer IPV, or does it suffice that a pair of 
competitors had brought that allegedly superior product to the market 
more than a decade earlier? 
5. Isotretinoin 
In an article published two years later, Conk trotted out 
Accutane® (isotretinoin) as another example, though this one designed to 
illustrate the value of engaging in risk-utility balancing even in the 
absence of an FDA-approved RAD.175 In retrospect, this illustration also 
backfired, nicely demonstrating the pitfalls of his approach to judging 
design defect claims. First, Conk argued that the manufacturer’s method-
of-use patent (perhaps one of the weakest types of patents176) gave it a 
monopoly that discouraged the introduction of safer alternatives.177 
Although it would keep others from selling isotretinoin tablets of 
particular doses for the treatment of acne, it in no way prevented the 
  
 175 See Conk, supra note 21, at 761-71. As he explained in closing the discussion: 
The Accutane example demonstrates that the institutional competence problems with the 
section 2(b) alternative safer design test . . . are not so formidable as they might appear at 
first blush. . . . [S]mall changes yielded significant safety gains but were neglected until 
[the] approaching loss of a broad patent monopoly threatened the manufacturer-designer 
with loss of market control. 
Id. at 771. Actually, upon closer examination, it demonstrates just the opposite. 
 176 See William D. Noonan, Patenting Medical Technology, 11 J. LEGAL MED. 263, 283, 
287-88 (1990); Richard A. Castellano, Note, Patent Law for New Medical Uses of Known 
Compounds and Pfizer’s Viagra Patent, 46 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 283, 294-301, 308-11 (2006); see 
also Peter Landers, Nosed Out? With New Patent, Mayo Clinic Owns a Cure for Sniffles, WALL ST. 
J., Apr. 30, 2003, at A1 (reporting that a researcher had secured method-of-use patents for antifungal 
agents to treat sinusitis and chronic asthma, and contrasting this situation with the failure of 
researchers to do so for the use of antibiotics in treating ulcers). 
 177 See Conk, supra note 21, at 762-63 (“Such a patent-constrained market environment 
can create a type of market failure that impedes the availability of alternative, safer compositions or 
methods of manufacture, or alternative safer dosing methods.”). The method-of-use patent for 
isotretinoin would not have limited “safer compositions or methods of manufacture” as he claimed 
because those represent different types of patents, and it would not even prevent a “safer dosing 
method” that fell outside of the bounds of the range of doses disclosed in the patent. Cf. Bayer AG v. 
Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1249-54 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that a generic drug 
manufacturer’s micronized version would not infringe patents for nifedipine crystals of a defined 
specific surface area). Indeed, the decision in the Prozac case that he quotes at length, see Conk, 
supra note 21, at 758-59 n.87, invalidated a method-of-use patent, see Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., 
Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 969-72 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Merck & Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 
F.3d 1364, 1372-77 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (invalidating a method-of-use patent covering the once-weekly 
formulation of Fosamax® on grounds of obviousness); Warner-Lambert Co. v. Apotex Corp., 316 
F.3d 1348, 1351-53, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (rejecting a claim by the manufacturer of Neurontin® 
(gabapentin), which was labeled only for treating epilepsy but widely used in patients with 
neurodegenerative diseases, that approval of a generic version would infringe (or induce 
infringement of) its method patent covering such off-label uses). 
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development of other vitamin A derivatives for such uses (or of 
isotretinoin for entirely other uses).178 He cited one patent covering short-
course treatments for less serious forms of acne,179 but this would not 
have involved any alteration in the dosage formulation (only revisions in 
the drug’s labeling),180 and nothing prevented researchers from 
publicizing such an off-label use.181 Conk suggested that Roche should 
have had an obligation to look into this method and revise its instructions 
accordingly, but in the next breath he correctly recognized that this 
would have provided a basis for liability under section 6(d).182 So why on 
earth does he keep complaining about the unduly narrow scope of design 
defect claims under section 6(c)? 
Conk also emphasized that, shortly before expiration of its 
patent, Roche filed an application for FDA approval of a new and 
  
 178 See Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Cosprophar, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 1114, 1117 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(summarizing, in the course of resolving a Lanham Act case, the history behind tretinoin (Retin-A®), 
an FDA-approved retinoid-based topical acne drug sold by a subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson, 
which began developing a cream version (Renova®) for use against wrinkles after published research 
confirmed the efficacy of this off-label use), aff’d, 32 F.3d 690 (2d Cir. 1994); Lawrence K. Altman, 
Medical Dilemma: Necessary Drugs with Intolerable Dangers, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1988, at C3 
(reporting that Accutane “was the first to be licensed in what is expected to be a series of drugs 
derived from Vitamin A, called retinoids”); Gina Kolata, A Second Skin Drug Is Called Major 
Threat for Birth Defects, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1988, § 1, at 1 (“Drug manufacturers have created 
1,500 compounds that are closely related to Accutane, . . . and researchers are testing some to see if 
they can cure skin diseases, treat a variety of cancers or prevent cancer of the breast, lung or 
colon.”). 
 179 See Conk, supra note 21, at 763-64 & n.108. In arguing that Roche failed to 
investigate this potentially safer method of use, Conk misunderstood the difference between 
Accutane’s indication (severe recalcitrant nodular acne) and the researcher’s method-of-use patent 
(for “a patient having mild cystic acne or with scarring non-cystic acne”). Even after the expiration 
of Roche’s method patent, the researcher could not market such a product without going through the 
FDA approval process for this new indication and dosing regimen. 
 180 For more background on the drug’s regulatory milestones, including a history of its 
many labeling revisions, see FDA, Isotretinoin (Marketed as Accutane) Capsule Information, 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/accutane/default.htm (last visited June 19, 2008). In the last 
twenty-five years, the agency has imposed increasingly stringent controls on access to this drug. See 
Robert S. Stern, When a Uniquely Effective Drug Is Teratogenic: The Case of Isotretinoin, 320 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1007, 1008 (1989); Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Imposes Tougher Rules for Acne Drug, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2005, at A1 (“The new program is the latest and by far most drastic of more 
than 40 efforts by the agency in the last 22 years to reduce harm from Accutane . . . while allowing 
its continued use.”); see also Ami E. Doshi, Comment, The Cost of Clear Skin: Balancing the Social 
and Safety Costs of iPLEDGE with the Efficacy of Accutane (Isotretinoin), 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 
625, 659-60 (2007) (concluding that the FDA should withdraw approval). 
 181 See, e.g., Boaz Amichai et al., Low-dose Isotretinoin in the Treatment of Acne 
Vulgaris, 54 J. AM. ACAD. DERMATOLOGY 644 (2006). Another commentator provided a better 
apparent illustration of Conk’s point, suggesting that Amgen had shelved a patent on a protein 
binding factor that would have dramatically slowed the excretion (and therefore the dosages needed) 
of its blockbuster anemia drug Epogen® (recombinant erythropoietin). See Kurt M. Saunders, Patent 
Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 389, 395-96 (2002). To support this allegation, he relied entirely on an e-mail message later 
posted on a blog. See id. at 395 n.31. The only published information about this episode that I could 
find suggested that government officials failed to take this conspiracy theory the least bit seriously. 
See Consumer Advocates Say Company May Be Suppressing Research at University-Run Lab, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 1, 1998, at A49 (describing a letter from Ralph Nader and an associate 
requesting an investigation by the Federal Trade Commission). 
 182 See Conk, supra note 21, at 764. 
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improved (micronized) formulation of isotretinoin, and he cited the 
favorable internal agency reviews prepared in advance of an advisory 
committee meeting held in 2000.183 He expressed outrage that section 
6(c) would allow the manufacturer to get away with “an egregious case 
of warehousing an alternative safer design for deployment when the 
patent term expires.”184 Sounding like the good plaintiff’s lawyer that he 
is, Conk continued: 
A jury might reasonably conclude that the manufacturer’s timetable for 
development of the new, low-dose, more controllable product was dictated too 
much by market considerations and too little by concern for the safety and 
health of those who consumed the product, those who were aborted, or those 
born with grave deformities that might have been avoided if the dosing pattern 
had been lowered and the new formulation had been deployed earlier.185 
A clarion call for punitive damages if I ever heard one! Except for one 
minor problem: in spite of the endorsement of the internal reviewers, and 
notwithstanding the subsequent publication of the research that indicated 
limited advantages to the micronized version (though not at all with 
respect to the serious risk of birth defects),186 the FDA never approved 
the new formulation.187 Moreover, even if it had done so, this would not 
have prevented agency approval of generic versions of the original 
formulation,188 and sponsors willing to conduct new clinical trials could 
  
 183 See id. at 765-66, 767-69. 
 184 Id. at 769; see also id. (“[T]he social cost of the tardy development of the new product 
provides the basis for a finding of liability in favor of the deformed children of mothers who took 
Accutane (the old formula) when Roche could have brought the new formulation to market earlier 
instead of waiting for the end of the old product’s patent monopoly period.”). 
 185 Id. at 770; see also id. (adding that other plaintiffs probably will not have such 
damning evidence to use in bringing their design defect claims). 
 186 See John S. Strauss et al., A Randomized Trial of the Efficacy of a New Micronized 
Formulation Versus a Standard Formulation of Isotretinoin in Patients with Severe Recalcitrant 
Nodular Acne, 45 J. AM. ACAD. DERMATOLOGY 187, 194-95 (2001); John S. Strauss et al., Safety of 
a New Micronized Formulation of Isotretinoin in Patients with Severe Recalcitrant Nodular Acne: A 
Randomized Trial Comparing Micronized Isotretinoin with Standard Isotretinoin, 45 J. AM. ACAD. 
DERMATOLOGY 196 (2001); id. at 199 & tbl.2 (indicating that the researchers removed one subject 
who had become pregnant while taking the micronized version and then aborted). Indeed, to the 
extent that patients might find the micronized version more tolerable (because less likely to cause 
bothersome side effects such as dry eyes), see id. at 207, and because nothing suggested a reduced 
teratogenic risk at the lower (but equally bioavailable) dosage, one might have seen an increase in 
the overall number of birth defects had the FDA approved the newer version. 
 187 See Michelle Meadows, The Power of Accutane: The Benefits and Risks of a 
Breakthrough Acne Drug, FDA CONSUMER, Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 18 (discussing the limited product 
changes that came out of the September 2000 advisory committee meeting); see also John S. Strauss 
et al., Guidelines of Care for Acne Vulgaris Management, 56 J. AM. ACAD. DERMATOLOGY 651, 656 
(2007) (discussing the latest views about the use of isotretinoin, but making no mention of a 
micronized version apart from citing his pair of co-authored articles from 2001). For the current 
version of Accutane’s package insert, see http://www.rocheusa.com/products/accutane/pi.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 12, 2008). 
 188 In fact, generic versions of the drug became available in 2002. See Gideon Koren et 
al., Generic Isotretinoin: A New Risk for Unborn Children, 170 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 1567 (2004); 
see also Margaret A. Honein et al., Can We Ensure the Safe Use of Known Human Teratogens?: 
Introduction of Generic Isotretinoin in the US as an Example, 27 DRUG SAFETY 1069, 1075 (2004) 
(explaining that each generic version must use a parallel risk-management program). Generic 
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have secured approval of other variations of the original formulation of 
isotretinoin. Thus, Conk unwittingly again demonstrated the wisdom of 
the Reporters’ refusal to allow plaintiffs to rely on hypothetical RADs 
for prescription products. 
D. Designing Access Restrictions 
Critics have objected that section 6(c) conflicts with the well-
accepted proposition that product manufacturers should not get to warn 
their way out of a duty to adopt reasonable alternative designs.189 Apart 
from the previously discussed difficulties with redesigning drugs, this 
complaint fails to appreciate the centrality of labeling in helping to 
define a pharmaceutical product’s niche.190 Moreover, these issues may 
go beyond labeling to include choices about how and to whom a seller 
markets a drug.191 
For instance, with teratogens such as thalidomide and 
isotretinoin, plaintiffs might pursue negligent marketing claims on the 
theory that a prescription drug manufacturer should have further 
  
applicants would not, however, have gotten approval if the FDA had withdrawn the NDA for the 
pioneer’s original formulation on safety grounds. See 21 C.F.R. § 216 (2008) (listing such 
withdrawals). I found only a single instance where, at the license holder’s request, the agency had 
done so. See FDA, Notice, Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc.: Withdrawal of Approval of a New Drug 
Application, 68 Fed. Reg. 53,384, 53,385 (Sept. 10, 2003) (withdrawing Tegison® (etretinate) four 
years after its sponsor had begun marketing a safer version). 
 189 See, e.g., Cupp, supra note 44, at 253-54. As the Reporters subsequently explained: 
[T]he manufacturer’s first obligation is reasonable design; warnings logically come after, 
in order to deal with any remaining pockets of hidden risk that cannot reasonably be 
designed out of the product. With respect to prescription products, this logical sequence 
is necessarily reversed. Exposure to design-based liability comes into play only as a 
measure of last resort . . . . 
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 19, at 178-79. 
 190 See Joe Collier & Ike Iheanacho, The Pharmaceutical Industry as an Informant, 360 
LANCET 1405, 1405 (2002) (“Although the primary function of drug companies is to develop and 
market drugs, these companies spend more time and resources generating, gathering, and 
disseminating information.”); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y L. & ETHICS 717, 717-18 (2005) (“Drugs are information-rich chemicals that in many 
respects are more akin to other information products (such as databases) than they are to other 
chemicals . . . . Creating new molecules has become relatively cheap, but determining which 
molecules are safe and effective for which therapeutic purposes has remained stubbornly expensive . 
. . .”); see also Lars Noah, Authors, Publishers, and Products Liability: Remedies for Defective 
Information in Books, 77 OR. L. REV. 1195, 1212 (1998) (“[D]rug companies are actually engaged in 
the business of producing and selling information for use by patients and their physicians . . . . [T]he 
product defectiveness inquiry depends entirely on the information accompanying the product, such 
as the indications and contraindications for use.”); id. (“The conceptual separation between the 
product itself and information contained within the product, so evident in cases declining to hold 
authors and publishers strictly liable, is absent in the prescription drug liability context.”); cf. 
Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 385 (N.J. 1984) (noting that “an inadequate warning could 
constitute a design defect”). 
 191 Comment k to section 402A had referred separately to proper marketing and proper 
warnings as prerequisites (along with proper preparation) for exempting sellers of unavoidably 
unsafe products from strict liability claims. See Swayze v. McNeil Labs., Inc., 807 F.2d 464, 468 
(5th Cir. 1987). 
2009] RESTATING DRUG PRODUCTS LIABILITY 885 
restricted distribution.192 Such claims would represent a hybrid between 
more traditional defects in design and labeling,193 challenging a 
manufacturer’s choice about the appropriate channels for distributing 
potentially hazardous goods, such as items not appropriate for use by 
youngsters,194 in a way that resembles novel (and largely unsuccessful) 
theories asserted against gun sellers.195 
  
 192 See Lars Noah, Too High a Price for Some Drugs?: The FDA Burdens Reproductive 
Choice, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 231, 236-37 & n.23, 256 & n.100 (2007) (noting that the 
manufacturer of Accutane has faced claims that it should have taken steps beyond the issuance of 
stern warnings to both doctors and patients to ensure that women would not become pregnant while 
using this teratogenic drug, and adding that these lawsuits have failed on other grounds); cf. id. at 
239 (wondering whether the FDA could “demand that the manufacturer sell a bundled product (for 
example, a single pill that combined a teratogen with a hormonal contraceptive)”); Lars Noah, 
Ambivalent Commitments to Federalism in Controlling the Practice of Medicine, 53 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 149, 188-91 (2004) (discussing a variety of distribution restrictions on prescription drugs 
considered by regulatory officials). Congress recently granted the FDA express authority to restrict 
the distribution of prescription drugs to specially trained physicians. See Food and Drug 
Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 901(b), 121 Stat. 823, 930 (to be 
codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(3)(A)). 
 193 Some negligent marketing claims relate primarily to issues of product design, while 
others focus on the nature of the information communicated to users (i.e., advertising), but a third 
subset of negligent marketing claims—those that relate to distribution choices—do not fit as neatly 
into an existing liability box. See Richard C. Ausness, Tort Liability for the Sale of Non-Defective 
Products: An Analysis and Critique of the Concept of Negligent Marketing, 53 S.C. L. REV. 907, 
909-10, 915-16, 944-46 (2002); see also id. at 939 (“Just a few years ago, it appeared that negligent 
marketing was about to become a powerful tool in products liability litigation, particularly where the 
products involved were not ‘defective’ in the traditional sense.”); id. at 954 (“[A] manufacturer’s 
failure to actively monitor retail sales or to supervise the conduct of distributors and retail sellers 
seems more like nonfeasance than misfeasance.”); id. at 965 (concluding for a variety of reasons that 
courts should decline to recognize such claims). Although many of the broader critiques of this 
theory have force, the distinctive treatment of medical technologies for purposes of applying other 
liability rules may justify some willingness to entertain negligent marketing claims. Ausness also 
mentioned Rx drugs, though focusing primarily on OxyContin. See id. at 915-17, 945 & n.349; see 
also id. at 916 (making a passing reference to the diet drug combination fen-phen). OxyContin (like 
the handgun litigation) relates more to criminal misuse, see infra note 203, while fen-phen, which 
relates to problems of inappropriate off-label prescribing, better matches the type of negligent 
marketing claim that strikes me as worth considering. 
 194 See, e.g., Moning v. Alfono, 254 N.W.2d 759, 762 (Mich. 1977) (holding that a jury 
should resolve negligence claims against the manufacturer, wholesaler, and retailer of slingshots 
marketed directly to children); id. at 771 (“The issue in the instant case is not whether slingshots 
should be manufactured, but the narrower question of whether marketing slingshots directly to 
children creates an unreasonable risk of harm.”); cf. First Nat’l Bank of Dwight v. Regent Sports 
Corp., 803 F.2d 1431, 1435 (7th Cir. 1986) (rejecting failure-to-warn and negligent marketing claims 
against the manufacturer of metal-tipped lawn darts sold as appropriate for adults only, but allowing 
claims for violations of federal regulations prohibiting sales of such products through toy stores and 
similar retail outlets). 
 195 See, e.g., Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 28 P.3d 116, 119 (Cal. 2001); Chicago v. Beretta 
U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099, 1148 (Ill. 2004); Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 
1055, 1059 (N.Y. 2001); see also Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & John G. Culhane, Gun Torts: Defining 
a Cause of Action for Victims in Suits Against Gun Manufacturers, 81 N.C. L. REV. 115, 204-09 
(2002). But see Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1201-09 (9th Cir. 2003) (allowing a negligent 
marketing claim to proceed); City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136, 1141 
(Ohio 2002) (allowing a municipality to pursue such claims). Some of these lawsuits alleged that 
manufacturers of certain types of weapons or ammunition should not have sold these products to 
civilians, instead limiting their distribution to law-enforcement professionals and the military. See, 
e.g., McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 152, 156-57 (2d Cir. 1997) (noting, in the course of 
rejecting such a claim, that the manufacturer of Black Talon® bullets subsequently limited sales to 
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Although the Products Liability Restatement finds a bright line 
distinguishing prescription and nonprescription products, which it then 
uses to justify different rules for the former category (because of the 
power of differential marketing),196 pharmaceuticals actually fall along a 
continuum. For instance, stricter prescription requirements apply to 
controlled substances and certain teratogens (and the most restrictive 
access restrictions apply to investigational drugs dispensed to subjects 
enrolled in clinical trials). Although most people use prescription drugs 
on an out-patient basis, physicians order the administration of some 
medications in hospitals and other controlled settings.197 Conversely, the 
relatively recent phenomenon of advertising prescription drugs directly 
to consumers, as well as the advent of Internet prescribing and 
dispensing, may have made these products more similar to over-the-
counter (OTC) drugs.198 A few nonprescription drugs, in contrast, now 
require securing permission from a pharmacist,199 and plaintiffs might 
argue that other OTC pharmaceuticals also should move “behind-the-
counter” (or even to Rx status),200 but the Restatement reserves the 
  
professionals); id. at 163 (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (“Selling tanks to the armed forces is fine; selling 
them to the general public is, I would think, clearly negligent.”). 
 196 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 19, at 156, 170-73, 178-79; id. at 168-69 
(“[S]uch differentiation [in design defect standards based on users] is not possible for 
nonprescription products, which are available to everyone on the open market.”). 
 197 See, e.g., Press Release, FDA Approves Entereg to Help Restore Bowel Function 
Following Surgery, http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2008/NEW01838.html (May 20, 2008) 
(explaining that, in order to minimize risks relative to benefits, this drug will be restricted to 
inpatient use, only at specially certified hospitals, and patients may receive no more than fifteen 
doses). 
 198 See Chester Chuang, Note, Is There a Doctor in the House? Using Failure-to-Warn 
Liability to Enhance the Safety of Online Prescribing, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1452, 1483 & n.131 (2000) 
(imagining the emergence of a new class of “quasi-prescription” drugs, and suggesting that Rx 
antihistamines might qualify); id. at 1453 (“In an online world where the physician is conspicuously 
absent, or at best virtual, the learned intermediary doctrine breaks down . . . .”); see also Henderson 
& Twerski, supra note 19, at 173 n.91 (conceding that, if physicians routinely acquiesced in patient 
demands for heavily advertised products, “[t]his breakdown of the learned intermediary as a 
screening device would make marketing of prescription drugs not substantially different from that of 
nonprescription products”); infra notes 246-50. For more about direct-to-consumer advertising, see 
infra Part III.B. 
 199 See Daniel Healey, Plan BTC: The Case for a Third Class of Drugs in the United 
States, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 375, 375-77, 385-86 (2008) (explaining that the FDA conditioned 
approval for switches from prescription status of emergency contraceptive and smoking cessation 
products on an age restriction enforced by pharmacists); see also FDA, Notice of Public Meeting, 
Behind the Counter Availability of Certain Drugs, 72 Fed. Reg. 56,769 (Oct. 4, 2007) (seeking input 
about the merits of this approach). Federal law now requires behind-the-counter status (though not 
limited to pharmacies) for products containing pseudoephedrine, though this statute sought to 
prevent criminal diversion rather than any direct risks to the consumer. See 21 U.S.C. § 830(e) 
(2006); Jean C. O’Connor et al., Developing Lasting Legal Solutions to the Dual Problems of 
Methamphetamine Production and Use, 82 N.D. L. REV. 1165, 1178-79 (2006). 
 200 See Lars Noah, Treat Yourself: Is Self-Medication the Prescription for What Ails 
American Health Care?, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 359, 382-83 (2006); id. at 381 (“If an OTC drug 
with otherwise unassailable labeling and design causes an injury, then the victim might argue that 
the product should have been made available only under professional medical supervision and never 
sold directly to consumers.”); see also Howard Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Products, and 
Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1271 (1994) (“Why should the presence of a ‘good’ 
warning, no matter how explicit, prevent courts from considering the value of alternative marketing 
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narrow design defect test of section 6(c) for products already subject to 
prescription restrictions (though without drawing any distinctions among 
them).201 
Some commentators have suggested that drug manufacturers 
have a duty to cut off supplies to Internet companies that engage in 
irresponsible online prescribing and dispensing.202 More controversially, 
if general practitioners engaged in patterns of dangerous 
overprescribing,203 then a plaintiff might claim that the drug manufacturer 
had a duty to limit access to only some subset of responsible physicians 
(perhaps only certain specialists or physicians who have registered with 
the manufacturer after attesting to their knowledge of the risks involved 
  
strategies in light of the common tendency of people to overuse over-the-counter drugs that provide 
relief from chronic ailments?”). 
 201 Cf. supra note 15 (explaining that “medical foods” require a prescription). Separately, 
now that OTC drugs may offer some genuine clinical utility accompanied by non-trivial risks, why 
not treat these products as “unavoidably unsafe”? See Thomas M. Moore & Scott L. Hengesbach, 
Comment k: A Prescription for the Over-the-Counter Drug Industry, 22 PAC. L.J. 43, 55 n.57, 61-86 
(1990) (arguing that sellers of OTC drugs should receive the same exemption from strict liability 
claims granted to sellers of prescription drugs); Daniel W. Whitney, Product Liability Issues for the 
Expanding OTC Drug Category, 48 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 321, 324 (1993) (“[I]t is difficult to fathom 
how a Rx drug would lose its social utility merely because it is being made available OTC.”). After 
all, the movement of a product from prescription to nonprescription status does not alter its intrinsic 
character so much as the means of access and the method of marketing. Cf. Bober v. Glaxo 
Wellcome PLC, 246 F.3d 934, 939-40, 942 (7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting a consumer fraud claim against 
the manufacturer of Zantac® for suggesting that two doses of the 75 mg OTC version could not be 
substituted for the prescribed 150 mg version). The unpredictably of drug response would apply 
whether or not access requires a prescription, and OTC drugs encounter no less regulatory scrutiny 
than Rx drugs: indeed, for those that have gotten switched, they have undergone far closer FDA 
review. See Noah, supra note 200, at 365-66. In some instances, physicians may even “prescribe” 
OTC products. See infra note 249. 
 202 See Richard C. Ausness, Will More Aggressive Marketing Practices Lead to Greater 
Tort Liability for Prescription Drug Manufacturers?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 136 (2002) 
(forecasting that negligent marketing claims will be brought against manufacturers of prescription 
drugs when patients suffer injuries as a result of dispensing by unscrupulous Internet pharmacies); 
Chuang, supra note 198, at 1480-88; cf. Stephanie Feldman Aleong, Green Medicine: Using Lessons 
from Tort Law and Environmental Law to Hold Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and Authorized 
Distributors Liable for Injuries Caused by Counterfeit Drugs, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 245, 265-72 
(2007) (suggesting an entirely inapt nondelegable duty theory to hold manufacturers liable for 
hazardous counterfeiting). Serious practical difficulties would, however, complicate any such effort. 
See Chuang, supra note 198, at 1460-61 (noting that Pfizer had sought assistance from the Federal 
Trade Commission to combat online prescribing of Viagra); cf. Ceci Connolly, Pfizer Cuts Supplies 
to Canadian Drugstores, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 2004, at A10. The FDA once conditioned drug 
approval on restricted distribution through a single pharmacy. See Aaron Zitner, Date-Rape Drug 
OK’d to Treat Sleep Disorder, L.A. TIMES, July 18, 2002, at A12 (GHB); cf. Anna Wilde Mathews 
& Leila Abboud, FDA Approves Generic OxyContin, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2004, at A3 (“[T]he 
FDA has never limited any opioid to certain pharmacies, and agency officials say they don’t have 
the authority to block certain physicians from prescribing a drug.”). 
 203 Courts generally have rejected negligent marketing claims involving the opioid 
analgesic OxyContin. See, e.g., Labzda v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1355 (S.D. 
Fla. 2003); see also Phillip J. Wininger, Note, Pharmaceutical Overpromotion Liability: The Legal 
Battle over Rural Prescription Drug Abuse, 93 KY. L.J. 269, 281-94 (2004-2005) (evaluating the 
prospects for such claims). Imagine, however, that the manufacturer had sold OxyContin without the 
required legend for Schedule II controlled substances (or, worse yet, without even the Rx legend, 
which would make it available on OTC shelves alongside analgesics such as acetaminophen and 
ibuprofen); I assume that—whether called a design defect, informational defect, or negligent 
marketing claim—such a case would fall under the defectiveness per se rubric. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 4 & cmt. d (1998). 
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in the use of a product).204 Such a theory might morph into a design 
defect claim (viewing the drug product as a package or bundle that 
includes choices about how patients may secure access to it),205 which in 
turn would cast some doubt on the narrow conception of drug designs 
reflected in section 6(c).206 
III. INFORMATIONAL DEFECTS 
This Part considers alleged defects in the information that 
accompanies prescription products, especially those advertised directly to 
consumers. Under the “learned intermediary” rule, manufacturers 
satisfied their duty to warn of the hazards associated with Rx drugs by 
communicating risk information to physicians.207 Accordingly, section 
6(d) of the Products Liability Restatement provides as follows: 
  
 204 See Swayze v. McNeil Labs., Inc., 807 F.2d 464, 477 (5th Cir. 1987) (Goldberg, J., 
dissenting) (“McNeil could have prevented liability by removing, selectively, the [narcotic 
anesthesia] drug from hospitals that could not ensure that qualified doctors would prescribe [it, as 
opposed to certified nurse anesthetists who lacked prescribing privileges].”); see also Erik Eckholm 
& Olga Pierce, Methadone Rises as a Painkiller with Big Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2008, at A1 
(“Methadone, once used mainly in addiction treatment centers to replace heroin, is today being given 
out by family doctors, osteopaths and nurse practitioners for throbbing backs . . . and a host of other 
severe pains. . . . [The FDA] is now considering requiring doctors to take special classes on 
prescribing narcotics.”); cf. In re TMJ Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 97 F.3d 1050, 1060 (8th Cir. 
1996) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the manufacturer of Teflon should have ceased 
supplying this raw material to a medical device company because it knew of dangers associated with 
this application); Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480, 1485-86 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that a 
negligence claim could proceed against the supplier of mineral spirits where it knew that a retailer 
packaged the chemical in used milk jugs and sold the product without warnings); Mason v. Texaco 
Inc., 862 F.2d 242, 246 (10th Cir. 1988) (explaining that a “bulk seller [has] the obligation to sell 
only to knowledgeable and responsible distributors”). 
 205 See, e.g., Carl Salzman, Mandatory Monitoring for Side Effects: The “Bundling” of 
Clozapine, 323 NEW ENG. J. MED. 827 (1990) (describing a controversial (and short-lived) system of 
restricted distribution adopted by the manufacturer of the new antipsychotic Clozaril® (partly in 
response to liability fears) that included weekly blood testing as a prerequisite for dispensing the 
drug to schizophrenic patients in order to guard against fatalities caused by agranulocytosis, a side 
effect reported during clinical trials in less than 2% of subjects); see also Noah, supra note 190, at 
1214 (discussing other contexts that involve product bundling). When Celgene created its complex 
risk management program (S.T.E.P.S.) for Thalomid to guard against the risk of birth defects, it 
secured a patent on it (and, when Hoffmann-LaRoche had to create a similar program for Accutane, 
it purchased a license from Celgene). See Doshi, supra note 180, at 641 n.113. 
 206 See Margaret Gilhooley, When Drugs Are Safe for Some but Not Others: The FDA 
Experience and Alternatives for Products Liability, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 927, 945-47 (1999); id. at 946 
(“The best case for applying a distribution limit, if products liability law were to be extended to 
recognize a new type of defect, relates to misuse of a drug that poses grave risks not only to the 
immediate users, but also to the wider public.”). With little explanation, however, this commentator 
dismissed the possibility: 
Limiting the distribution of drugs, however, is too novel to be an appropriate basis for a 
finding of products liability. It is not clear, for example, how such a responsibility fits 
into the structure of the Restatement. A limit on distribution goes beyond being a 
warning, but unlike the typical design defect, it does not relate to a change in the 
formulation or dose of the drug. 
Id. at 945; see also id. at 946-49 (favoring, instead, patient-directed labeling to serve as a 
counterweight to inappropriate prescribing by physicians). 
 207 See infra Part III.A. 
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A prescription drug . . . is not reasonably safe due to inadequate instructions or 
warnings if reasonable instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of 
harm are not provided to: (1) prescribing and other health-care providers who 
are in a position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions 
or warnings; or (2) the patient when the manufacturer knows or has reason to 
know that health-care providers will not be in a position to reduce the risks of 
harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings.208 
When set alongside the blackletter formulation for design defects, which 
asked only whether a fully-informed health care professional would 
prescribe a product to any class of patients, the second clause of this 
provision imagines a different type of decisionmaking process when 
suggesting that manufacturers might have a duty to supply information to 
patients as well. Perhaps this language reflects an understanding of the 
physician’s primary role as related to product selection and only 
secondarily concerned with communicating risk information.209 The 
scope of section 6(d)(2)’s exception to the learned intermediary rule 
remains unclear. 
The Reporters initially tried to recognize an exception in 
situations where manufacturers had engaged in direct-to-consumer 
advertising (DTCA),210 which would have greatly expanded the duty of 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to warn patients. The final draft did not 
  
 208 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(d) (1998) (omitting parallel 
reference to “medical device”). The reference to “other” (non-prescribing) health-care providers 
recognizes that the assessment and treatment of adverse events may occur outside of the prescribing 
relationship and that manufacturers distribute professional labeling widely (and not only in ways that 
immediately accompany the particular product). See id. cmt. d. But cf. Kaplan et al., supra note 27, 
at 66 (“Manufacturers should not be required to warn unascertainable ‘others’ who, because of 
independent decisions made by doctors, have been enlisted in the treatment of patients.”). Non-
physician prescribers may qualify as learned intermediaries. See Walker v. Merck & Co., 648 F. 
Supp. 931, 934-35 (M.D. Ga. 1986) (treating nurses as learned intermediaries when they 
administered a vaccine), aff’d mem., 831 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1987); Wyeth-Ayerst Labs. Co. v. 
Medrano, 28 S.W.3d 87, 92-93 (Tex. Civ. App. 2000) (same, in case of an implanted contraceptive); 
see also infra note 236 (noting the extension of prescribing privileges). 
 209 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. d (1998) (“When 
prescribing health-care providers are adequately informed of the relevant benefits and risks 
associated with various prescription drugs and medical devices, they can reach appropriate decisions 
regarding which drug or device is best for specific patients.”); see also Thomas v. Hoffman-
LaRoche, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 224, 229 (N.D. Miss. 1989) (“[T]he physician through education, 
experience, and specialized training is in the best position to make a benefit/risk analysis in making 
the determination to prescribe a particular drug for a specific patient.”). One court suggested that the 
learned intermediary rule would not protect a manufacturer against a claim for failure to warn the 
general public of a drug recall. See Nichols v. McNeilab, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 562, 564-65 (E.D. Mich. 
1993) (distinguishing the notification of a drug withdrawal prompted by safety concerns from the 
risk information conveyed to patients at the time that a drug is initially prescribed); see also 
Francesca Lunzer Kritz, Recalls: Who Knew?, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2002, at F1 (reporting that 
patients often do not receive notifications of drug recalls). But cf. Windham v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 
786 F. Supp. 607, 611 (S.D. Miss. 1992) (finding that manufacturer had no duty to warn a patient 
who had filled a prescription three years earlier of newly acquired risk information). 
 210 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 103(a)(3)(iii) (Council 
Draft No. 1, 1993); see also Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers: Assessing the 
Regulatory and Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REV. 141, 161-68 (1997) (detailing the drafting history, 
and criticizing the claimed support for this exception). Parts III.A and III.B below borrow from (and 
update) my earlier article on this subject. See id. at 155-61, 169-79. 
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include this exception, instead explaining that the ALI took no position 
on the issue and left it for developing case law.211 As direct advertising of 
prescription drugs has continued to expand, plaintiffs predictably have 
urged courts to recognize such an exception to the learned intermediary 
rule,212 but so far only a single jurisdiction has taken this step.213 
A. Learned Intermediary Doctrine 
In essentially all jurisdictions, manufacturers of prescription 
drugs satisfy their common law duty to warn by providing precautionary 
information to physicians and others who act in the capacity of learned 
intermediaries.214 Thirty-five years ago the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit offered the following oft-quoted 
justification for this rule: 
Prescription drugs are likely to be complex medicines, esoteric in formula and 
varied in effect. As a medical expert, the prescribing physician can take into 
account the propensities of the drug, as well as the susceptibilities of his 
patient. His is the task of weighing the benefits of any medication against its 
potential dangers. The choice he makes is an informed one, an individualized 
medical judgment bottomed on a knowledge of both patient and palliative.215 
The physician essentially acts as a proxy, selecting a therapeutic product 
on the patient’s behalf. 
Only in situations where such an individualized decision is 
unlikely to be made—for example, when individuals receive vaccines 
through a mass immunization program—would a manufacturer have to 
provide a warning directly to the patient.216 A few courts have extended 
the mass immunization exception to other drugs, such as contraceptives, 
  
 211 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. at 174 (1998); see also Charles J. 
Walsh et al., The Learned Intermediary Doctrine: The Correct Prescription for Drug Labeling, 48 
RUTGERS L. REV. 821, 869 (1996) (calling section 6(d) a “tepid endorsement” of the learned 
intermediary doctrine). 
 212 See Bob Van Voris, Drug Ads Could Spell Legal Trouble: Consumer Campaigns May 
Result in Greater Liability, NAT’L L.J., July 21, 1997, at B1 (“[L]awyers on both sides of the issue 
agree that plaintiffs will use the ads to assault the learned intermediary defense.”). 
 213 See infra Part III.B.1. 
 214 See Ehlis v. Shire Richwood, Inc., 367 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting the 
nearly universal adoption of this doctrine); Guidry v. Aventis Pharm., Inc., 418 F. Supp. 2d 835, 840 
(M.D. La. 2006); Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 778 A.2d 829, 838 (Conn. 2001). But see State ex rel. 
Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899, 901 (W. Va. 2007) (rejecting the rule); id. at 904 
(finding that “the total number of jurisdictions recognizing the learned intermediary doctrine, either 
by decision of the highest court or by statute, is only twenty-two”). 
 215 Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974) (declining, however, to 
apply the rule because, although the polio vaccine qualified as a prescription drug, it had not been 
prescribed to the recipient in a conventional sense and more closely resembled the unsupervised use 
of an OTC drug); id. at 1277 (concluding that “Wyeth knew or had reason to know that the vaccine 
would not be administered as a prescription drug”). 
 216 See, e.g., Mazur v. Merck & Co., 964 F.2d 1348, 1361-64 (3d Cir. 1992); Allison v. 
Merck & Co., 878 P.2d 948, 958 n.16 (Nev. 1994). With regard to childhood vaccines, however, 
federal legislation has overridden the mass immunization exception. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(c) 
(2006); supra note 166. 
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for which a health care professional may not make an individualized 
judgment in prescribing a particular medication.217 Even so, the 
overwhelming majority of courts do not recognize any exception for 
contraceptives.218 In 1997, one state supreme court held that FDA-
mandated patient package inserts (PPIs) eliminated the learned 
intermediary rule,219 while several other courts have rejected any such 
exception.220 
The learned intermediary doctrine reflects several related, 
subsidiary rationales. First, courts do not wish to intrude upon the doctor-
patient relationship, and warnings that contradict information supplied by 
their physician might undermine the patient’s trust in the physician’s 
judgment.221 Second, physicians may be in a superior position to convey 
meaningful information to their patients,222 as they must do to satisfy 
their duty to secure informed consent.223 Third, drug manufacturers 
  
 217 See, e.g., Odgers v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 609 F. Supp. 867, 878-79 (E.D. Mich. 1985) 
(oral contraceptives); MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 69-70 (Mass. 1985) 
(same); see also Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1071 (8th Cir. 1989) (intrauterine devices). 
 218 See In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 955 F. Supp. 700, 704-05 & n.18 
(E.D. Tex. 1997) (collecting cases), aff’d, 165 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Martin v. Ortho 
Pharm. Corp., 661 N.E.2d 352, 356 (Ill. 1996) (observing that a “majority of courts . . . have held 
that the FDA regulations concerning contraceptive pharmaceuticals should not serve as a basis to 
displace or create exceptions to the learned intermediary doctrine”); cf. Doe v. Solvay Pharm., Inc., 
350 F. Supp. 2d 257, 272 (D. Me. 2004) (declining to extend the rationales underlying the 
contraceptive exception to an antidepressant prescribed for the treatment of obsessive-compulsive 
disorder). 
 219 See Edwards v. Basel Pharm., 933 P.2d 298, 301 (Okla. 1997) (“When direct warnings 
to the user of a prescription drug have been mandated by a safety regulation promulgated for the 
protection of the user, an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine exists . . . .”). The court also 
held that compliance with the FDA’s PPI requirement would not foreclose an inadequate warning 
claim. See id. at 301-03; see also Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652, 658 (1st Cir. 1981) 
(holding that compliance with FDA labeling requirements would not preclude tort liability). 
 220 See, e.g., Presto v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 487 S.E.2d 70, 73-74 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997); 
Martin, 661 N.E.2d at 356; Mikell v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 649 So. 2d 75 (La. Ct. App. 1994); 
see also In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 165 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Why 
the learned intermediary doctrine should somehow be less applicable when the severity of the side 
effects encourages the FDA to promote additional labeling escapes us.”). 
 221 See Brooks v. Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1232 (4th Cir. 1984) (“One in a serious 
medical condition . . . faces unwanted, unsettling and potentially harmful risks if advice, almost 
inevitably involved and longwinded, from non-physicians, contrary to what the doctor of his choice 
has decided should be done, must be supplied to him during the already stressful period shortly 
before his trip to the operating room.”); McKee v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 782 P.2d 1045, 1055 
(Wash. 1989) (suggesting that PPIs “may confuse and frighten the patient”). 
 222 See Brooks, 750 F.2d at 1232 (noting that “the question turns on who is in a better 
position to disclose risks”); Martin, 661 N.E.2d at 357 (“[P]rescribing physicians, and not 
pharmaceutical manufacturers, are in the best position to provide direct warnings to patients 
concerning the dangers associated with prescription drugs.”); MacDonald, 475 N.E.2d at 74 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Doctors, unlike printed warnings, can tailor to the needs and abilities of 
an individual patient the information that that patient needs in order to make an informed decision 
whether to use a particular drug.”). Professional labeling approved by the FDA may even urge 
physicians to communicate particular information to their patients. See Noah, supra note 42, at 321 
& n.117. Manufacturers may supply PPIs to physicians who directly administer or implant a product. 
See Humes v. Clinton, 792 P.2d 1032, 1043 (Kan. 1990) (granting summary judgment to IUD 
manufacturer where physician had neglected to hand out its PPIs in favor of a homemade leaflet). 
 223 See, e.g., Hutchinson v. United States, 915 F.2d 560, 562-63 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding 
that doctor was liable for not warning patient of risks involved with the use of asthma medication); 
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typically lack effective means to communicate directly with patients, 
making it necessary to rely on physicians to convey the relevant 
information—unlike OTC products, pharmacists usually dispense 
prescription drugs from bulk containers rather than as unit-of-use 
packages in which the manufacturer may have enclosed labeling.224 
Finally, because of the complexity of risk information about prescription 
drugs, comprehension problems would complicate any effort by 
manufacturers to translate physician labeling for lay patients.225 For this 
reason, even critics of the rule do not suggest that pharmaceutical 
companies should provide warnings only to patients and have no tort 
duty to warn physicians.226 
The learned intermediary rule has important consequences for 
litigation. When reduced to the question of whether the warning 
conveyed to a physician or other health care practitioner was adequate, 
plaintiffs will encounter greater difficulties getting a case to a jury.227 
  
MacPherson v. Searle & Co., 775 F. Supp. 417, 423 (D.D.C. 1991); Korman v. Mallin, 858 P.2d 
1145, 1149-51 (Alaska 1993) (describing the duty of physician to secure patient’s informed consent 
to treatment); Niemiera v. Schneider, 555 A.2d 1112, 1119-21 (N.J. 1989) (absolving manufacturer 
but remanding claim that physician failed to warn patient); Martin v. Hacker, 628 N.E.2d 1308, 
1311-13 (N.Y. 1993); see also Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598, 607 (Cal. 1993) (discussing the 
“uniquely human and necessarily situational ingredients that contribute to a specific doctor-patient 
exchange of information”). 
 224 See Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 130-31 (9th Cir. 1968) (observing that 
“it is difficult under such circumstances for the manufacturer, by label or direct communication, to 
reach the consumer with a warning,” and contrasting OTC drugs, but noting that means of 
communication other than labeling are available in a mass immunization program); see also FDA, 
Prescription Drug Product Labeling; Medication Guide Requirements, 60 Fed. Reg. 44,182, 44,197 
(Aug. 24, 1995) (defining “unit-of-use packaging” as “products [that] are pre-packaged in 
standardized amounts that can be dispensed directly to patients”); FDA, Revocation of Patient 
Package Insert Requirements, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,147, 39,150-51 (Sept. 7, 1982) (noting that oral 
contraceptives are unique in this sense, which assures that “each patient receives a patient brochure 
with the drug”). In recent years, pharmacists have experimented with computer-generated 
information sheets to accompany prescriptions, sometimes but not always with assistance from 
pharmaceutical manufacturers or medical associations. See Jonathan D. Rockoff, Prescription 
Leaflets Lack Key Safety Data, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2008, at D3; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Faulty 
Warning Labels Add to Risk in Prescription Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1999, at A27. 
 225 See, e.g., Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1070 (8th Cir. 1989) (noting that “the 
information regarding risks is often too technical for a patient to make a reasonable choice”); Reaves 
v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287, 1290 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (“As with other prescription 
drugs, patients are unlikely to understand technical medical information regarding the nature and 
propensities of oral contraceptives.”); see also AMA Council on Sci. Aff., Health Literacy, 281 
JAMA 552, 552 (1999); Lauran Neergaard, Doctors’ Orders, Drug Labels Often Misunderstood, 
PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 9, 2004, at A3 (reporting an estimate from the Institute of Medicine that 
ninety million Americans have limited health literacy). 
 226 Indeed, the first judicial opinion to use the “learned intermediary” terminology did so 
in a case where the prescription drug manufacturer had argued that it owed no duty to warn the 
physician. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966). Similarly, evidently 
no one has suggested freeing physicians of their duty to secure informed consent from patients when 
prescribing drugs accompanied by PPIs. 
 227 See, e.g., Ackermann v. Wyeth Pharms., 526 F.3d 203, 209-14 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(Effexor®); Ziliak v. AstraZeneca LP, 324 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir. 2003) (inhaled corticosteroid); 
Stahl v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 264-68 (5th Cir. 2002) (Lamisil®); id. at 268 
(“[W]hen a particular adverse effect is clearly and unambiguously mentioned in a warning label and 
the prescribing physician unequivocally states that he or she was adequately informed of that risk by 
the warning, the manufacturer has satisfied its duty to warn . . . .”); id. at 269-72 (finding no 
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Although physicians may have an incentive to shift blame to the drug 
manufacturer,228 normally they will testify that they understood the 
warnings provided by the company,229 as contrasted with a plaintiff’s 
testimony that the warning communicated to the physician seemed 
insufficient. Moreover, as contrasted with a consumer-directed warning 
to which jurors often can apply their own experience, plaintiffs may have 
to produce expert testimony to support an inadequacy claim.230 In some 
cases, of course, plaintiffs succeed in convincing juries that a warning 
directed to their physicians was inadequate, either because it failed to 
mention known risks,231 failed to draw sufficient attention to this 
information,232 was diluted by overpromotion of the product,233 or was not 
communicated through the most effective means available.234 
  
inadequacy in the instructions for monitoring liver function); Estate of LaMontagne v. Bristol-Myers 
Squibb, 111 P.3d 857, 862-65 & n.19 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (Glucophage®). 
 228 See S.H. Willig, Physicians, Pharmacists, Pharmaceutical Manufacturers: Partners in 
Patient Care, Partners in Litigation?, 37 MERCER L. REV. 755, 769-77 (1986). 
 229 See, e.g., Hall v. Merck, Sharp & Dohme, 774 F. Supp. 604, 606-07 (D. Kan. 1991); 
Wooten v. Johnson & Johnson Prods. Inc., 635 F. Supp. 799, 802-04 (N.D. Ill. 1986). Alternatively, 
physicians may concede that they had learned of the information from other sources, which would 
mean that any failure to warn did not cause the patient’s injury. See Motus v. Pfizer Inc., 358 F.3d 
659, 660-61 (9th Cir. 2004); Ellis v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 311 F.3d 1272, 1283 n.8 (11th Cir. 2002); Eck 
v. Parke, Davis & Co., 256 F.3d 1013, 1021-24 (10th Cir. 2001) (physician’s testimony that she 
already knew of the risk and would have selected the drug even with a fuller warning rebutted the 
heeding presumption); Miller v. Pfizer Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1126-30 (D. Kan. 2002), aff’d, 
356 F.3d 1326 (10th Cir. 2004); id. at 1129 n.108 (noting that the prescribing physician’s consulting 
relationship with the defendant would not provide the jury with a sufficient basis for disbelieving his 
testimony); Harden v. Danek Med., Inc., 985 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998); Noah, supra 
note 26, at 453; see also id. at 455 (“Courts have . . . declined to impose a duty on product sellers to 
educate health care providers about information that has appeared in the medical literature.”). 
 230 See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. MacMurdo, 562 So. 2d 680, 683 (Fla. 1990) (“[T]he adequacy 
or inadequacy of the warning to inform a physician must, except in the more obvious situations, be 
proved by expert testimony.”); Wyeth Labs., Inc. v. Fortenberry, 530 So. 2d 688, 692 (Miss. 1988) 
(“The adequacy of a warning addressed to the medical community may fall into the category of 
issues requiring expert testimony.”). 
 231 See, e.g., Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 745-46 (11th Cir. 1986); 
DeLuryea v. Winthrop Labs., 697 F.2d 222, 225 (8th Cir. 1983); Wooderson v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 
681 P.2d 1038, 1049-50, 1056-57 (Kan. 1984); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 389 (N.J. 
1984); see also Marks v. OHMEDA, Inc., 871 So. 2d 1148, 1156 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (sustaining the 
apportionment of full responsibility to the manufacturer of an anesthesia machine for carbon 
monoxide poisoning suffered by a patient where it had failed to warn hospital employees of this 
risk). 
 232 See, e.g., McNeil v. Wyeth, 462 F.3d 364, 368 (5th Cir. 2006); Thom v. Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co., 353 F.3d 848, 853-54 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that the adequacy of a warning 
presented a question for the jury where the package insert was “equivocal” in referring to reports of 
adverse effect as “rare” and only “temporally associated” but for which a “causal relationship . . . 
had not been established”); Bennett v. Madakasira, 821 So. 2d 794, 805-07 (Miss. 2002). 
 233 See, e.g., Caraker v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 172 F. Supp. 2d 1018, 1030 (S.D. Ill. 
2001); see also Axen v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 974 P.2d 224, 234 (Or. Ct. App. 1999) (relevant to 
punitive damages). 
 234 See, e.g., Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 146-47 (3d Cir. 1975); Mahr 
v. G.D. Searle & Co., 390 N.E.2d 1214, 1232 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Richards v. Upjohn Co., 625 P.2d 
1192, 1196-97 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980); see also Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Bailey, 878 So. 2d 31, 
55-59 (Miss. 2004) (noting that plaintiffs had argued “that Propulsid became a victim of label 
fatigue” by virtue of the five revisions to the package insert—sometimes accompanied by “Dear 
Doctor” letters—issued over the course of five years to convey increasingly alarming risk 
information, and concluding that this presented a question for the fact-finder). 
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The learned intermediary doctrine has attracted its share of 
critics who argue, among other things, that the defense reflects an 
anachronistic and excessively paternalistic model of the physician-
patient relationship and fails to take into account changes in the delivery 
of health care services.235 In particular, some critics argue that the 
emergence of managed care organizations has constrained physician 
autonomy so substantially that prescribing decisions may no longer 
reflect an informed medical judgment.236 Even so, in 2004, one of the last 
remaining jurisdictions not to have ruled on this issue expressly adopted 
section 6(d),237 while, in 2007, the West Virginia Supreme Court became 
the first jurisdiction to reject the learned intermediary rule altogether.238 
B. Debate over an Advertising Exception 
This Section canvasses the arguments made by proponents of an 
exception to the learned intermediary doctrine in DTCA cases,239 as 
reflected in an important decision from the New Jersey Supreme Court, 
and suggests a number of responses. Until the central feature that defines 
the marketing of prescription drugs—namely, the requirement that a 
  
 235 See, e.g., Timothy S. Hall, Reimagining the Learned Intermediary Rule for the New 
Pharmaceutical Marketplace, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 193, 195-99, 226-34, 261 (2004); Nancy K. 
Plant, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine: Some New Medicine for an Old Ailment, 81 IOWA L. 
REV. 1007, 1078 (1996) (concluding that “[r]adical changes in the health care system” justify 
elimination of the learned intermediary doctrine). But see Richard C. Ausness, Learned 
Intermediaries and Sophisticated Users: Encouraging the Use of Intermediaries to Transmit Product 
Safety Information, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1185, 1229-35 (1996) (arguing that, although 
manufacturers are best situated to generate risk information, only physicians and other 
intermediaries should have the duty to communicate this information to end-users); Walsh et al., 
supra note 211, at 880 (“The learned intermediary doctrine has proven durable. Its continuing 
viability is supported by the common sense notion that, in the case of prescription drugs, information 
is best directed toward medical professionals.”). 
 236 See Hall, supra note 235, at 226-27; Plant, supra note 235, at 1023-32. In addition, 
prescribing privileges have spread to health care professionals who do not have a medical degree. 
See Mary Beck, Improving America’s Health Care: Authorizing Independent Prescriptive Privileges 
for Advanced Practice Nurses, 29 U.S.F. L. REV. 951, 954 (1995) (explaining that eleven states give 
advanced practice nurses full prescribing authority, while thirty-seven states grant them limited 
prescribing authority subject to supervision by a physician); Phyllis Coleman & Ronald A. Shellow, 
Extending Physicians’ Standard of Care to Non-Physician Prescribers: The Rx for Protecting 
Patients, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 37, 45-71 (1998) (criticizing the extension of limited prescribing 
authority to advanced practice nurses, physician assistants, pharmacists, optometrists, and 
psychologists); Brent Pollitt, Fool’s Gold: Psychologists Using Disingenuous Reasoning to Mislead 
Legislatures into Granting Psychologists Prescriptive Authority, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 489, 507-24 
(2003). 
 237 See Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 758 (Ky. 2004) (declining, however, to take any 
position on possible exceptions). 
 238 See State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 2007); see 
also Jerica L. Peters, Note, State v. Karl: An Unreasonable Rejection of the Learned Intermediary 
Doctrine, 48 JURIMETRICS J. 285, 301-02, 305-08 (2008) (criticizing the decision). 
 239 See, e.g., Teresa Moran Schwartz, Consumer-Directed Prescription Drug Advertising 
and the Learned Intermediary Rule, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 829 (1991); Tim S. Hall, Note, 
Bypassing the Learned Intermediary: Potential Liability for Failure to Warn in Direct-to-Consumer 
Prescription Drug Advertising, 2 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 449 (1993). For my earlier and more 
detailed responses to their particular arguments, see Noah, supra note 210, at 169-79. 
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medical professional authorize the purchase by a particular patient—is 
modified,240 the learned intermediary rule does not lose its force simply 
because a company chooses to promote its product directly to 
consumers.241 Plaintiffs’ lawyers do their share of tacky (and potentially 
hazardous) direct advertising to users of prescription products,242 but 
surely they would not have to fear tort claims brought by patients who 
discontinued a prescribed (and still net beneficial) course of treatment (or 
simply became anxious) in response to exaggerated risk information 
appearing in ads trolling for clients.243 
Preliminarily, however, the possibility of recognizing an 
advertising (or other) exception raises questions about the 
interrelationship between the design and warning provisions of the 
Products Liability Restatement.244 If an exception to the learned 
  
 240 Arguments about the reduced role of physicians in health care delivery, if taken to an 
extreme, may suggest that the existing prescription restrictions no longer make any sense. Perhaps 
someday patients will purchase any drugs that they would like, whether recommended by a 
physician, nurse, neighbor, or pharmaceutical company. In the meantime, however, a medical 
professional will continue to intervene in the decision to prescribe a drug and make the final 
judgment about its relative risks and benefits for a particular patient. It would constitute professional 
malpractice to do otherwise. See supra note 223; see also Plant, supra note 235, at 1055-62 
(elaborating on the informed consent duties of prescribers). 
 241 Wholly apart from the liability issues, DTCA continues to generate heated debate. See 
Julie M. Donohue et al., A Decade of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 357 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 673, 674 (2007); Matthew F. Hollon, Editorial, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising: 
A Haphazard Approach to Health Promotion, 293 JAMA 2030 (2005); Richard L. Kravitz, Direct-
to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs: Implications for the Patient-Physician 
Relationship, 284 JAMA 2244 (2000); Nat Ives, FDA Ponders Pros and Cons of the Ways 
Prescription Drugs Are Promoted to Consumers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2003, at C11; Bruce Japsen, 
AMA Urges a No-Ad Period for New Drugs, CHI. TRIB., June 15, 2006, at 1. 
 242 See Bernstein, supra note 118, at 1965, 1973, 1976-77, 1980 n.116, 1981; Schwartz & 
Goldberg, supra note 40, at 166 & n.204; Chen-Sen Wu, Distributive Justice in Pharmaceutical 
Torts: Justice Where Justice Is Due?, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Fall 2006, at 207, 223-24; Mary 
Flood, Drug Doubts Put Lawyers in Motion, HOUS. CHRON., June 10, 2007, at Bus. 1 (reporting that 
plaintiffs’ attorneys use newspaper and television ads and “case-soliciting Web sites that already 
look like a pharmacy’s inventory, except that the drugs listed are alleged to cause harm,” and adding 
that the manufacturer of the latest target (the diabetes drug Avandia®) expressed concern that 
“lawyer ads could frighten patients into discontinuing their medicine, which could endanger their 
health”); id. (noting that one Houston firm’s phone number is “1-800-BAD-DRUG”); Joseph P. 
Fried, Specialty Lawyers Gear up for Suits over Two Medications, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2000, § 1, at 
28; see also David Brown, Scientist’s Two Roles in Study May Conflict, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 2004, 
at A10 (reporting that the author of a controversial study linking autism to a type of vaccine had 
failed to disclose his closely related work for a plaintiff’s lawyer done under a grant of nearly 
$90,000 from a legal aid society). One of my favorites aired during the summer of 2008, from a 
series of ads run by the firm Ferrer Poirot & Wansbrough on various cable channels, was styled as a 
“Medical Alert!” and did not focus on any particular drug but instead a class of serious side effects 
(Stevens Johnson syndrome or toxic epidermal necrolysis) allegedly associated with two dozen 
(mostly still marketed, and many OTC) pharmaceutical products. One of the firm’s latest TV spots 
(focusing on the risk of diabetes associated with the atypical antipsychotic drug Seroquel®) helpfully 
tells prospective clients not to discontinue treatment without first checking with their doctors. 
 243 Cf. Bailey v. Huggins Diagnostic & Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 952 P.2d 768, 770-73 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1997) (rejecting tort claims against the author of a book that had exaggerated the risks 
associated with mercury in dental amalgam). 
 244 Similarly, as a reasonable physician test has begun to displace the traditional custom-
based standard of care, courts have had to rethink various subsidiary malpractice doctrines. See 
Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the Millennium, 
57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 166-68 (2000). 
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intermediary rule covers a particular case, such as mass immunizations, 
should that also render inapplicable section 6(c)’s physician-based design 
defect standard in favor of the more open-ended test of section 2(b)?245 
How about the far less common contraceptive exception—if section 
6(d)(2) would allow a failure-to-warn claim because the learned 
intermediary has fallen out of the picture, would that also render 
inapplicable the protective design defect standard of section 6(c)?246 The 
Reporters subsequently considered this difficulty, though only in 
connection with a possible advertising exception, but they thought that 
such an “unlikely juncture” lay “far in the future.”247 
Separately, if courts increasingly recognized exceptions to the 
learned intermediary rule that depended on the particulars of the relative 
degree of consumer and physician involvement in product selection,248 
then why not work it in the other direction—for instance, when health 
care professionals select OTC drugs for their patients?249 Of course, a 
categorical rule—as the Reporters preferred for design defects and 
ultimately (though incompletely) accepted for warning claims—avoids 
the uncertainty that would attend a case-by-case inquiry into whether a 
  
 245 Courts following Restatement (Second) § 402A comment k did not do so categorically 
when finding that a drug had not satisfied one of the prerequisites for this immunity from strict 
liability design defect claims; instead, the failure, for instance, to supply a proper warning to patients 
might render comment k’s protection against design defect claims inapplicable in the particular case. 
Under the Products Liability Restatement, at least insofar as prescription drug manufacturers had 
warned patients adequately in such cases, a design defect claim might offer plaintiffs their only 
recourse. The mass immunization exception may not, however, provide a good test of this difficulty 
because public health authorities have made a societal risk-benefit judgment. See supra note 165 and 
accompanying text. 
 246 Cf. Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1195 n.7 (Alaska 1992) (“In strict liability 
design cases involving such [atypical prescription] products, it may be appropriate to apply the 
‘ordinary consumer expectation’ test rather than the ‘ordinary doctor expectation test.’”). 
 247 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 19, at 173. 
 248 As happened, for instance, in cases extending the mass immunization exception to 
other settings involving vaccine administration. See Hall, supra note 235, at 206 & n.55, 209-10; see 
also id. at 198 (advocating in all cases “a fact-based inquiry to determine whether the drug in 
question was in fact sold in the absence of an effective intermediary”); id. at 205, 239-54, 261 
(same); id. at 220-21, 231, 244 (arguing that § 6(d) represented a move in this direction); id. at 216-
19 (objecting to the blanket application of the rule subject only to narrow categorical exceptions). 
For a new twist on immunizations, see Stephen Smith, Fly-by Flu Shot: No Need to Get out of the 
Car—Vaccination Is Available at Hospital’s Drive-through, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 29, 2008, at B1. 
 249 See, e.g., Ferrara v. Berlex Labs., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 552, 553-55 & n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1990) 
(applying the doctrine to reject claims for failing to warn of dangerous interaction against the 
manufacturers of a prescription antidepressant and an OTC decongestant prescribed by the plaintiff’s 
physician); see also Kelley v. Wiggins, 724 S.W.2d 443, 449-50 (Ark. 1987) (affirming verdict 
against a clinic for negligently using Sudafed® in high-risk patient); Sharkey v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 
600 So. 2d 701, 711 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (crediting a physician’s testimony that he would not have 
recommended aspirin for a child with flu-like symptoms if the OTC label had included a fuller 
warning of the risk of Reye’s syndrome); Noah, supra note 42, at 321 & n.117, 338 (noting that the 
FDA sometimes approves separate professional labeling for OTC drugs); Peter Temin, Realized 
Benefits from Switching Drugs, 35 J.L. & ECON. 351, 358-59 (1992); Whitney, supra note 201, at 
329-30 (arguing that the learned intermediary rule should apply in such cases). But see Mitchell v. 
VLI Corp., 786 F. Supp. 966, 970 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (declining to apply the learned intermediary rule 
to an OTC contraceptive sponge that a physician had supplied to his patient). 
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particular physician-patient encounter passed some threshold for 
applying the learned intermediary doctrine.250 
1. Norplant Litigation 
In Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories Inc.,251 the New Jersey Supreme 
Court adopted an exception to the learned intermediary rule whenever a 
prescription drug manufacturer has engaged in direct-to-consumer 
advertising. The case involved Norplant® (levonorgestrel), an 
implantable long-acting contraceptive product.252 The consolidated 
lawsuits claimed that the manufacturer had failed to warn patients of a 
litany of alleged side effects of use and complications associated with 
removal of the product.253 The trial judge dismissed the complaints,254 but 
the state supreme court reversed. After taking apparent comfort in the 
fact that the Products Liability Restatement had left the question to 
developing case law,255 the majority concluded that DTCA undermined 
most of the rationales thought to justify the learned intermediary rule.256 
Although essentially no one doubts that direct advertising has 
altered the dynamic between patients and their physicians when 
considering the use of a drug promoted in this fashion,257 the dissent 
  
 250 See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text (explaining that the use of 
prescription status as a bright line rule for selecting among design defect standards suffers from both 
under- and overinclusiveness). 
 251 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999). 
 252 See id. at 1247, 1251; see also Allan J. Coukell & Julia A. Balfour, Levonorgestrel 
Subdermal Implants: A Review of Contraceptive Efficacy and Acceptability, 55 DRUGS 861, 881-83 
(1998); Gina Kolata, Will the Lawyers Kill Off Norplant?, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1995, § 3, at 1. 
Shortly after the court’s decision, the defendant negotiated a global settlement. See Gardiner Harris 
& Robert Langreth, After Setbacks, American Home Plans Remedies, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 1999, at 
B1. The manufacturer no longer sells this product. See Erin Allday, FDA Approves New 
Contraceptive Injected in Arm: Norplant-like Device Used in Europe Will Be Available in ‘07, S.F. 
CHRON., July 19, 2006, at A2 (reporting that Norplant was withdrawn in 2002). 
 253 See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1248. 
 254 See id. at 1249. 
 255 See id. at 1253; cf. id. at 1267 (Pollock, J., dissenting) (“Given the statutory basis for 
the learned intermediary doctrine in New Jersey, recourse to the Restatement . . . is gratuitous.”). The 
majority rejected the argument emphasized by the dissenting opinion that the state legislature had 
codified the learned intermediary rule. See id. at 1253-54 (majority opinion). 
 256 See id. at 1255-57, 1263. In the course of its opinion, the majority quoted several 
passages from my earlier article on the subject, see id. at 1251-52, 1255-56, 1258, but evidently 
failed to notice that I had concluded that the exception made no sense, citing instead a student note 
published in the William Mitchell Law Review as supporting its ultimate conclusion, see id. at 1256. 
Indeed, immediately after quoting my summary of the rationales underlying the learned intermediary 
rule, the majority offered a brief synopsis that blatantly mischaracterized some of these before 
explaining that at least three of the four became inapplicable when manufacturers engage in DTCA. 
See id. at 1255-56. As the dissent briefly explained, all four of the rationales remained pertinent. See 
id. at 1269 (Pollock, J., dissenting). 
 257 See Matthew F. Hollon, Direct-to-Consumer Marketing of Prescription Drugs: 
Creating Consumer Demand, 281 JAMA 382, 383-84 (1999); Richard L. Kravitz et al., Influence of 
Patients’ Requests for Direct-to-Consumer Advertised Antidepressants: A Randomized Controlled 
Trial, 293 JAMA 1995, 2000 (2005); Steven Pearlstein, Drug Firms Take a Dose of Responsibility 
for Ads, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2005, at D1 (“A study by the Kaiser Family Foundation found that 
each $1 invested in advertising yields an extra $4.20 in sales.”); FDA Survey Finds Drug Ads 
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emphasized that, at least with respect to Norplant (a hybrid drug-device 
product requiring surgical implantation),258 doctors would continue 
playing a central role.259 The majority also never explained how such 
advertising rendered inapplicable concerns that supplying comprehensive 
risk information directly to patients might cause them to discontinue 
needed treatments,260 much less that a manufacturer could do this in a 
way reasonably comprehensible to lay persons.261 
  
Influence Requests by Patients, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 2003, at D5. But see John E. Calfee et al., 
Direct-to-Consumer Advertising and the Demand for Cholesterol-Reducing Drugs, 45 J.L. & ECON. 
673, 683-86 (2002) (finding little evidence that DTCA increased short-term demand for statins, but 
noting beneficial effects such as improved patient compliance with already prescribed treatments). 
For instance, it appears that the aggressive marketing of COX-2 inhibitors led to the dangerous 
overprescribing of these drugs. See Marc Kaufman, New Study Criticizes Painkiller Marketing: 
Arthritis Drug Ads a Factor in Overuse, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2005, at A1; Barry Meier et al., 
Medicine Fueled by Marketing Intensified Trouble for Pain Pills, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2004, § 1, 
at 1. 
 258 Cf. William E. Boden & George A. Diamond, DTCA for PTCA—Crossing the Line in 
Consumer Health Education?, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2197, 2200 (2008) (“[A drug-eluting] stent 
can be selected and implanted only by someone with a very sophisticated medical understanding . . . 
. It seems almost unimaginable . . . that a cardiologist would accede to a patient’s request for a 
particular stent on the basis of the information gleaned from a television ad.”). Implanted devices 
that have no drug component also have become the subject of such campaigns. See Ross Kerber, 
Device Makers Target Consumers with Their Ads, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 10, 2004, at C1; see also 
FDA, Draft Guidances for Industry on Improving Information About Medical Products and Health 
Conditions, 69 Fed. Reg. 6308, 6309 (Feb. 10, 2004) (issuing a guidance for consumer advertising of 
restricted devices). 
 259 See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1267-68 (Pollock, J., dissenting); see also Jerry Menikoff, 
Demanded Medical Care, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1091, 1109 n.45, 1116 (1998) (“[I]t would be highly 
unusual for a physician to view her power to write a drug prescription as merely a requirement to 
make sure that the patient was adequately informed about the drug.”); Steven H. Miles, Informed 
Demand for “Non-Beneficial” Medical Treatment, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 512, 513-14 (1991); 
Michelle D. Ehrlich, Note, Doctors Can “Just Say No”: The Constitutionality of Consumer-Directed 
Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 12 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 535, 550, 553-55 (1990) 
(“[T]he physician—and not the patient/consumer—makes the ultimate decision of what drug a 
patient will purchase.”); cf. Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206, 218 (Pa. 1971) (“We decline to 
accept the proposition that a qualified doctor can so easily turn himself into a dupe [by alleging that 
sales representatives had pressured him into prescribing the drug].”), abrogated on other grounds by 
Kaczkowski v. Bolubasz, 421 A.2d 1027 (Pa. 1980). The majority belatedly recognized as much. See 
Perez, 734 A.2d at 1263-64. Nonetheless, it decided as a matter of policy that physicians’ 
foreseeable intervention (and their failure to convey or act upon risk information that they had 
received from the drug manufacturer) would not amount to a superseding cause. See id. at 1260-63 
(adding, however, that a jury could allocate relative shares of responsibility to these joint 
tortfeasors). But see Krasnopolsky v. Warner-Lambert Co., 799 F. Supp. 1342, 1346 (E.D.N.Y. 
1992) (superseding cause). 
 260 Extensive warnings conveyed directly by pharmaceutical manufacturers might make 
patients lose trust in their physicians or discontinue necessary drug therapies because of undue 
anxiety about the reported side effects that the physician felt did not deserve mention or emphasis in 
a particular case—after all, advertisements emphasize benefits and come before the patient visits a 
physician, while PPIs emphasize risks and reach patients only upon drug dispensing. 
 261 Cf. Raymond L. Woosley, Drug Labeling Revisions—Guaranteed to Fail?, 284 JAMA 
3047, 3048 (2000) (“In the last 25 years, the package inserts for new drugs have increased in length 
more than 5-fold. For example, the 2-page package insert for cisapride, when printed in 12-point font 
on 8.5 x 11 paper, is more than 10 pages long and contains more than 470 facts about the drug.”). 
For a critique of the Perez decision from the perspective of a practicing physician (enrolled in law 
school), see Timothy McIntire, Note, Legal and Quality of Patient Care Issues Arising from Direct-
to-Consumer Pharmaceutical Sales, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 105, 127-28, 130-33 (2002); see also id. at 
108-09, 134 (emphasizing the difficulty in trying to translate complex risk information for patients); 
supra note 225. 
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Moreover, although no one doubts that physicians often fail to 
engage in meaningful (tailored) discussions with patients about drugs 
risks,262 imposing such an obligation on manufacturers may further 
reduce the incentives of conscientious physicians even to try. Evidently 
the majority thought that Norplant, like some of the other examples it 
had cited, did not qualify as a therapeutically important product,263 
echoing suggestions made by some commentators that another exception 
to the learned intermediary doctrine should apply to “lifestyle” drugs and 
devices, whether or not directly advertised to consumers.264 
The majority opinion repeatedly suggested that Wyeth should 
not enjoy protection from liability for failing to warn patients directly 
when it has aimed misleading advertisements at them,265 but it conceded 
that this characterization assumed that the plaintiffs would manage to 
prove their allegations at trial.266 In fact, the plaintiffs may not have seen 
  
 262 See Stolberg, supra note 224, at A27 (“In a 1997 survey of 1,000 patients, the F.D.A. 
found that only one-third had received information from their doctors about the dangerous side 
effects of drugs they were taking.”). 
 263 See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1257 (“Further, when one considers that many of these ‘life-
style’ drugs or elective treatments cause significant side effects without any curative effect, 
increased consumer protection becomes imperative, because these drugs are, by definition, not 
medically necessary.”); infra note 266 (discussing the majority’s references to promotional 
campaigns for seemingly trivial drugs); see also Odgers v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 609 F. Supp. 867, 
878-79 (E.D. Mich. 1985) (oral contraceptives). 
 264 See, e.g., Kathy A. King-Cameron, Comment, Carving Another Exception to the 
Learned Intermediary Doctrine: Application of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine in Silicone 
Breast Implant Litigation, 68 TUL. L. REV. 937, 969-70 (1994); see also Hall, supra note 235, at 197 
& n.10, 229-30, 237, 243, 250 (arguing that the “lifestyle” use of a drug should count as a factor 
against application of the learned intermediary rule); Susan A. Casey, Comment, Laying an Old 
Doctrine to Rest: Challenging the Wisdom of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 19 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 931, 952-55 (1993) (arguing that an advertising exception should exist at least 
with regard to elective prescription drugs and medical devices promoted to consumers for cosmetic 
purposes, such as acne treatments and breast implants). For a critique of the suggestion that such a 
distinct category exists, see supra notes 105-19 and accompanying text. 
 265 See, e.g., Perez, 734 A.2d at 1257 (“It is one thing not to inform a patient about the 
potential side effects of a product; it is another thing to misinform the patient by deliberately 
withholding potential side effects while marketing the product as an efficacious solution to a serious 
health problem.”); id. (“The question is whether the absence of an independent duty to warn patients 
gives the manufacturer the right to misrepresent to the public the product’s safety.”); id. at 1261 
(declining to “insulate the manufacturer who has engaged in deceptive trade practices”); id. at 1264 
(“[W]e must decide if a pharmaceutical manufacturer is free to engage in deceptive advertising to 
consumers. . . . [The learned intermediary rule] does not confer on pharmaceutical manufacturers a 
license to mislead or deceive consumers when those manufacturers elect to exercise their right to 
advertise their product directly to such consumers.”). 
 266 See id. at 1247-48; id. at 1263 (“acknowledg[ing] that the procedural posture of this 
case casts defendant’s product in an unfair light”). Elsewhere in the opinion, the majority painted an 
unflattering picture of DTCA, citing advertisements involving entirely different pharmaceutical 
products, indicated for the treatment of allergies, baldness, erectile dysfunction, and excess weight. 
See id. at 1247, 1251-53, 1260, 1264. It also discussed changes in health care delivery that made it 
more difficult for physicians to spend time having meaningful discussions with their (increasingly 
pushy) patients. See id. at 1247, 1255, 1260; see also id. at 1262 n.6 (Internet prescribing). The 
dissent admonished the majority for going beyond the confines of the record developed in the 
Norplant cases before the court. See id. at 1268 (Pollock, J., dissenting) (“Through the incorporation 
of presumed facts, the majority has created a phantom record . . . .”). 
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any of the allegedly misleading ads,267 and it also seems implausible that 
the print ads in major magazines would have failed to comply with the 
FDA’s relatively clear command that the full prescribing information 
appear on the next page.268 What the plaintiffs wanted, however, was not 
clearer risk information in advertisements that they may not have seen 
(or remembered); instead, they sought printed warnings to accompany 
the drugs when later dispensed to them. 
If other courts around the country followed New Jersey’s lead in 
recognizing this exception to the learned intermediary rule, it would have 
the effect of requiring that manufacturers wishing to engage in DTCA 
produce and disseminate comprehensive PPIs. No other court has done 
so to this point, and several courts have rejected the proposed 
exception.269 The West Virginia Supreme Court, however, relied heavily 
on Perez when it recently decided to reject the learned intermediary rule 
altogether.270 
  
 267 See id. at 1260 (majority opinion); id. at 1268 (Pollock, J., dissenting); cf. In re 
Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 955 F. Supp. 700, 707-08 & n.45 (E.D. Tex. 1997) 
(declining to address arguments in favor of an exception because the plaintiffs had not seen any 
advertisements), aff’d, 165 F.3d 374 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 268 See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1263 (referring to an agreed statement of facts that seemed to 
concede as much); cf. id. at 1258 (summarizing the agency’s “brief statement” and other still 
evolving requirements). The majority referenced ads appearing in Glamour, Mademoiselle, and 
Cosmopolitan in 1991. See id. at 1248; see also William Green, Consumer-Directed Advertising of 
Contraceptive Drugs: The FDA, Depo-Provera, and Product Liability, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 553, 
555-58 (1995) (describing Upjohn’s print ads for another long-acting contraceptive sold in the early 
1990s); id. at 566 (concluding that “the Depo-Provera advertisement appears to comply with section 
502(n)’s brief summary requirement”). No doubt the small print did not include disclosures of 
alleged risks that only later came to light, but, so long as these ads had included the latest prescribing 
information, they would not have run afoul of agency requirements (or, for that matter, represent 
inadequate warnings under state law if the risks were unknowable). 
 269 See In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 165 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 
1999); Porter v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 1:06-CV-1297-JOF, 2008 WL 544739, at *7-9 (N.D. Ga. 
2008); Beale v. Biomet, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1376 (S.D. Fla. 2007); Cowley v. Abbott Labs., 
Inc., 476 F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1060 n.4 (W.D. Wis. 2007); In re Meridia Prods. Liab. Litig., 328 F. 
Supp. 2d 791, 812 n.19 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (“Five years have passed since the New Jersey Supreme 
Court decided Perez. In the intervening period, no other state has followed New Jersey’s lead.”), 
aff’d, 447 F.3d 861 (6th Cir. 2006); Heindel v. Pfizer, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 2d 364, 378 (D.N.J. 2004) 
(applying Pennsylvania law); see also Banner v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 891 A.2d 1229, 1236-37 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (declining to apply Perez where a drug manufacturer simply had 
provided brochures for doctors to give to their patients); Rowe v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 892 
A.2d 694, 700 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006). Nor have courts found the learned intermediary rule 
inapplicable when patients assert misrepresentation claims based on direct advertising. See Miller v. 
Pfizer Inc., 196 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1119-22 (D. Kan. 2002) (Zoloft®); N.J. Citizen Action v. 
Schering-Plough Corp., 842 A.2d 174, 176-78 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (Claritin®). As 
suggested below, see infra note 274, that position strikes me as harder to defend. 
 270 See State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899, 908-10 (W. Va. 
2007); see also Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1214-24 (D.N.M. 2008) 
(predicting that the New Mexico Supreme Court would do the same). The Karl case involved 
Propulsid® (cisapride), and, although serious questions have arisen about promotional efforts for this 
drug aimed at physicians, it apparently was not heavily advertised directly to patients. See Gardiner 
Harris & Eric Koli, Lucrative Drug, Danger Signals and FDA, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2005, at A1. 
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2. Satisfying an Expanded Duty to Warn 
The Perez majority hastened to add that, as provided by state 
statute, the defendant would enjoy a rebuttable (or stronger) presumption 
of adequacy so long as the warnings complied with FDA requirements.271 
This reflects a potentially serious misunderstanding of the intended 
purpose of the agency’s advertising rules (and it also fails to appreciate 
the entirely flimsy nature of the FDA’s recent non-rule pronouncements 
on the subject272): these do not attempt to fulfill a risk disclosure function 
so much as to ensure fair balance.273 If the plaintiffs had not, in fact, seen 
any Norplant ads, then compliance with agency requirements designed to 
prevent misleading advertising could hardly have satisfied the new-found 
duty to warn patients directly.274 If extended to broadcast ads, where the 
  
 271 See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1259 (“For all practical purposes, absent deliberate 
concealment or nondisclosure of after-acquired knowledge of harmful effects, compliance with FDA 
standards should be virtually dispositive of such claims.”); id. at 1263 (“The FDA has established a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme for direct-to-consumer marketing of pharmaceutical products. 
Given the presumptive defense that is afforded to pharmaceutical manufacturers that comply with 
FDA requirements, we believe that it is fair to reinforce the regulatory scheme by allowing” these 
failure-to-warn claims.). In contrast, the dissent argued that this state statute had codified the learned 
intermediary doctrine without countenancing any exceptions along the lines crafted by the majority. 
See id. at 1264-67 (Pollock, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1269 (criticizing the majority’s discussion 
of the compliance defense and proximate causation issues because the parties had not received any 
opportunity to address these issues). 
 272 Some commentators also have made this mistake. See, e.g., William A. Dreier, Direct-
to-Consumer Advertising Liability: An Empty Gift to Plaintiffs, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 806, 824-25 
(2000); id. at 816-20 (asserting that “FDA standards are minute and definite,” repeatedly citing the 
agency’s guidance documents); Caroline L. Nadal, Note, The Societal Value of Prescription Drug 
Advertisements in the New Millennium: Targeted Consumers Become the Learned, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 
451, 482-83, 487, 495 & n.229, 498-500, 504-05 (2001) (referring to the FDA’s regulations and 
guidelines interchangeably); cf. Robert A. Bell et al., Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug 
Advertising and the Public, 14 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 651, 654-55, 656 (1999) (finding that many 
consumers harbor misconceptions about the stringency of the applicable regulatory controls). 
Although courts grant agencies substantial latitude in interpreting their own regulations, see Lars 
Noah, Divining Regulatory Intent: The Place for a “Legislative History” of Agency Rules, 51 
HASTINGS L.J. 255, 284-90, 294-99 (2000), the FDA’s guidance documents governing DTCA would 
not pass muster as mere interpretive rules if it ever made a formal attempt to enforce them directly. 
 273 See Noah, supra note 210, at 175-76. So-called “reminder” and “help seeking” 
advertisements do not even have to satisfy the fair balance requirement. See Alicia Mundy, Making a 
Name for Drugs Without Using Their Names: Some Ads Highlight Only Web Addresses So Side 
Effects Don’t Have to Be Listed, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2008, at B1. 
 274 Cf. Kaplan et al., supra note 27, at 69 (“Under the draft formulation [of the Products 
Liability Restatement], manufacturers seemingly would be liable if they advertised but failed to warn 
consumers directly—even if the advertisements were never seen or read by plaintiffs.”). Conversely, 
if they had seen and relied on genuinely misleading ads, then perhaps the patients could assert a 
misrepresentation or breach of express warranty claim. See, e.g., Desiano v. Warner-Lambert Co., 
326 F.3d 339, 342 (2d Cir. 2003); In re Meridia Prods. Liab. Litig., 328 F. Supp. 2d 791, 811, 818 
(N.D. Ohio 2004); Woods v. Gliatech Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 802, 810 (D. W. Va. 2002); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 9 (1998) (recognizing misrepresentation claims); 
Dreier, supra note 19, at 264. This alternative would provide a more carefully tailored response to a 
compelling but entirely hypothetical set of facts imagined by the majority. See Perez, 734 A.2d at 
1262 (“[W]e must consider as well a case in which a diabetic patient might have been influenced by 
advertising to request a drug from a physician without being warned by the manufacturer or the 
physician of the special dangers posed to a diabetic taking the drug. If an overburdened physician 
does not inquire whether the patient is a diabetic, the question remains whether the manufacturer 
should be relieved entirely of responsibility.”). Of course, assuming that the manufacturer had 
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FDA’s “requirements” appear in technically non-binding (and hardly 
unambiguous) guidance documents,275 then the compliance defense 
would offer essentially no protection unless courts understood the 
manner in which agency expectations operate as de facto requirements.276 
Lastly, of course, only a handful of jurisdictions have recognized an 
FDA compliance defense. 
If courts recognized an advertising exception to the learned 
intermediary rule (or abrogated it entirely), then pharmaceutical 
manufacturers would have to find a way of disseminating PPIs, ensure 
that these inserts contained references to all possible side effects in 
nontechnical language, and, in the unlikely event that they managed to 
  
supplied an adequate warning to the physician, a medical malpractice claim would do so as well. Cf. 
Ferrara v. Berlex Labs., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 552, 554-55 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (rejecting the plaintiff’s 
argument that, given the dozens of dangerous interactions with MAO inhibitors, the manufacturer 
should have supplied patients with an information card); id. at 553 (noting that the plaintiff had 
secured a malpractice judgment against her physician for having missed this drug interaction 
warning). 
 275 See FDA, Consumer-Directed Promotion of Regulated Medical Products; Public 
Hearing, 70 Fed. Reg. 54,054 (Sept. 13, 2005) (summarizing milestones in the agency’s supervision 
of the practice); see also Lars Noah, The FDA’s New Policy on Guidelines: Having Your Cake and 
Eating It Too, 47 CATH. U. L. REV. 113, 140-42 (1997) (criticizing the agency’s practice of not 
taking definitive positions in guidance documents). At the time that the plaintiffs in Perez used 
Norplant, “[t]here [we]re no regulations that pertain specifically to consumer-directed promotional 
materials.” FDA, Direct-to-Consumer Promotion; Public Hearing, 60 Fed. Reg. 42,581, 42,582 
(Aug. 16, 1995). More than a decade has passed since the FDA announced plans to issue a notice of 
proposed rulemaking to address the issue. See Noah, supra note 210, at 153; see also id. at 146 & 
n.21 (explaining the procedural impediments to the issuance of advertising regulations). In 1999, the 
agency finalized its guideline governing broadcast advertising of prescription drugs. See FDA, 
Guidance for Industry on Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,197 (Aug. 
9, 1999). Five years later, the FDA issued a draft guidance allowing advertisers to satisfy the brief 
summary requirement by using approved PPIs or highlights from package inserts in consumer-
friendly language. See FDA, Draft Guidances for Industry on Improving Information About Medical 
Products and Health Conditions, 69 Fed. Reg. 6308 (Feb. 10, 2004); see also id. (“One of the 
principal objectives of the[se] three [draft] guidances is to encourage prescription drug firms to 
present risk information in their consumer-directed advertisements using language that is 
understandable by a lay user.”); Francesca Lunzer Kritz, FDA on Drug Ads: Less Is More, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 10, 2004, at F1 (noting objections to the brief summary guidance). Congress recently 
granted the agency greater authority in this area, though only after the FDA issues binding rules. See 
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 901(d)(2), 121 Stat. 
823, 939 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 353b(a)) (authorizing advance review of broadcast DTCA); 
see also id. § 901(d)(6), 121 Stat. at 942 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 352(n)) (eliminating formal 
rulemaking procedures applicable to drug advertising regulations). 
 276 See Wash. Legal Found. v. Kessler, 880 F. Supp. 26, 34 (D.D.C. 1995) (anticipating 
that the FDA would “threaten[] (but never actually initiat[e]) enforcement procedures against 
companies which failed to comply with the agency’s de facto policy” against the dissemination of 
information related to off-label uses, which it had announced in a “draft policy statement”); Noah, 
supra note 57, at 904-05; see also Thomas Ginsberg, Drug Ads Pour in for Review: The FDA Said It 
Had Seen “A Huge Increase” in Advertising Submitted for Scrutiny Under a Voluntary Industry 
Program, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 23, 2006, at C1; Melody Petersen, Who’s Minding the Drugstore?, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2003, § 3, at 1 (noting complaints that the agency has become less vigilant); 
Julie Schmit, A Winded FDA Races to Keep up with Drug Ads That Go Too Far, USA TODAY, May 
31, 2005, at 1A (reporting that the agency has ordered more corrective advertising). See generally 
Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of Congressional Delegations of Authority, 
1997 WIS. L. REV. 873. 
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design such an unassailable warning,277 hope that a jury would not decide 
that continued advertising to consumers diluted the effectiveness of this 
warning. Even then, providing full risk information will offer only 
limited assistance to patients unless they receive equally clear 
information about all of the other products and procedures that might 
serve the same purpose: a manufacturer’s duty to warn of risks 
associated with its product generally does not include such a broader 
duty to educate,278 while physicians owe just such a duty when securing 
informed consent.279 Precisely because of the difficult comparative 
judgments involved, patients must look to physicians for help in making 
treatment choices. 
Extending a parallel suggested previously in connection with the 
design defect standard,280 manufacturers of toys and other goods 
accessible to young children have a duty to warn their parents.281 If 
manufacturers choose to advertise directly to youngsters, and the kids 
then whine until their parents purchase inappropriate products, the 
manufacturers still would owe no duty to warn the kids directly (though, 
if overpromotion dilutes the force of information already supplied to 
adult purchasers, then it might well provide the basis for an inadequate 
warning claim). Although such promotional efforts may deserve 
  
 277 See Aaron D. Twerski, Liability for Direct Advertising of Drugs to Consumers: An 
Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1149, 1153-54 (2005); see also Michael S. 
Jacobs, Toward a Process-Based Approach to Failure-to-Warn Law, 71 N.C. L. REV. 121, 149 
(1992) (“By scrutinizing closely the seemingly trivial details of type size, warning location, and 
relative degree of expressed urgency, and by permitting outcomes to hinge on the presence or 
absence of one or two seemingly innocuous words, courts impose upon manufacturers a duty of 
virtual perfection, easily breached . . . .”). 
 278 Cf. Graham v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 350 F.3d 496, 514 (6th Cir. 2003) (rejecting claim 
that OPV manufacturer had a duty to inform physicians that IPV represented the preferred choice); 
Demmler v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 671 A.2d 1151, 1154-55 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (rejecting an 
inadequate warning claim for failure to specify the appropriate therapy in the event that a listed side 
effect occurred). For a recent proposal to impose such a broader duty, see infra note 302. 
 279 See Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and 
Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 366-67 & n.25 (2002); see also Gerald F. Tietz, 
Informed Consent in the Prescription Drug Context: The Special Case, 61 WASH. L. REV. 367, 406-
17 (1986) (urging stricter application of the informed consent duty with respect to prescribing). 
 280 See supra notes 37-41, 194 and accompanying text; see also Marvin M. Lipman, Bias 
in Direct-to-Consumer Advertising and Its Effect on Drug Safety, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 761, 762 
(2006) (“The only other commercials of this kind are the breakfast-cereal [ads that air during 
children’s cartoon shows] . . . . In both instances, an intermediary is necessary—in one case a parent 
who has the money and, in the other case, a physician who has the prescription pad.”); Michael 
Kirsch, Even If They’re Too Slick and Manipulative, Drug Ads Are Useful, PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 8, 
2000, at 11B (“This is analogous to marketing toys and breakfast cereals to children. Though our 
youngsters can’t buy them, they have learned how to close the sale. In a similar manner, patients 
now ask their doctors to sign on to their wonder-drug requests.”); cf. Francesca Lunzer Kritz, What 
Teens Are Hearing About Drugs: Some Messages Help, Others Are Troubling, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 
2008, at F1 (reporting that some DTCA campaigns target adolescents). 
 281 See, e.g., Metzgar v. Playskool Inc., 30 F.3d 459, 465-66 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Hahn 
v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 805 F.2d 1480 (11th Cir. 1986); Emery v. Federated Foods, Inc., 863 P.2d 426 
(Mont. 1993); M. Stuart Madden, Products Liability, Products for Use by Adults, and Injured 
Children: Back to the Future, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1205, 1214 (1994) (“[A]n adult product with which 
children may have contact must contain warnings and instructions advising adults on the special 
risks to children that the product may create.”). 
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criticism (and efforts at prohibition),282 presumably no one would argue 
that recognizing a largely incoherent duty to warn children directly 
offered a second-best solution to the problem. 
By definition, adequate consumer labeling cannot be designed 
for prescription drugs.283 Although the FDA increasingly switches Rx 
drugs to OTC status,284 products that continue to require prescription 
labeling reflect the agency’s judgment that professional intervention 
remains necessary to ensure their safe use.285 The FDA has in the past 
mandated PPIs for some drugs to supplement the labeling provided to 
physicians, and it continues to encourage their broad use, but no one 
suggests that PPIs should fully replace professional labeling. Direct 
advertising further encourages active participation by consumers in 
prescribing decisions, a favorable development that courts should not 
reward by expanding the tort duties of drug manufacturers and, because 
consumer-directed warnings inevitably would fall short, discouraging 
such advertising in the future.286 
As the United States Supreme Court has observed repeatedly in 
deciding commercial speech cases, some information is better than 
none.287 Drug advertising naturally emphasizes the benefits of a product, 
but even this may provide valuable information in the prescription drug 
context if consumers otherwise would leave bothersome conditions 
  
 282 See Stephanie Clifford, Tug of War in Food Marketing to Children, N.Y. TIMES, July 
30, 2008, at C5; David Crary, Blitzed with Toy Ads, Cash-strapped Parents Push Back, TRENTON 
TIMES (N.J.), Nov. 30, 2008, at B4 (describing the Campaign for a Commercial-Free Childhood); see 
also Comm. on Children’s Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 676 (Cal. 1983) 
(“Defendants engaged in a nationwide, long-term advertising campaign designed to persuade 
children to influence their parents to buy sugared cereals.”); Shin-Yi Chou et al., Fast-food 
Advertising on Television and Its Influence on Childhood Obesity, 51 J.L. & ECON. 599 (2008); 
Juliet B. Schor & Margaret Ford, From Tastes Great to Cool: Children’s Food Marketing and the 
Rise of the Symbolic, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 10 (2007); Symposium, Food Marketing to Children 
and the Law, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1 (2006). 
 283 See Dunkin v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 443 F. Supp. 121, 123 (W.D. Tenn. 1977) 
(“[P]rescription drugs are sold on a prescription basis and not over-the-counter because the special 
expertise of a trained physician is necessary for their safe use. Thus, an effective warning could go 
only to the medical profession, and not to an untrained patient.”); Peter Temin, The Origin of 
Compulsory Drug Prescriptions, 22 J.L. & ECON. 91, 103 (1979) (“[T]he FDA assumed that 
adequate directions for laymen could not be written for some drugs.”); see also supra note 225. 
 284 See Noah, supra note 200, at 360, 362-63, 371. 
 285 A number of reasons may exist for prescription labeling, such as the difficulty with 
self-diagnosis, a product’s margin of safety, and the extent to which dosages need to be carefully 
titrated for each patient. See id. at 366-68, 375. 
 286 See Walsh et al., supra note 211, at 881 (“Ironically, preservation of this brightline 
[learned intermediary] rule would help create the conditions necessary for improved 
communications between pharmaceutical manufacturers and patients.”). 
 287 See, e.g., Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002) (“We have 
previously rejected the notion that the government has an interest in preventing the dissemination of 
truthful commercial information in order to prevent members of the public from making bad 
decisions with the information.”); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 69 
(1983) (holding that a federal law prohibiting unsolicited mailings was unconstitutional when 
applied to a pharmaceutical company distributing informational pamphlets that encouraged the use 
of contraceptives); Lars Noah, What’s Wrong with “Constitutionalizing Food and Drug Law”?, 75 
TUL. L. REV. 137, 143-44 & n.40 (2000); David C. Vladeck, The Difficult Case of Direct-to-
Consumer Drug Advertising, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 259 (2007). 
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untreated. To the extent that advertising fails to highlight harmful 
attributes of prescription drugs, the FDA can modify its fair balance 
requirements. The ultimate safeguard, however, must be the physician. 
So long as prescription drugs continue to require the intervention of a 
medical professional, courts should focus on the duty of physicians to 
secure informed consent, while letting regulatory requirements work to 
supplement rather than supplant the drug information provided to 
patients.288 
IV. MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES 
This Part offers a glimpse at various other issues related to the 
design and informational defect standards that the Products Liability 
Restatement has announced for prescription drug manufacturers. First, 
experimental products do not receive distinctive treatment under section 
6, and the new Restatement offered only ambiguous guidance about 
continuing duties to test after approval. Second, generic versions of 
prescription drugs raise curious questions as to which manufacturer 
should shoulder responsibility for injuries to patients. Third, prescription 
medical devices get identical treatment under section 6 notwithstanding 
fundamental differences from pharmaceuticals, while human tissue 
products get carved out entirely notwithstanding their similarities to 
implanted devices. Finally, questions arise about including other parties 
in the chain of distribution for purposes of imposing liability. Just as the 
purportedly bright line between prescription and nonprescription has 
become increasingly blurred,289 the sharp distinction between 
manufacturers and health care providers imagined by the Reporters may 
break down over time. 
A. Experimental Drugs and the Duty to Keep Testing 
The Products Liability Restatement does not separately address 
investigational products, even though these appeared to be a central 
concern in the Second Restatement’s comment k to section 402A.290 
  
 288 See Walsh et al., supra note 211, at 880 (“[T]ruthful direct-to-consumer advertising 
will provide the consumer with useful information without eroding the paramount role of the 
prescribing physician. In any event, there is little evidence that direct-to-consumer advertising has 
harmed consumers or foisted medically inappropriate therapies upon them.”); Catherine A. Paytash, 
Note, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and Patient Package Inserts: A Balanced Approach to 
Preventing Drug-Related Injury, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1367-71 (1999) (urging an administrative 
solution, in particular FDA-mandated PPIs, rather than any judicial modifications of the learned 
intermediary rule). 
 289 See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text. 
 290 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965) (“It is also true in 
particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity 
for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of 
ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug 
notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk.”); Adams v. G.D. Searle & Co., 576 So. 2d 728, 732 
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Clinical trials of unapproved new drugs occasionally cause serious injury 
to subjects,291 but only a few courts have resolved claims for injuries 
caused by drugs not yet approved by the FDA.292 The last decade has 
witnessed growing tort litigation on behalf of subjects injured during 
clinical trials,293 though claims against the suppliers of investigational 
products remain fairly uncommon.294 Insofar as section 6 turns on 
differential access rather than deference to FDA approval decisions, it 
should encompass investigational products accessible only to subjects 
enrolled in trials and under the strict supervision of clinical investigators, 
even though the research aims to answer the very questions that lay at the 
heart of design and informational defect claims (indeed, though subjects 
may hope to derive some therapeutic benefit from their participation, 
clinical trials aim primarily to generate scientific information rather than 
deliver medical treatment).295 
  
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (“Comment k was designed in part to protect new and experimental 
drugs.”). During a floor debate, the Reporter apparently had focused exclusively on experimental 
drugs. See 41 A.L.I. PROC. 359-60 (1964) (remarks by Dean Prosser); cf. Joseph A. Page, Generic 
Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k and for Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853, 
865-71 (1983) (identifying numerous ambiguities in these references to “experimental” drugs). 
 291 See, e.g., Elisabeth Rosenthal, British Rethinking Test Rules After Drug Trial Nearly 
Kills Six, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2006, at A1 (“Although tests of [the monoclonal antibody] TGN1412 
in monkeys showed no significant trouble, all six human subjects nearly died.”); John Schwartz & 
David Brown, A Deadly Medical Gamble: Test of Promising Drug Turns into “Calamity,” WASH. 
POST, July 8, 1993, at A1; Dan Vergano, Drug-Trial Deaths “Go Unreported,” USA TODAY, Nov. 
8, 2000, at 12D. Although manufacturers of investigational drugs might try to insulate themselves 
with liability waivers, the FDA prohibits their use. See 21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2008). Separately, the 
Products Liability Restatement generally rejects such waivers. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 18 (1998). 
 292 See, e.g., Kernke v. Menninger Clinic, Inc., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1117, 1121-22, 1124 (D. 
Kan. 2001) (applying the learned intermediary doctrine in granting summary judgment to the 
manufacturer of an investigational drug for schizophrenia); Mink v. Univ. of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 
713, 717-18 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (involving early clinical trials of DES, and including claims against the 
manufacturer); Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 339-40 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (extending comment k 
protection to an investigational drug, but requiring clear disclosure of its experimental status). 
 293 See Sharona Hoffman & Jessica Wilen Berg, The Suitability of IRB Liability, 67 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 365 (2005); E. Haavi Morreim, Litigation in Clinical Research: Malpractice Doctrines 
Versus Research Realities, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 474 (2004); Richard S. Saver, Medical Research 
and Intangible Harm, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 941 (2006); Roger L. Jansson, Comment, Researcher 
Liability for Negligence in Human Subject Research: Informed Consent and Researcher Malpractice 
Actions, 78 WASH. L. REV. 229 (2003); Alice Dembner, Lawsuits Target Medical Research, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 12, 2002, at A1. 
 294 Claims against sponsors of products subject to the FDA’s investigational device 
exemption (IDE) have arisen with somewhat greater frequency. See, e.g., Chambers v. Osteonics 
Corp., 109 F.3d 1243 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding such claims preempted); Martin v. Telectronics Pacing 
Sys., Inc., 105 F.3d 1090, 1098-101 (6th Cir. 1997) (same); Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 111 F.3d 782 
(10th Cir. 1997) (rejecting preemption defense); Guckin v. Nagle, 259 F. Supp. 2d 406 (E.D. Pa. 
2003) (rejecting a manufacturer’s effort to remove on the basis of federal question jurisdiction tort 
claims filed against multiple parties in state court by a subject injured during a clinical trial of an 
investigational device). 
 295 See Noah, supra note 279, at 371 & n.50, 378-79, 384, 388; id. at 385 & nn.126-27 
(discussing the “therapeutic misconception” in research). Patients not enrolled in clinical trials 
continue to press for access to investigational drugs. See Jerry Menikoff, Beyond Abigail Alliance: 
The Reality Behind the Right to Get Experimental Drugs, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 1045 (2008); Judy 
Vale, Note, Expanding Expanded Access: How the Food and Drug Administration Can Achieve 
Better Access to Experimental Drugs for Seriously Ill Patients, 96 GEO. L.J. 2143 (2008); see also 
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FDA approval does not entirely remove the experimental aspect 
of new drugs,296 and the agency demands that manufacturers conduct 
postmarket surveillance. The nature and extent of common law duties to 
engage in postapproval research have, however, received scant attention. 
Whether resolving a design or informational defect claim, courts may 
struggle to determine precisely when a seller should have known that its 
product presented a risk of injury.297 Pharmaceutical manufacturers 
generally have no duty to guard against or warn of unknowable risks.298 
According to the Products Liability Restatement, pharmaceutical 
“manufacturers have the responsibility to perform reasonable testing 
prior to marketing a product and to discover risks and risk-avoidance 
measures that such testing would reveal.”299 Although a few courts 
resolving products liability claims against sellers of medical technologies 
  
Gina Kolata & Kurt Eichenwald, For the Uninsured, Drug Trials Are Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 22, 1999, at A1; supra note 63 (discussing claims by subjects seeking continued access). 
 296 See Noah, supra note 279, at 363 (“[P]roduct approval does not define the point at 
which an investigational intervention passes the threshold into standard therapy. Instead, the research 
phase continues after licensure, both in the sense that more safety data accumulates and insofar as 
physicians may improvise when using a product in ways not originally contemplated.”); id. at 394 
(“One common misconception is that FDA approval of a medical technology represents the point at 
which it crosses the line from experimental to standard therapy.”); id. at 394-99 (elaborating); see 
also id. at 386-94 & nn.134 & 141 (discussing the indistinct line between treatment and research); 
id. at 400-08 (same). See generally Bernadette Tansey, What FDA Approval Means: Agency Weighs 
Benefits, Risks Before Drugs Get to Market, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 3, 2005, at C1. 
 297 Imagine that a drug company receives a single report from a physician of an 
unexpected adverse drug event (ADE) in a patient. If the suspected ADE turns out to be spurious, 
subsequent patients will not suffer that injury or, if they do and attempt to file a lawsuit, patients will 
lose on causation at trial; if, however, the drug turns out to have caused the injury, plaintiffs often 
will have stronger evidence of causation by the time of trial even though the far less certain ADE 
might have served as the trigger for a duty to warn at the earlier time of sale. One would expect 
courts to require greater substantiation of risks before allowing a design defect (as opposed to a 
failure-to-warn) claim to proceed. Technologically sophisticated products subject to lengthy 
premarket review by administrative agencies pose tricky “state-of-the-art” questions. If risk 
information comes to light late in the agency’s review, sellers generally still can make labeling 
modifications before sale, but designs become fixed earlier in the R&D process. 
 298 See Toner v. Lederle Labs., 732 P.2d 297, 306-07 (Idaho 1987) (“Comment k does not 
require sellers to be clairvoyant.”); Moore v. Vanderloo, 386 N.W.2d 108, 116 (Iowa 1986); 
Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 782 (R.I. 1988) (refusing to hold 
manufacturer of DES liable “for failure to warn of risks inherent in a drug [because] it neither knew 
nor could have known by the application of scientific knowledge available at the time of distribution 
that the drug could produce the undesirable effects suffered by plaintiff”); see also Kathleen H. 
Wilson, Note, The Liability of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers for Unforeseen Adverse Drug 
Reactions, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 745-50 (1980). A pair of jurisdictions impute knowledge to 
drug manufacturers, thereby shifting the burden of proof on this issue to the defendant. See Shanks 
v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1199-200 (Alaska 1992); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 
387-88 (N.J. 1984); cf. Carlin v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 1347, 1349 (Cal. 1996) (“[W]e have 
expressly and repeatedly applied a strict liability standard to manufacturers of prescription drugs for 
failure to warn of known or reasonably scientifically knowable risks.”). 
 299 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6 cmt. g (1998); see also id. § 2 
cmt. m (“The harms that result from unforeseeable risks—for example, in the human body’s reaction 
to a new drug, medical device, or chemical—are not a basis of liability. Of course, a seller . . . is 
charged with knowledge of what reasonable testing would reveal.”); id. § 10 cmt. c (“With regard to 
. . . prescription drugs and devices, courts traditionally impose a continuing duty of reasonable care 
to test and monitor after sale to discover product-related risks.”). 
908 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:3  
have made a similar point,300 the case law offers essentially no guidance 
about the contours of a duty to test.301 One recent article urged the 
recognition of an expanded obligation to do so but suffered from similar 
ambiguities about the scope of such a duty.302 
Drug-drug interactions provide an illustration of the potential 
difficulties in defining a broader duty to test. Obviously, if a 
manufacturer discovers a dangerous interaction during clinical trials or 
postmarket surveillance, then it would have a duty to communicate 
information about the risk.303 What if, however, a patient experiences a 
previously unknown acute drug interaction and argues that the 
  
 300 See, e.g., Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 707 F. Supp. 1517, 1528-29 (D. Minn. 
1989) (“[T]he duty to test is a subpart of the duty to warn.”); Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.E.2d 
182, 188-90 (N.Y. 1982) (allowing plaintiff’s claim that a DES manufacturer could have discovered 
reproductive toxicity if it had undertaken rodent testing); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 52 
(Wis. 1984) (same, focusing on postapproval period). 
 301 See Daniel R. Cahoy, Medical Product Information Incentives and the Transparency 
Paradox, 82 IND. L.J. 623, 640-41 & nn.78-81 (2007) (discussing the limited recognition of a 
common law duty to test); Merrill, supra note 3, at 38 (discussing some of the earliest case law on 
this question); see also Valentine v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 252, 265 (Ct. App. 
1999) (concluding that “imposition of liability for breach of an independent duty to conduct long-
term testing, where the causal link to the known harm to plaintiff is the unknown outcome of testing 
that was not done, would be beyond the pale of any California tort doctrine we can identify” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
 302 See George W. Conk, Punctuated Equilibrium: Why § 402A Flourished and the Third 
Restatement Languished, 26 REV. LITIG. 799, 856-62, 878-80 (2007); id. at 805-06 (“This patient-
centered approach emphasizes the ongoing experimental quality of medical products, and a 
corresponding duty of product stewardship—a duty of ongoing study and product development, a 
duty of systematic manufacturer surveillance of the actual use of their products after obtaining 
regulatory approval to market the product.”); see also id. at 879-80; id. at 856 & n.142 (suggesting 
incorrectly that section 6 relates only to FDA-approved uses); id. at 857 (suggesting incorrectly that 
the Products Liability Restatement deals with postapproval risks under the forgiving standard for 
post-sale warnings). Separately, Conk called on sellers to satisfy a broader duty to educate patients, 
see id. at 872-74, 877-78, which would mean laying out the pros and cons not just of their product 
but also competing products (and non-product substitutes). He noted that, contrary to recent 
pronouncements by the FDA, manufacturers may act unilaterally to revise approved labeling in order 
to communicate new risk information, see id. at 863-64 & n.171, but the agency certainly would 
never tolerate any of the other additional items that he would want to see included. Another proposal 
designed to encourage continued testing would recognize a broader duty to disclose (though only to 
physicians) uncertain risks, for instance when manufacturers have failed to investigate the 
teratogenic potential of drugs, coupled with awards of limited damages not dependent on proving 
that the drug actually caused a particular injury. See Berger & Twerski, Informed Choice, supra note 
118, at 259, 287-88; see also Susanne L. Flanders, Note, A Tough Pill to Swallow: The 
Insurmountable Burden in Toxic Tort Claims Against Manufacturers of Children’s Medications, 16 
J.L. & POL’Y 305, 308, 315-18, 338-41, 348-55 (2007) (focusing on (primarily OTC) drugs 
marketed for use in children, but making broader claims that would include a duty to engage in 
pediatric testing of prescription drugs marketed solely for use by adults). For my detailed critique of 
these various proposals, see Lars Noah, Platitudes About “Product Stewardship” in Torts: 
Continuing Drug Research and Education, 15 MICH. TELECOM. & TECH. L. REV. 359 (2009). 
 303 See, e.g., Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 976 F.2d 77, 81-82 (1st Cir. 1992) (allowing 
failure-to-warn claim against manufacturer of phenobarbital to proceed where drug allegedly 
interacted with amoxicillin and caused toxic epidermal necrolysis); Ferrara v. Berlex Labs., Inc., 732 
F. Supp. 552, 553-55 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (rejecting failure-to-warn claim against manufacturer of MAO 
inhibitor because it had warned physicians of dangerous interactions with over forty substances, 
including a decongestant that the plaintiff’s physician had prescribed). 
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manufacturer should have tested for it?304 A strict liability standard that 
focused on the knowability of this risk seemingly would ask only 
whether a manufacturer could have checked for the interaction, while a 
negligence standard would recognize the impracticality of advance 
testing for every conceivable drug-drug interaction.305 
Package inserts serve, first and foremost, to define for health 
care professionals the range of uses and users that have undergone 
rigorous study and FDA review. Assuming that labeling accurately 
communicates what the seller knows (and does not know) about the 
safety and efficacy of the prescription product in different user 
populations, why impose liability when an unexpected injury occurs in a 
subpopulation not studied (and, therefore, not an indicated use)?306 A 
duty to investigate all foreseeable uses to which health care professionals 
might put an approved drug would be entirely unmanageable, and it 
would threaten to deprive intended users of a valuable product. 
B. Generic Drugs 
Generic drug manufacturers might find themselves in a weaker 
litigating position than their brand-name brethren. For instance, in trying 
to mount a defense against design defect claims, they may face an 
evidentiary disadvantage because of their lack of access to the clinical 
  
 304 See Bryant v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723, 728-30 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) 
(allowing such a claim to proceed based on testimony from the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses); see also 
Carl C. Peck et al., Editorial, Understanding Consequences of Concurrent Therapies, 269 JAMA 
1550 (1993); D.I. Quinn & R.O. Day, Drug Interactions of Clinical Importance, 12 DRUG SAFETY 
393 (1995) (cataloging known interactions); Langreth, supra note 34, at B16 (discussing the 
discovery of several additional serious interactions shortly after approval of Posicor that led to its 
withdrawal). 
 305 See Richard McCormick, Pharmaceutical Manufacturer’s Duty to Warn of Adverse 
Drug Interactions, 66 DEF. COUNS. J. 59, 67 (1999) (arguing that application of a strict liability 
standard in this context would threaten to impose limitless liability); id. at 68 (“If every concurrent 
use is foreseeable, then manufacturers would be obligated to test for these interactions, increasing 
the time beneficial drugs would take to go to market and pushing prices beyond the reach of most 
consumers.”); see also id. at 65 (“[F]ew cases directly consider the manufacturer’s failure to warn of 
an interaction that it should have discovered prior to marketing.”); cf. Ceci Connolly, Price Tag for a 
New Drug: $802 Million: Findings of Tufts University Study Are Disputed by Several Watchdog 
Groups, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 2001, at A10 (reporting that the figure had more than tripled in the 
space of a decade, largely because of demands for larger and more complex clinical trials). 
 306 See Robak v. Abbott Labs., 797 F. Supp. 475, 476 (D. Md. 1992) (“Certainly, no 
manufacturer need explicitly spell out all of the conditions for which a drug is not indicated.”). 
Obviously, if a seller knows of widespread off-label pediatric use, it cannot fail to disclose known 
risks in that foreseeable though unintended user population; similarly, if a seller knows of 
widespread off-label use for a different condition (or through a different method of administration), 
then it may have to disclose known risks. See Lars Noah, Constraints on the Off-Label Uses of 
Prescription Drug Products, 16 J. PROD. & TOXICS LIAB. 139, 159-62 (1994); Kaspar J. 
Stoffelmayr, Comment, Products Liability and “Off-Label” Uses of Prescription Drugs, 63 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 275, 299-305 (1996). But why suggest that the seller must comprehensively study safety and 
efficacy in every conceivable but unintended use or user? Cf. Medics Pharm. Corp. v. Newman, 378 
S.E.2d 487, 488-89 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (recognizing a duty to test the safety of off-label uses). 
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trials underlying the NDA for the innovator product,307 unless courts 
decided to apply a more forgiving standard of knowability to 
manufacturers of generic drugs.308 In addition, if section 6(c) does not 
take cost into account,309 then generic drug manufacturers routinely might 
face a design defect claim after the innovator introduces a new and 
slightly improved (and more expensive) version of the original. 
Sellers of generic drugs may encounter peculiar problems when 
it comes to off-label uses: if an innovator company receives FDA 
approval for a new indication, then it may receive three years of 
additional market exclusivity for that use—this would not prevent the 
prescribing of the generic version for that new use,310 but the labeling for 
the generic drug will not include any information (including, in all 
likelihood, risk information) associated with that new use. In the event 
that a patient suffers an injury while using the generic version (which 
completely failed to mention risks associated with the new indication 
approved only for the brand-name version), would a court have any way 
of finessing this problem? If a physician prescribed the generic version 
for the new indication after consulting the labeling of the innovator drug, 
would that insulate the generic manufacturer from a failure-to-warn 
claim (and might it open the brand-name manufacturer to an inadequate 
  
 307 See Eisenberg, supra note 190, at 736-38 (discussing the applicable trade secrecy 
protections). If the alleged design defect related to the use of a different dosage form or an inactive 
ingredient not found in the brand-name product, then the supplier of the slightly altered generic 
version would have generated the necessary bioequivalence data. See Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. 
Leavitt, 435 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Zeneca, Inc. v. Shalala, 213 F.3d 161 (4th Cir. 2000); see 
also Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Clinical Equivalence of Generic and Brand-Name Drugs Used in 
Cardiovascular Disease: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis, 300 JAMA 2514 (2008); Melinda 
Beck, Inexact Copies: How Generics Differ from Brand Names, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2008, at D1; 
Melissa Healy, FDA Standards Are Questioned, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2008, at F7. In addition, 
generic drug manufacturers would have to abide by any risk labeling changes that the FDA mandates 
for the brand-name version, see Julie Schmit, Updating Generic-Drug Labels Can Take Months, 
USA TODAY, Apr. 21, 2005, at 3B, and any failure to do so would support a defectiveness per se 
claim. 
 308 Courts have not done so. See Foster v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 29 F.3d 165, 169-70 
(4th Cir. 1994) (dictum); id. at 169 (“When a generic manufacturer adopts a name brand 
manufacturer’s warnings and representations without independent investigation, it does so at the risk 
that such warnings and representations may be flawed.”); Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 
514, 543-44 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (dictum), aff’d, 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008); id. at 544 (“While it is true 
that the ANDA process requires generic manufacturers to use the same labeling as the previously 
approved innovator drug, we cannot agree that this absolves them of liability for the representations 
made on their own drugs.”); Bell v. Lollar, 791 N.E.2d 849, 855 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (“We see no 
reason to provide greater protection against state law failure to warn claims to generic drugs than to 
pioneer drugs. . . . Purepac was free to strengthen its label [for a generic version of the Rx drug 
Tylenol 3] by adding an alcohol warning.”). See generally FDA, Abbreviated New Drug Application 
Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 17,950, 17,955, 17,961 (Apr. 28, 1992). 
 309 See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text. 
 310 See Sigma-Tau Pharms., Inc. v. Schwetz, 288 F.3d 141, 145-48 (4th Cir. 2002) 
(holding that the approval of a second indication (protected by a separate exclusivity period) did not 
prevent the FDA from approving generic versions for only the original (and no longer protected) 
indication notwithstanding the likelihood of off-label prescribing of the generic drugs for the new 
indication); Eisenberg, supra note 190, at 724, 729-30; see also Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Shalala, 
91 F.3d 1493, 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (sustaining the FDA’s authority to approve a generic drug for 
only a subset of the innovator drug’s labeled indications). 
2009] RESTATING DRUG PRODUCTS LIABILITY 911 
warning claim in the event of any alleged shortcomings in the risk 
information)? 
Even without such differences in labeling, patients who suffer 
injuries while taking a generic drug sometimes pursue claims against the 
manufacturer of the innovator product, but courts generally have rejected 
such efforts to find deeper pockets.311 Even so, to the extent that 
physicians and patients may rely on representations made by brand-name 
manufacturers (after all, generic manufacturers generally do little to 
promote their versions of well-known prescription drugs), use of the 
generic version would not alter the fact that inadequate warnings 
accompanying the brand-name drug caused the injury. Indeed, the 
physician may have prescribed the brand-name product (based on 
information supplied by the manufacturer of that product), only to have 
the pharmacist dispense a generic version manufactured by an entirely 
different company.312 
In rare cases, some courts have allowed victims to sue both 
brand-name and generic manufacturers when unable to identify the 
particular source of a drug. Under this “market share” theory, which 
courts have used almost exclusively in the DES litigation, the imposition 
of liability sometimes sought to approximate the aggregate risk created 
by the different suppliers,313 with one jurisdiction going so far as to 
  
 311 See, e.g., Colacicco, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 519-20 & n.2, 538-43 (dictum); Flynn v. Am. 
Home Prods. Corp., 627 N.W.2d 342, 350 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); see also Doe 2 v. Ortho-Clinical 
Diagnostics, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 2d 614, 626-28 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (holding that the company that 
originally discovered and patented the mercury-based preservative thimerosal, which later was 
copied by other manufacturers and used in their vaccines and other drug products, owed no duty to 
warn users); cf. Piscitello v. Hobart Corp., 799 F. Supp. 224, 226 (D. Mass. 1992) (“It would be 
unfair to impose such an expansive view of tort liability on those whose original [meat grinder] 
design is mimicked without the designer’s permission.”). Occasionally, the innovator company 
supplies bulk quantities of drug product to a generic company for labeling, see Teva Pharm. Indus. 
Ltd. v. Crawford, 410 F.3d 51 (D.C. Cir. 2005), which would simplify the tort issues. 
 312 See Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., 85 Cal. Rptr. 3d 299, 309-17 (Ct. App. 2008) (allowing 
misrepresentation but not products liability claims against the brand-name manufacturer in such a 
case); id. at 320-21 (“We hold that Wyeth’s common-law duty to use due care in formulating its 
product warnings extends to patients whose doctors foreseeably rely on its product information when 
prescribing metoclopramide, whether the prescription is written for and/or filled with Reglan or its 
generic equivalent.”); id. at 318-19 (rejecting failure-to-warn claims against the manufacturers of the 
generic products that injured the plaintiff because her physician had not read or relied upon their 
labeling!); cf. Miles Labs., Inc. v. Superior Court, 184 Cal. Rptr. 98, 101-03 (Ct. App. 1982) 
(allowing a claim for failure to warn of risks of use during pregnancy against the manufacturer of a 
DES product labeled solely for use in male (prostate cancer) patients because it might have been 
dispensed in place of other DES products labeled for the prevention of miscarriages). But see Foster, 
29 F.3d at 167-68, 170-72 (rejecting negligent misrepresentation claims against the manufacturer of 
the brand-name version of promethazine when a pharmacist had substituted a generic version); 
Goldych v. Eli Lilly & Co., 2006 WL 2038436, at *1, *6 (N.D.N.Y. July 19, 2006). 
 313 See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980); Conley v. Boyle Drug 
Co., 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1990); Martin v. Abbott Labs., 689 P.2d 368 (Wash.1984); see also Allen 
Rostron, Beyond Market Share Liability: A Theory of Proportional Share Liability for Nonfungible 
Products, 52 UCLA L. REV. 151 (2004); Aaron D. Twerski, Market Share—A Tale of Two 
Centuries, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 869 (1989); Andrew B. Nace, Note, Market Share Liability: A 
Current Assessment of a Decade-Old Doctrine, 44 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1991); cf. RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 15 cmt. c (1998) (“The Institute leaves to developing law the 
question of whether, given the appropriate factors, a rule of proportional liability should be adopted. 
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prevent exculpation by suppliers that clearly could not have caused a 
particular plaintiff’s harm.314 An extension of such risk-contribution 
notions even in cases where patients can identify the source of the drug 
as a generic manufacturer might justify imposing some tort liability on 
the manufacturer of the brand-name version (for causing the injury 
through a design defect or failure to warn, even if they did not supply the 
particular dosage unit that ultimately harmed the plaintiff).315 
C. Medical Devices 
Although comment k to section 402A of the Second Restatement 
mentioned only prescription drugs and vaccines, several courts have 
applied it to comparable medical devices.316 Courts also have applied the 
learned intermediary rule to such devices,317 and it makes even more 
sense to do so in connection with the sale of sophisticated equipment 
used in the course of treating patients.318 Consistent with this pattern, 
  
However, if a court does adopt some form of proportional liability, the liability of each defendant is 
properly limited to the individual defendant’s share of the market.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 26 cmt. n (2000). 
 314 See Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989); In re New York 
County DES Litig., 615 N.Y.S.2d 882, 885 (App. Div. 1994); see also Christopher J. McGuire, 
Note, Market-Share Liability After Hymowitz and Conley: Exploring the Limits of Judicial Power, 
24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 759 (1991). Other jurisdictions allow exculpation. See, e.g., Collins v. Eli 
Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 52 (Wis. 1984). Nonetheless, they may allocate relatively greater shares 
of responsibility to those companies more actively involved in preclinical testing, securing original 
FDA approval, and marketing the product. See id. at 53-54; see also id. at 50 n.11 (rejecting the 
argument that market share liability would discourage the introduction of cheaper generic drugs). 
 315 Cf. supra note 190 (explaining that drug manufacturers produce and distribute 
information as much as they sell products). Courts occasionally have indicated a willingness to 
entertain liability claims against entities that supply inaccurate information about therapeutic 
products even though they played no role in their production or distribution. See Coleman v. Danek 
Med., Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 629 (S.D. Miss. 1998) (allowing fraud claims against medical societies 
for sponsoring seminars at which allegedly unsafe uses of pedicle screws in spinal fusion were 
discussed); In re Factor VIII or IX Concentrate Blood Prods. Litig., 25 F. Supp. 2d 837 (N.D. Ill. 
1998) (rejecting First Amendment defense raised by the National Hemophilia Foundation); see also 
Noah, supra note 26, at 464-65. 
 316 See Transue v. Aesthetech Corp., 341 F.3d 911, 915-17 (9th Cir. 2003); Adams v. 
Synthes Spine Co., 298 F.3d 1114, 1117-19 (9th Cir. 2002); Parkinson v. Guidant Corp., 315 F. 
Supp. 2d 741, 747 (W.D. Pa. 2004); Harwell v. Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 803 F. Supp. 1287, 1300 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1992); Tansy v. Dacomed Corp., 890 P.2d 881, 885 (Okla. 1994) (“Most courts which have 
considered the question have found that Comment k applies to medical devices, especially those 
which are implanted in the human body.”). 
 317 See, e.g., Toole v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 235 F.3d 1307, 1313-14 (11th Cir. 2000); 
Talley v. Danek Med., Inc., 179 F.3d 154, 162-63 (4th Cir. 1999); Sita v. Danek Med., Inc., 43 F. 
Supp. 2d 245, 259 (E.D.N.Y. 1999); McCombs v. Synthes (U.S.A.), 587 S.E.2d 594, 595 (Ga. 
2003); Bean v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 965 S.W.2d 656, 663 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998); see also Lloyd 
C. Chatfield, II, Note, Medical Implant Litigation and Failure to Warn: A New Extension for the 
Learned Intermediary Rule?, 82 KY. L.J. 575 (1993-1994). 
 318 See, e.g., Kirsch v. Picker Int’l, Inc., 753 F.2d 670, 671 (8th Cir. 1985) (X-ray 
machine); cf. Brown v. Drake-Willock Int’l, Ltd., 530 N.W.2d 510, 515-16 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) 
(technician injured while cleaning dialysis machine). But see Piper v. Bear Med. Sys., Inc., 883 P.2d 
407, 414-15 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (ventilator valve). See generally Hall, supra note 235, at 221-26, 
253-54 (comparing and contrasting the learned intermediary and sophisticated user doctrines); 
Carole A. Cheney, Comment, Not Just for Doctors: Applying the Learned Intermediary Doctrine to 
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section 6 of the Products Liability Restatement drew no distinction 
between prescription drugs and medical devices. 
1. Are Device Designs Different? 
For a variety of reasons, design defect claims involving medical 
devices do not pose nearly the same difficulties that arise with 
prescription pharmaceuticals. Although the Reporters explained 
emphatically (and persuasively) that “drug designs are different,” they 
have not offered a similarly detailed defense of their decision to apply 
the special design defect standard to medical devices.319 Moreover, while 
other commentators have offered a range of both criticism and praise of 
section 6(c) with reference to the treatment of pharmaceutical products, it 
seems that not one of them has endorsed its extension to prescription 
devices.320 Instead, the contours of express federal preemption as a 
defense to tort claims against medical device manufacturers, which has 
evolved fitfully and attracted its share of criticism,321 may better define 
those contexts where courts should decline to engage in duplicative 
design defect review—namely, those devices that have undergone full 
premarket review and approval, at least where the FDA has made a 
particular judgment about a feature challenged by the plaintiff.322 
  
the Relationship Between Chemical Manufacturers, Industrial Employers, and Employees, 85 NW. 
U. L. REV. 562 (1991). 
 319 In their essay “Drug Designs Are Different,” the Reporters devoted only a single, 
lengthy (and error-filled) footnote to medical devices. See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 19, at 
163 n.47. Contrary to what they said, the FDA has no such thing as “Class III drugs,” Class III 
devices do not invariably require premarket approval (PMA), new drug approval comes under an 
entirely different provision of the statute (and, even if they have converged in practice, the statutory 
standards for safety and effectiveness differ for new drugs and Class III devices subject to PMA 
requirements), and Congress first subjected devices to any sort of premarket scrutiny in 1976 (it did 
not in that year, as they suggested, gradually start “streamlining” previously applicable 
requirements). See NOAH, supra note 3, at 49-50, 254-56, 269-70, 277-79. 
 320 See, e.g., Conk, supra note 21, at 783-86; see also Michael D. Green & William B. 
Schultz, Tort Law Deference to FDA Regulation of Medical Devices, 88 GEO. L.J. 2119, 2123-37 
(2000) (comparing and contrasting the characteristics and regulation of drugs and devices); id. at 
2138 (“[M]arginal design improvements are always possible for devices and almost never possible 
for drugs. . . . With the number of small manufacturers of medical devices . . . and the ability to 
manipulate the device to change its characteristics, we should expect design aspects to figure 
prominently in the safety of devices.”). 
 321 See Lars Noah, Reconceptualizing Federal Preemption of Tort Claims as the 
Government Standards Defense, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 903, 904-05, 926-28, 939-57, 967-78 
(1996); Robert J. Katerberg, Note, Patching the “Crazy Quilt” of Cipollone: A Divided Court 
Rethinks Federal Preemption of Products Liability in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1440 
(1997). 
 322 See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1007, 1011 (2008); Rachel Mervis, 
Note, Furthering Consumer Safety of Medical Devices: The Necessity of a Device-Specific State Law 
as Required for Express Preemption Under the MDA, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 387 (2005); cf. Lars 
Noah, Amplification of Federal Preemption in Medical Device Cases, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 183, 
204-11 (1994) (arguing that the preemption defense extends to certain claims against devices that 
have not undergone full premarket approval). 
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In sharp contrast to prescription drugs, medical devices are built 
rather than discovered. Innovation in this field tends to be incremental,323 
and the FDA’s premarket screening mechanism accommodates the 
introduction of new and slightly improved models of medical devices.324 
In addition, devices generally should not present the same unpredictable 
(and variable) responses encountered with metabolized drugs, though 
anatomical variation exists (as does variation in the skill of surgeons). In 
short, the risk-utility standard does not seem nearly as inapt in this 
context, and perhaps juries can more easily judge the trade-offs made in 
the course of designing devices.325 Nonetheless, focusing on the presence 
of a learned intermediary (and the public policy rationales for limiting 
the liability of sellers that supply products of value to some patients), the 
Products Liability Restatement does not differentiate between 
prescription drugs and medical devices. 
A few courts already have discussed the application of section 
6(c) to implanted devices,326 and the new design defect standard has not 
  
 323 See In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., 75 F.3d 1069, 1081 n.12 (6th Cir. 1996); James S. 
Benson, Forces Reshaping the Performance and Contribution of the U.S. Medical Device Industry, 
51 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 331, 332 (1996) (“[M]edical device product development is inherently 
iterative, depending heavily on feedback from user experience in real-life clinical settings.”); Aaron 
V. Kaplan et al., Medical Device Development: From Prototype to Regulatory Approval, 109 
CIRCULATION 3068 (2004). Also, it takes little speculation to decide whether device redesigns would 
pass muster with the FDA, which, in most cases, would require only an abbreviated clearance 
process. See, e.g., United States v. An Article of Device Consisting of 1,217 Cardboard Boxes, 607 
F. Supp. 990, 996-97 (W.D. Mich. 1985). 
 324 See Peter Barton Hutt et al., The Standard of Evidence Required for Premarket 
Approval Under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 47 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 605, 612-13 
(1992); Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. 
L. REV. 1753, 1808 (1996) (“[T]he [Medical Device] Amendments were promoted as a new type of 
regulatory statute, one that would assure careful review of the few high risk technologies but permit 
less intrusive, less costly regulation of most devices.”); see also Michael VanBuren, Note, Closing 
the Loopholes in the Regulation of Medical Devices: The Need for Congress to Reevaluate Medical 
Device Regulation, 17 HEALTH MATRIX 441, 448-60 (2007) (identifying weaknesses in the FDA’s 
pre- and post-market scrutiny of devices for safety and effectiveness). 
 325 See, e.g., Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1119, 1126 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(affirming plaintiff’s verdict based in part on an allegation that the manufacturer had failed to 
redesign breast implants to reduce the risk of leakage and rupture); Coursen v. A.H. Robins Co., 764 
F.2d 1329, 1337-39 (9th Cir. 1985) (Dalkon Shield); Worsham v. A.H. Robins Co., 734 F.2d 676, 
681-82 (11th Cir. 1984) (same); Webster v. Pacesetter, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 2d 27, 31-33 (D.D.C. 
2003) (finding that plaintiff failed to identify a RAD for the pacemaker lead); Dyer v. Danek Med., 
Inc., 115 F. Supp. 2d 732, 738-39 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (“Plaintiffs have failed to clearly identify a safer 
design alternative [for a pedicle screw], which is a prerequisite for a finding of design defect.”); 
Adams v. G.D. Searle & Co., 576 So. 2d 728, 731-34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (reversing summary 
judgment for the manufacturer of an IUD on a design defect claim alleging that the use of a 
polypropylene withdrawal string was more likely than a polyethylene string to retract into the uterus 
where it might cause a perforation or pelvic inflammatory disease); Larsen v. Pacesetter Sys., Inc., 
837 P.2d 1273, 1286 (Haw. 1992) (pacemaker); Tansy v. Dacomed Corp., 890 P.2d 881, 886 (Okla. 
1994). 
 326 See, e.g., Sita v. Danek Med., Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 245, 255-59 & n.9 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(rejecting plaintiff’s design defect claim against a manufacturer of pedicle screws used in spinal 
fixation for failing to establish a feasible safer design); id. at 256 n.9 & 258 (making only passing 
references to § 6(c)); Wheat v. Sofamor, S.N.C., 46 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1361-62 & n.11 (N.D. Ga. 
1999) (declining to predict whether Georgia courts would follow § 6(c), but concluding that, under a 
risk-utility test, pedicle screws had an appropriate role in securing long bones (as indicated in their 
labeling) even if not appropriate for plaintiff’s spinal fixation surgery); Gebhardt v. Mentor Corp., 
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fared well among those that have squarely addressed the question. For 
instance, in a case involving an intravenous line that became detached 
from a catheter, the Illinois Supreme Court found that the plaintiff had 
satisfied either the consumer expectations or risk-utility test, and it 
declined to consider adopting section 6(c) because the defendant had not 
preserved that issue for appeal.327 A few years later in a case involving a 
prosthetic hip, an intermediate appellate court in Illinois rejected the new 
standard, instead applying a modified consumer expectations test that 
allowed the defendant to introduce evidence of countervailing utilities of 
the challenged design.328 
2. Tissue Engineering and Manufacturing Defects 
Elsewhere, the Products Liability Restatement expressly excludes 
human tissue products from coverage,329 which accurately reflects judicial 
interpretations of the blood shield statutes found in most states,330 but it 
  
191 F.R.D. 180, 185-86 & n.2 (D. Ariz. 1999) (holding that the plaintiff’s design defect claim 
against the manufacturer of an implanted device used to treat gastroesophageal reflux failed under 
either § 6(c) or § 2(b) of the Products Liability Restatement, and declining to resolve the 
applicability of § 402A comment k of the Second Restatement); cf. Anderson v. Siemens Corp., 335 
F.3d 466, 470-71 (5th Cir. 2003) (declining to apply § 6 to an ICU ventilator with a malfunctioning 
alarm because it did not qualify as a “prescription” product). 
 327 See Hansen v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 764 N.E.2d 35, 43-46 (Ill. 2002); see also 
Peter Waldman, Intravenous Bags, Tubes Redesigned for Safety, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2006, at D3. 
 328 See Mele v. Howmedica, Inc., 808 N.E.2d 1026, 1038-42, 1045-46 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2004); id. at 1037-38 (“Even if implantees have no expectation specific to this particular part of the 
artificial hip, they may have relevant expectations about the safety of the artificial hip as a whole. . . . 
The trial court correctly rejected the proposal to assess risks from the standpoint of the ordinary 
doctor.”). But cf. Rosburg v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 226 Cal. Rptr. 299, 303-05 (Ct. App. 1986) 
(allowing expert testimony about the limited life expectancy of a breast implant to rebut the 
plaintiff’s belief that the device should last a lifetime); Schindler v. Sofamor, Inc., 774 A.2d 765, 
766, 775 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (spinal fixation device could not be expected to last forever in case of 
nonfusion). See generally Kathleen Fackelmann, Hip Implants Get the Active Back in Gear: New 
Ceramic Joints Can Benefit Aging but On-the-Go Boomers, USA TODAY, June 24, 2003, at 8D 
(reporting that new ceramic versions should prove to be more durable than older metal and plastic 
hip implants); Stephen Smith, As Americans Age, So Do Their Implants, BOSTON GLOBE, July 18, 
2005, at C1. 
 329 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 19(c) (1998) (“Human blood 
and human tissue, even when provided commercially, are not subject to the rules of this 
Restatement.”). The status of non-human tissue products used in the treatment of patients remains 
unclear for liability purposes, though so-called xenotransplants have attracted regulatory attention. 
See Fritz H. Bach et al., Ethical and Legal Issues in Technology: Xenotransplantation, 27 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 283 (2001); Patrik S. Florencio & Erik D. Ramanathan, Are Xenotransplantation Safeguards 
Legally Viable?, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 937 (2001); Rhonda L. Rundle, Edwards Lifesciences 
Says FDA Is to Clear Cow-Tissue Heart Valve, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 2003, at D6; Rick Weiss, 
Gene Alteration Boosts Pig-Human Transplant Feasibility, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2002, at A11. 
Perhaps as raw materials (that surgeons integrate into patients), suppliers of non-human tissues 
would face liability only in the event of contamination and other sorts of manufacturing defects. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 5 cmt. c (1998) (discussing the limited duties of 
raw material suppliers). 
 330 See, e.g., Condos v. Musculoskeletal Transplant Found., 208 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1229 
(D. Utah 2002) (“No court has ever applied strict liability to the distribution of human tissue.”); id. at 
1229-30 (citing § 19 as further authority, and concluding that the transplantation of processed bone 
tissue, which allegedly caused recipient to contract hepatitis C, did not constitute a “sale” subject to 
strict liability); Cryolife, Inc. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. Rptr. 3d 396, 398, 402-05 (Ct. App. 2003) 
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fails to recognize the increasingly difficult categorization judgments that 
FDA officials encounter as the field of regenerative medicine develops.331 
If, instead, section 6 applied to drug-like blood derivatives and device-like 
human tissue products, then a separate doctrinal question would arise: are 
instances of contamination in source material treated as manufacturing 
defects or design defects?332 I assume, for instance, that, after the recent 
discovery that foreign suppliers of the active ingredient used in heparin 
surreptitiously had substituted a dangerous material,333 the finished good 
manufacturers would face manufacturing defect claims.334 
  
(same, in a case alleging bacterial contamination of a patellar tendon harvested from a cadaver and 
used during knee surgery); see also Jason L. Williams, Note, Patient Safety or Profit: What 
Incentives Are Blood Shield Laws and FDA Regulations Creating for the Tissue Banking Industry?, 
2 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 295 (2005). Essentially all states exempt blood from strict products liability. 
See Zichichi v. Middlesex Mem. Hosp., 528 A.2d 805, 810 (Conn. 1987); Michael J. Miller, Note, 
Strict Liability, Negligence and the Standard of Care for Transfusion-Transmitted Disease, 36 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 473, 488-90 (1994); see also Hyland Therapeutics v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 3d 509, 
516 (Ct. App. 1985) (explaining the rationale in terms similar to comment k). These statutes 
generally also protect commercial suppliers of blood-derived products from strict liability claims. 
See McKee v. Cutter Labs., Inc., 866 F.2d 219, 221-22 (6th Cir. 1989); Weishorn v. Miles-Cutter, 
Inc., 721 A.2d 811, 814 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); Rogers v. Miles Labs., 802 P.2d 1346, 1350-52 
(Wash. 1991); cf. Doe v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp., 3 S.W.3d 404, 419 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) 
(applying the learned intermediary doctrine). But see JKB, Sr. v. Armour Pharm. Co., 660 N.E.2d 
602, 605-06 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (rejecting such an extension). 
 331 See 21 C.F.R. pt. 1271 (2008); Nw. Tissue Ctr. v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 522, 536 (7th Cir. 
1993) (invalidating on procedural grounds the FDA’s assertion of its device authority over heart 
valves recovered from cadavers); Lars Noah, A Postmodernist Take on the Human Embryo Research 
Debate, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1133, 1146-47 & n.66 (2004); Michael Leachman, Comment, Regulation 
of the Human Tissue Industry: A Call for Fast-Track Regulations, 65 LA. L. REV. 443 (2004); Rick 
Weiss, First Bladders Grown in Lab Transplanted: Breakthrough Shows Promise for Creating 
Other Human Organs, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2006, at A1; see also Noah, supra note 90, at 61 (“If 
biotechnology rendered untenable the traditional distinction between drugs and biologics, then 
nanomedicine may do the same to the line separating devices and biologics.”). 
 332 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 19 cmt. c (1998) (assuming 
that, in the absence of blood shield statutes, such cases involve product contamination and would 
lead to the imposition of strict liability for manufacturing defects). In contrast, one commentator who 
focused on HIV contamination of blood factor concentrates used by hemophiliacs treated purported 
delays in adopting pasteurization and other viral inactivation processes as matters of defective design 
(and, on that assumption, criticized section 6(c)’s reasonable physician standard for not imposing 
liability under these circumstances). See Conk, supra note 19, at 1098-101, 1111-14, 1117. But see 
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 19, at 159-61; id. at 160 (arguing that “the contaminants that 
caused their harm constituted manufacturing defects”); id. at 161 (distinguishing between “the 
design of the defendants’ methods of production” and the “products themselves”); id. at 161 
(“[P]laintiffs in the blood cases . . . lost because they were unable to establish through credible proof 
that an alternative method of decontaminating blood was reasonably available at the time of sale.”). 
In their response to Conk’s essay, however, the Reporters never attempted to justify the exclusion of 
blood and tissue products, apart from recognizing the widespread adoption of blood shield statutes. 
His rejoinder curiously argued that the plaintiffs’ failures in this negligence-based litigation 
demonstrated that courts have the capacity to engage in risk-utility balancing. See Conk, supra note 
21, at 774, 779-81; see also id. at 774-79 (elaborating on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, and 
explaining their litigation failures on other grounds); id. at 772-73 (reiterating his view that these 
cases involved design rather than manufacturing defects); id. at 780 (conceding that subsequently 
developed recombinant versions of blood factor concentrates would not have qualified as RADs). 
 333 See Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Identifies Tainted Heparin in 11 Countries, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 22, 2008, at A1. 
 334 Cf. Am. Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 434 (Tex. 1997) (“Although 
pesticide residue may be found in many if not all cigarettes, it is not an ingredient American 
intended to incorporate into its cigarettes. Analyzed in this light, the presence of pesticide residue 
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D. Links in the Chain of Distribution 
Although the title of section 6 refers to a “commercial seller or 
distributor” of prescription products, section 6(a) covers only a 
“manufacturer . . . who sells or otherwise distributes.” Section 6(e) 
further provides as follows: 
A retail seller or other distributor of a prescription drug or medical device is 
subject to liability for harm caused by the drug or device if: (1) at the time of 
sale or other distribution the drug or medical device contains a manufacturing 
defect as defined in § 2(a); or (2) at or before the time of sale or other 
distribution of the drug or medical device the retail seller or other distributor 
fails to exercise reasonable care and such failure causes harm to persons.335 
At the outset, this language leaves open some questions about the 
liability of entities other than manufacturers and retailers,336 especially 
when contrasted with the blackletter language elsewhere in the 
Restatement that expressly addresses wholesalers as well as component 
part suppliers. 
As for suppliers of inputs used by finished good manufacturers, 
generally these companies need fear liability only in case of a flaw in 
what they supplied or a failure to disclose information unknown to the 
immediate purchaser.337 Nonetheless, when manufacturers of defective 
medical devices go bankrupt, patients occasionally manage to prevail 
against raw material suppliers.338 Even though such claims normally 
  
could be a manufacturing defect, not a design defect.”); Paul A. Offit, The Cutter Incident, 50 Years 
Later, 352 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1411 (2005) (describing early litigation over incompletely inactivated 
polio vaccine). Alternatively, because the finished drug deviated from the specifications of its 
license, the manufacturers might face a claim of defectiveness per se. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 4(a) (1998). 
 335 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(e) (1998). 
 336 For instance, does “other distributor” in section 6(e) refer only to the retail level of 
distribution? See Anderson v. Siemens Corp., 335 F.3d 466, 471 n.10 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
the distributor of a ventilator used in a hospital ICU was not a “retailer” within the meaning of § 
6(e)); cf. Fagan v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., 356 F. Supp. 2d 198, 204-07, 215 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(dismissing claims against the manufacturer of Epogen® where counterfeiters had diverted, 
substantially diluted, and then sold the drug on the gray market); id. at 207-11 (allowing negligence 
claims against the distributor to proceed). 
 337 See, e.g., Fisher v. Prof’l Compounding Ctrs. of Am., 311 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1019-21 
(D. Nev. 2004) (holding that suppliers of bulk fenfluramine used to compound diet drugs had failed 
to ensure that pharmacists knew of the risks associated with this drug substance); White v. Weiner, 
562 A.2d 378, 380 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (upholding summary judgment for a company that had 
supplied bulk active ingredient to another company that manufactured a prescription drug that 
caused a patient’s death), aff’d, 583 A.2d 789 (Pa. 1991); George v. Parke-Davis, 733 P.2d 507, 515-
16 (Wash. 1987) (rejecting a manufacturer’s indemnification claim against a bulk supplier of DES). 
See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 5 (1998) (setting forth the bulk 
supplier doctrine). This standard roughly parallels section 6(c) insofar as it declines to impose 
liability for a design defect for injuries caused by a product supplied to a sophisticated purchaser so 
long as it has some reasonably safe uses. 
 338 See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, 970 P.2d 98, 113-17 (Nev. 1998) (upholding a 
compensatory damage award of $4.2 million, but reversing a punitive damage award of $10 million, 
against the company that supplied silicone for use in breast implants). This also has happened when 
plaintiffs find it difficult to sue solvent finished good manufacturers, for instance because the 
injuries fall within the scope of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. See Moss v. Merck & 
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failed,339 some suppliers of biomaterials expended substantial resources 
in defending against these sorts of lawsuits,340 prompting them to stop 
supplying raw materials to medical device manufacturers.341 At the other 
end of the chain of distribution for prescription drugs and devices, as 
discussed in the sections that follow, injured patients might try to name 
physicians, pharmacists, and hospitals. 
1. Physicians, Pharmacists, and Compounding 
Consistent with the available case law (and the broadly 
applicable sales-service distinction), the Products Liability Restatement 
clearly did not mean to treat physicians as retail sellers or other 
distributors,342 even though some commentators have advocated 
extending strict liability to surgeons who implant nonessential medical 
devices.343 Instead, tort law uses the less exacting standards of medical 
malpractice to resolve personal injury claims arising from surgical and 
  
Co., 381 F.3d 501 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that claims brought against the manufacturer of 
thimerosal used in vaccines were not covered); Blackmon v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 267 F. Supp. 
2d 667, 678 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (same). 
 339 See, e.g., In re TMJ Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 97 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 1996); 
Anguiano v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 44 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1995); In re Silicone Gel Breast 
Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 996 F. Supp. 1110 (N.D. Ala. 1997); Artiglio v. Gen. Elec. Co., 957 
P.2d 1313 (Cal. 1998). 
 340 For instance, DuPont ultimately prevailed in all of the temporomandibular joint (TMJ) 
implant lawsuits filed against it for supplying raw materials, but it expended significant resources for 
its string of victories during the decade that this litigation lasted, paying far more in legal fees than it 
ever earned on this minor application. See Gary Taylor, A Discovery by DuPont: Hidden Costs of 
Winning, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 27, 1995, at B1 (reporting one estimate that the company had spent more 
than $40 million defending itself). 
 341 For instance, spooked by the breast implant lawsuits, Dow discontinued supplying 
silicone for other important medical device applications such as hydrocephalus shunts. See RAND 
Sci. & Tech. Policy Inst., Biomaterials Availability: Potential Effects on Medical Innovation and 
Health Care, Issue Paper No. 194, Jan. 2000, at 17, 32; see also Barnaby J. Feder, Implant Industry 
Is Facing Cutback by Top Suppliers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1994, at A1; cf. Cabrera v. Cordis Corp., 
134 F.3d 1418, 1422-23 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming the exclusion of plaintiff’s expert testimony in 
her claims against the manufacturer of a hydrocephalus shunt composed of silicone). In response to 
fears of an emerging shortage of raw materials needed to make critical medical devices, Congress 
enacted the Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1998. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1606 (2006); see 
also FDA, Medical Devices Draft Guidance for the Implementation of the Biomaterials Access 
Assurance Act of 1998, 66 Fed. Reg. 17,562 (Apr. 2, 2001) (describing the procedure to petition for 
a declaration concerning a biomaterials supplier’s compliance with establishment registration 
requirements). See generally Ann M. Murphy, Note, The Biomaterials Access Assurance Act of 1998 
and Corporate Supplier Liability: Who You Gonna Sue?, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 715 (2000). 
 342 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(e) cmt. h (1998) (explaining 
that retailers “should be permitted to rely on the special expertise of . . . prescribing and treating 
health-care providers”). See generally id. § 19(b) (“Services, even when provided commercially, are 
not products.”). 
 343 See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Sharing Accountability for Breast Implants: Strict Products 
Liability and Medical Professionals Engaged in Hybrid Sales/Service Cosmetic Products 
Transactions, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 873 (1994); Daniel F. Ryan, III & Timothy R. Lawn, Strict 
Liability Claims Against Health Care Providers in Breast Implant Litigation, 29 TORT & INS. L.J. 
818 (1994); Laura Pleicones, Note, Passing the Essence Test: Health Care Providers Escape Strict 
Liability for Medical Devices, 50 S.C. L. REV. 463, 472-87 (1999); see also Natasha Singer, The 
Little Botox Shop Around the Corner, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2007, at G3. 
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other medical procedures.344 Courts have held physicians liable for 
negligent prescribing decisions,345 including cases involving inadequate 
testing for the selection of the best available product for a particular 
patient,346 failing to warn of risks,347 and errors in drug administration.348 
Even compounding or customization, which seem closer to the activities 
of a manufacturer, may escape strict liability.349 
  
 344 See, e.g., In re Breast Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., 503 S.E.2d 445, 449 (S.C. 1998) 
(holding that, though breast augmentation surgery entails the implantation of a device, the service 
aspect of the transaction predominates); Hoven v. Kelble, 256 N.W.2d 379, 391-93 (Wis. 1977) 
(declining to impose strict liability for medical services); Noah, supra note 32, at 646-47. 
 345 See Linda A. Sharp, Annotation, Malpractice: Physician’s Liability for Injury or 
Death Resulting from Side Effects of Drugs Intentionally Administered to or Prescribed for Patients, 
47 A.L.R.5th 433 (1997 & Supp. 2008). 
 346 See, e.g., Lynch v. Bay Ridge Obstet. & Gyn. Assocs., 532 N.E.2d 1239, 1240 (N.Y. 
1988) (allowing a claim against a physician for negligently failing to diagnose plaintiff’s pregnancy 
and then prescribing a drug whose use was contraindicated in such patients); see also Edwards v. 
Tardif, 692 A.2d 1266, 1267-68 (Conn. 1997) (wrongful death action based on negligent prescribing 
without examination of patient); Hogle v. Hall, 916 P.2d 814, 816-17 (Nev. 1996) (sustaining a jury 
verdict for a child who suffered severe birth defects against a physician who negligently had 
prescribed Accutane during the mother’s pregnancy); Eiss v. Lillis, 357 S.E.2d 539, 542-44 (Va. 
1987) (negligent failure to monitor patient’s drug therapy); cf. Forman v. Pillsbury, 753 F. Supp. 14, 
18-20 (D.D.C. 1990) (rejecting claim where patient had disregarded physician’s instructions for 
continued blood monitoring while on drug). Occasionally, a patient will allege that a physician 
committed malpractice for failing to switch the patient to a newly approved product that might have 
worked more effectively. See Reese v. Stroh, 907 P.2d 282, 283-84 (Wash. 1995). Courts also may 
entertain tort claims against physicians for undermedicating patients, for instance undertreating pain 
that would have responded to powerful analgesic products. See James R. Blaufuss, Note, A Painful 
Catch-22: Why Tort Liability for Inadequate Pain Management Will Make for Bad Medicine, 31 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1093 (2005); Rima J. Oken, Note, Curing Healthcare Providers’ Failure to 
Administer Opioids in the Treatment of Severe Pain, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1917, 1968-81 (2002). 
 347 See, e.g., Hutchinson v. United States, 915 F.2d 560, 562-63 (9th Cir. 1990) (doctor 
held liable for not warning patient of risks involved with use of asthma medication); Bowman v. 
Songer, 820 P.2d 1110, 1113-15 (Colo. 1991) (dermatologist negligent for failing to warn patient of 
risk of sun exposure during use of topical prescription drug); Tenuto v. Lederle Labs., 687 N.E.2d 
1300, 1301-02 (N.Y. 1997) (physician had a duty to warn plaintiff of risk of contracting polio from 
an infant who had received a polio vaccine); Shadrick v. Coker, 963 S.W.2d 726, 729-30, 734-35, 
736-37 (Tenn. 1998) (informed consent doctrine requires physician to tell patient that medical device 
was not FDA approved); see also Noah, supra note 279, at 364-70. Physicians also may have duties 
to warn former patients when new risk information comes to light about a previously prescribed drug 
or implanted medical device. See, e.g., Harris v. Raymond, 715 N.E.2d 388, 394-95 (Ind. 1999); 
Tanuz v. Carlberg, 921 P.2d 309, 312, 316 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996). In some jurisdictions, third parties 
involved in traffic accidents with a person driving under the influence of a sedating medication may 
have a claim against the patient’s physician in case of a failure to warn of this side effect. See, e.g., 
Burroughs v. Magee, 118 S.W.3d 323, 324-25 (Tenn. 2003) (holding, however, that the third party 
could not assert a claim for negligent prescribing). But see Lester ex rel. Mavrogenis v. Hall, 970 
P.2d 590 (N.M. 1998). 
 348 See, e.g., Bazel v. Mabee, 576 N.W.2d 385, 387 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a 
jury could find a physician negligent for using Betadine despite knowledge of patient’s allergy); 
Leiker ex rel. Leiker v. Gafford, 778 P.2d 823, 827-28, 857 (Kan. 1989) (negligence for 
administering excessive dose of a drug); Harrison v. Axelrod, 599 N.Y.S.2d 96 (App. Div. 1993) 
(nurse negligent for administering incorrect dose). 
 349 See Dove ex rel. Dove v. Ruff, 558 N.E.2d 836, 837-40 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (drug 
compounding). But see Detwiler v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 884 F. Supp. 117, 121-22 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995) (physician modified silicone for cosmetic injection); cf. Putensen v. Clay Adams, Inc., 91 Cal. 
Rptr. 319, 323-24 (1970) (explaining that, in claims against supplier of bulk polyethylene, some 
surgeons had crafted cardiac catheters from this material). At some point, of course, entrepreneurial 
physicians decide to commercialize an idea, which would turn them into product sellers. See Bruce 
Ingersoll & Rose Gutfeld, Medical Mess: Implants in Jaw Joint Fail, Leaving Patients in Pain and 
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Pharmacists have a limited duty of care in connection with 
dispensing drugs and supplying information.350 In addition, pharmacists 
may face tort liability for mistakes in compounding drugs,351 and the 
Products Liability Restatement appears to treat them as within the chain 
of distribution for limited purposes,352 but they generally escape strict 
liability because courts regard them as providers of a service rather than 
sellers of a product.353 In fact, courts have rejected products liability 
claims against pharmacies even when they engage in large-scale 
compounding operations,354 even though the FDA treats such activity as 
akin to commercial drug manufacturing.355 
  
Disfigured, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 1993, at A1 (describing the history behind Vitek, founded by Dr. 
Charles Homsy, and its Teflon-based interpositional implant for TMJ syndrome). 
 350 See, e.g., Fagan v. AmerisourceBergen Corp., 356 F. Supp. 2d 198, 213 (E.D.N.Y. 
2004) (“[S]ince there is an allegation that the label on the Epogen was facially defective [and 
indicative of counterfeiting], the instant case does not involve a latent defect; but rather a patent 
defect, for which [the mail-order pharmacy] may be held liable for failing to discover upon 
reasonable inspection.”); Harco Drugs, Inc. v. Holloway, 669 So. 2d 878 (Ala. 1995) (pharmacist 
should have double-checked prescription because it was illegible and an oncologist normally would 
not have prescribed a cardiology drug); Lou v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 809 (Ark. 1985) (pharmacist who 
altered prescription to correct an assumed prescribing error held liable after a child suffered a severe 
reaction to the drug). When a pharmacist dispenses the wrong drug, the wrong dosage, or with the 
wrong label, he or she may be liable for negligence if the error harms the patient. In these 
circumstances, no matter how well-trained and careful a pharmacist may be, the processing error 
itself usually suffices to prove negligence. See, e.g., Forbes v. Walgreen Co., 566 N.E.2d 90, 91 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1991) (pharmacist liable for dispensing incorrect medication); Walter v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 748 A.2d 961, 967-68 (Me. 2000) (same); see also Eric M. Grasha, Note, Discovering 
Pharmacy Error: Must Reporting, Identifying, and Analyzing Pharmacy Dispensing Errors Create 
Liability for Pharmacists?, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1419 (2002); Christopher Rowland, CVS Faces 
Pharmacy Reviews: Settlement with State Comes After Scores of Prescription Errors, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Feb. 10, 2006, at C1 (reporting that “pharmacies typically experience a 3 percent error 
rate”). A presumption of negligence in the case of processing errors differs, however, from strict 
liability for dispensing a product with a manufacturing defect that the pharmacist could not have 
detected. 
 351 See, e.g., Brown v. S. Baptist Hosp., 715 So. 2d 423, 426 n.2, 431 (La. Ct. App. 1998); 
Schroeder v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctr., Inc., 833 S.W.2d 411, 416-19, 422 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992). 
 352 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 6(e) (1998) (manufacturing 
defects). Courts that reject strict liability claims against pharmacists seem, however, to do so without 
limitation, which would mean excluding responsibility for manufacturing defects as well. See 
Ashworth v. Albers Med., Inc., 395 F. Supp. 2d 395, 407-08 (S.D. W. Va. 2005) (rejecting claims 
against pharmacy that unknowingly dispensed counterfeit drug); Fontanez v. Parenteral Therapy 
Assoc., 974 So. 2d 1101, 1105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (“[T]he imposition of strict liability on a 
pharmacist simply dispensing a prescription drug would improperly convert retail pharmacists into 
insurers of the safety of the manufactured drug.”). Furthermore, the line between included 
manufacturing defects and excluded design defects may become particularly blurry in the context of 
pharmacy compounding operations. 
 353 See, e.g., Kohl v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 78 F. Supp. 2d 885, 890 (W.D. Ark. 1999); 
Madison v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 595 S.E.2d 493 (S.C. 2004); see also In re Rezulin Prod. Liab. 
Litig., 133 F. Supp. 2d 272, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“[A]lmost every state that has considered the 
issue has declined to find pharmacists liable for breach of either implied or express warranty with 
respect to properties of prescription drugs.”); Walls v. Alpharma USPD, Inc., 887 So. 2d 881, 886 
(Ala. 2004); Morgan v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 30 S.W.3d 455, 461-66 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) 
(declining to impose a duty to warn). But see Heredia v. Johnson, 827 F. Supp. 1522, 1524 (D. Nev. 
1993) (rejecting pharmacy’s motion for summary judgment on a strict liability claim for an alleged 
failure to transmit the manufacturer’s warning to a consumer about a drug’s risks). 
 354 See Schaerrer v. Stewart’s Plaza Pharmacy, Inc., 79 P.3d 922 (Utah 2003). But cf. 
Fontanez, 974 So. 2d at 1106 (allowing a breach of warranty claim); id. at 1105 (“[T]he risk of harm 
associated with the use of a drug which somehow became contaminated during the compounding 
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Again, as with other health care professionals, some have argued 
that pharmacists should face strict liability claims (after all, they do not 
differ markedly from retailers that simply sell products in sealed 
containers).356 Pharmacies and other businesses that sell OTC drugs and 
devices face the same threat of products liability as any other retailer of 
consumer goods.357 Indeed, pharmacies may have greater flexibility than 
manufacturers when it comes to regulating consumer access to 
nonprescription products,358 which might make them more vulnerable to 
negligent marketing claims if they fail to adopt necessary safeguards.359 
In the last decade, online prescribing and dispensing have 
become increasingly common. Aside from the difficulties that Internet 
sales of prescription drugs present for regulatory officials,360 and the 
possibility that manufacturers might have a duty to limit such modes of 
distribution,361 this phenomenon may justify rethinking the traditional 
  
process should be borne by the one best able to implement procedures to prevent the contamination, 
not by a consumer who is powerless to protect himself or herself.”). 
 355 See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 360-61 (2002); In re 
Establishment Inspection of Wedgewood Vill. Pharmacy, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 2d 525, 545-50 (D.N.J. 
2003), aff’d, 421 F.3d 263, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Sene X Eleemosynary Corp., 479 
F. Supp. 970, 978-79 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (rejecting practice of pharmacy defense to misbranding 
charges associated with large-scale compounding). The resurgence in pharmacy compounding has 
raised concerns about product safety. See Erin Hallissy & Sabin Russell, Who’s Mixing Your Drugs, 
S.F. CHRON., June 23, 2002, at A1 (documenting serious instances of contamination). 
 356 See, e.g., Furrow, supra note 47, at 404-13; see also Rhonda L. Rundle, Getting Your 
Drugs from a Vending Machine, WALL ST. J., June 21, 2005, at D1 (discussing efforts to use ATM-
like kiosks to dispense prescription refills). 
 357 See, e.g., Morales v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 214 F. Supp. 2d 723, 726 (S.D. Tex. 
2002). 
 358 Before Congress legislated in this area, concerns about methamphetamine prompted 
some retailers to place OTC cough-cold products containing the meth precursor pseudoephedrine 
behind the counter. See Margaret Webb Pressler, Retailers Restrict Some Cold Medicines: Ingredient 
Can Be Used to Make Meth, WASH. POST, May 14, 2005, at A1. Retailers also have begun to limit 
access to other OTC cough-cold products in response to problems with teenagers purchasing them to 
get high. See Rebecca Dana, Household Medicine Abused by the Young: Trend Alarms Activists, 
Officials, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2004, at A1; cf. Annys Shin, Speeding up Safety, WASH. POST, May 
3, 2008, at D1 (“The rush to banish [bisphenol A] is an example of how businesses have learned to 
respond quickly when their customers become alarmed. Major retailers and manufacturers have been 
taking their own measures because of a regulatory system that has not kept up with changes in the 
marketplace . . . .”). Only once before has the manufacturer of an OTC drug created a “behind-the-
counter” system of distribution. See Francesca Lunzer Kritz, Over the Counter but Not Easy to 
Reach, WASH. POST, Oct. 8, 2002, at F3 (Mucinex®). 
 359 See Nora Lockwood Tooher, Meth Suits Target Cold Medicine Makers and Sellers, 
LAWYERS WKLY. USA, Feb. 27, 2006; see also supra note 199 and accompanying text (discussing 
“behind-the-counter” status). 
 360 See Linda C. Fentiman, Internet Pharmacies and the Need for a New Federalism: 
Protecting Consumers While Increasing Access to Prescription Drugs, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 119 
(2003); Nicholas P. Terry, Prescriptions Sans Frontières, 4 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 183 
(2004); Phil Ayres, Comment, Prescribing a Cure for Online Pharmacies, 72 TENN. L. REV. 949 
(2005); John Richard Castronova, Comment, Operation Cyber Chase and Other Agency Efforts to 
Control Internet Drug Trafficking: The “Virtual” Enforcement Initiative Is Virtually Useless, 27 J. 
LEGAL MED. 207 (2006); Symposium, Pharmaceuticals and the Internet, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 
483 (2006); Erik Eckholm, Abuses Are Found in Online Sales of Medication, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 
2008, at A21; Sarah Rubenstein, New Bill Targets Rogue Druggists on the Internet, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 9, 2008, at D1. 
 361 See supra note 202 and accompanying text. 
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view that physicians and pharmacists offer predominantly professional 
services and, therefore, lie outside of the chain of distribution.362 
Similarly, if an exception to the learned intermediary rule applies (e.g., 
mass immunization, contraceptives, DTCA),363 then it seemingly would 
undermine the professional-status rationale underlying the exclusion of 
doctors and pharmacists from the chain of distribution for such drugs. 
2. Will Pharmacogenomics Change Everything? 
These issues may take on greater importance in the future as 
medical product development and use undergo fundamental changes. 
The improved understanding of the human genome promises advances in 
personalized medicine. “Pharmacogenomics” refers to the science of 
utilizing information about genetic variations to facilitate drug 
development and to create optimal patient treatments.364 Moreover, 
because human beings exhibit a great deal of variation, better 
understanding of individual differences presents an opportunity for 
physicians to tailor drugs to suit their patients’ individual genetic quirks 
and minimize the risk of side effects.365 To the extent that 
pharmacogenomics blurs the line between manufacturing and 
compounding, courts may have to revisit the sales-service distinction as 
it applies to pharmaceutical products. 
Even if pharmacogenomics never results in complete 
customization of drug therapy, it may affect the resolution of products 
liability litigation against pharmaceutical manufacturers. For instance, 
this research may help to identify subgroups of patients for whom 
reasonable physicians would prescribe a certain drug in the face of a 
  
 362 See Joanna M. Carlini, Comment, Liability on the Internet: Prescription Drugs and the 
Virtual Pharmacy, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 157 (2000); Kelly K. Gelein, Note, Are Online 
Consultations a Prescription for Trouble? The Uncharted Waters of Cybermedicine, 66 BROOK. L. 
REV. 209 (2000). 
 363 See supra notes 244-47 and accompanying text (asking whether a different design 
defect standard would apply in such circumstances). 
 364 See Jeffrey L. Moe, Commercialization Considerations for Individualized Diagnostic 
and Drug Therapies Resulting from Pharmacogenomics, 66 LA. L. REV. 103 (2005); Lars Noah, The 
Coming Pharmacogenomics Revolution: Tailoring Drugs to Fit Patients’ Genetic Profiles, 43 
JURIMETRICS J. 1 (2002); Symposium, Pharmacogenomics, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 237 (2006); Andrew 
Pollack, A Special Drug Just for You, at the End of a Long Pipeline, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2005, at 
F1. 
 365 See Barbara J. Evans, What Will It Take to Reap the Clinical Benefits of 
Pharmacogenomics?, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 753 (2006); Yusuke Nakamura, Editorial, 
Pharmacogenomics and Drug Toxicity, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 856 (2008); Gina Kolata, A Tale of 
Two Drugs Hints at Promise for Genetic Testing, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2006, at F1; Ron Winslow & 
Anna Wilde Mathews, New Genetic Tests Boost Impact of Drugs: Cancer Screens, Moves by FDA 
Help Launch Era of Personalized Medicine, but Strategy Is Still Young, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2005, 
at D1; see also Andrew Pollack, F.D.A. Urges Genetic Test Before Giving AIDS Drug, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 24, 2008, at C3 (reporting the addition of a black box warning in the labeling for abacavir with 
instructions to screen for a particular gene variation found in approximately five percent of patients 
because they may suffer severe allergic reactions); id. (“The labels of several other drugs, like the 
blood thinner warfarin and the cancer drug irinotecan, also recommend [genetic] tests aimed at 
avoiding side effects or helping to adjust the dose.”). 
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plaintiff’s allegations of defective design.366 Conversely, it may expand 
the limited duty to warn of allergic reactions.367 Historically, such claims 
rarely succeeded, either because the manufacturer could not have known 
of the risk of allergic reactions,368 or because a warning would not have 
altered the consumer’s decision to use a product if they did not know of 
their susceptibility.369 Pharmacogenomics may eliminate both of these 
obstacles to recovery in drug products liability cases. For instance, in a 
class action lawsuit premised on a failure-to-warn theory, the plaintiffs 
alleged that the manufacturer of a vaccine against Lyme disease should 
have recommended that patients first get a genetic test for the HLA-
DR4+ allele, which occurs in thirty percent of the population and 
produces an autoimmune reaction in response to an outer surface protein 
found on the vaccine.370 As pharmacogenomic research reveals more 
such genetic variations, drug companies can expect to encounter an 
expansion in this sort of litigation. 
3. Hospitals and SUDs 
Finally, hospitals that supply defective drugs or devices to 
patients generally need not fear strict liability claims,371 and the Products 
  
 366 See Ron Winslow & Marilyn Chase, Genetic Research May Help Pick Patients’ Best 
Cancer Drugs: Aid for Physicians May Narrow Market for Blockbusters, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2008, 
at B4. 
 367 Drug manufacturers have an obligation to warn when they should have known that an 
appreciable number of hypersensitive individuals may suffer serious injury. See, e.g., Basko v. 
Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 430 (2d Cir. 1969); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
PRODS. LIAB. § 2(c) cmt. k (1998) (“[A] warning is required when the harm-causing ingredient is 
one to which a substantial number of persons are allergic.”); Marcia Anne Mobilia, Allergic 
Reactions to Prescription Drugs: A Proposal for Compensation, 48 ALB. L. REV. 343, 346-49 
(1984). 
 368 See Burlison v. Warner-Lambert Co., 842 F.2d 991, 992-93 (8th Cir. 1988); Daley v. 
McNeil Consumer Prods. Co., 164 F. Supp. 2d 367, 373-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Griggs v. Combe, Inc., 
456 So. 2d 790, 792 (Ala. 1984). 
 369 See James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Norms in Products Litigation: Liability for 
Allergic Reactions, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 761, 778-79, 802-03 (1990); Noah, supra note 42, at 392 
(supporting the use of ingredient disclosure statements to alert users with known allergies). 
 370 See LORI B. ANDREWS ET AL., GENETICS: ETHICS, LAW AND POLICY 545-46 (2d ed. 
2006) (describing the litigation in Cassidy v. SmithKline Beecham Corp.). The manufacturer 
subsequently discontinued marketing this vaccine, citing a significant decline in sales. See Sole Lyme 
Vaccine Is Pulled off Market, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2002, at C5. 
 371 See, e.g., Hoff v. Zimmer, Inc., 746 F. Supp. 872, 873, 876 (W.D. Wis. 1990) (hip 
prosthesis); San Diego Hosp. Ass’n v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 4th 8, 13 (1994); Budding v. 
SSM Healthcare Sys., 19 S.W.3d 678, 681-82 (Mo. 2000); Royer v. Catholic Med. Ctr., 741 A.2d 
74, 75, 78 (N.H. 1999) (defective prosthetic knee implant); Parker v. St. Vincent Hosp., 919 P.2d 
1104, 1106 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) (TMJ implant); Cafazzo v. Cent. Med. Health Servs., Inc., 668 
A.2d 521, 523 (Pa. 1995) (same). But see Karibjanian v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 717 F. 
Supp. 1081, 1085-86 (E.D. Pa. 1989); Skelton v. Druid City Hosp. Bd., 459 So. 2d 818, 823 (Ala. 
1984); Garcia v. Edgewater Hosp., 613 N.E.2d 1243, 1245, 1247-49 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (defective 
heart valve); cf. David v. Our Lady of Lake Hosp., Inc., 857 So. 2d 529, 530-33 (La. Ct. App. 2003) 
(applying strict liability to hospital in a blood transfusion case). The use of res ipsa loquitur in this 
context may approach a rule of strict liability. See, e.g., Chin v. St. Barnabas Med. Ctr., 734 A.2d 
778, 783 (N.J. 1999); Anderson v. Somberg, 338 A.2d 1, 15-17 (N.J. 1975); Maciag v. Strato Med. 
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Liability Restatement does not appear to treat them as retail sellers or 
other distributors who might face liability for manufacturing defects 
under section 6(e),372 though some commentators have suggested that 
hospitals should qualify as links in the chain of distribution.373 Hospitals 
may face negligence claims for supplying flawed devices,374 for failing to 
supply state-of-the-art equipment,375 and for failing to monitor drug 
therapy.376 For the most part, however, courts refuse to treat hospitals as 
members of the chain of distribution on the notion that they provide a 
service (indeed, even more so than retail pharmacies, they look like 
sophisticated purchasers rather than mere retailers). Courts do not care 
that hospitals nowadays generate itemized bills that charge for 
everything used by a patient (often with a substantial mark-up),377 may 
enter into exclusive (and lucrative) purchasing agreements with 
particular wholesalers and manufacturers (almost the way an automobile 
dealership does),378 and may have the clout to influence manufacturers’ 
design choices. Moreover, hospitals have the expertise to select and 
inspect drugs and devices—and patients presumably depend on hospitals 
  
Corp., 644 A.2d 647 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994); Jackson v. Oklahoma Mem’l Hosp., 909 P.2d 
765, 770-73 (Okla. 1995). 
 372 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 20 cmt. d (1998) (“[I]n a strong 
majority of jurisdictions, hospitals are held not to be sellers of products they supply in connection 
with the provision of medical care, regardless of the circumstances.”). 
 373 See, e.g., Rachel B. Adler, Comment, Device Dilemma: Should Hospitals Be Strictly 
Liable for Retailing Defective Surgical Devices?, 5 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 95, 103-10, 124-30 
(1994). Commentators have made the same argument in connection with injuries caused by drugs 
administered within a hospital. See Furrow, supra note 47, at 393-404; see also id. at 424, 434 
(suggesting that managed care organizations also should face products liability claims to the extent 
that they create restricted drug formularies). 
 374 See, e.g., Pearce v. Feinstein, 754 F. Supp. 308, 309 (W.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 375 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Smith, 552 F.2d 142, 144 (5th Cir. 1977); Washington v. 
Washington Hosp. Ctr., 579 A.2d 177, 180 (D.C. 1990) (CO2 monitor); Suttle v. Lake Forest Hosp., 
733 N.E.2d 726, 731 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); cf. Emory Univ. v. Porter, 120 S.E.2d 668, 669 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1961) (emphasizing the limited scope of this duty). 
 376 See, e.g., Newmann v. United States, 938 F.2d 1258, 1259-60 (11th Cir. 1991); Kelley 
v. Wiggins, 724 S.W.2d 443, 449 (Ark. 1987); Fleming v. Baptist Gen. Convention, 742 P.2d 1087, 
1090 (Okla.1987) (allowing a negligence claim against a hospital and a physician for the improper 
administration of an injectable drug subcutaneously rather than intravenously); Thompson v. Nason 
Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 707-09 (Pa. 1991) (anticoagulant therapy); Edinburg Hosp. Auth. v. Treviño, 
941 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Tex. 1997). 
 377 See, e.g., Hector v. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 225 Cal. Rptr. 595, 600-01 (Ct. App. 
1986) (noting that hospital had added a surcharge of 85%, but declining to impose strict liability for 
supplying a defective pacemaker). 
 378 See United States ex rel. Schmidt v. Zimmer, Inc., 386 F.3d 235, 236-37 (3d Cir. 
2004) (reversing summary judgment for defendant in False Claims Act lawsuit where surgeon 
alleged that the manufacturer of orthopedic implants had offered kickbacks to hospital chain for 
purchasing products that would get billed to Medicare); In re Cardiac Devices Qui Tam Litig., 221 
F.R.D. 318, 323 (D. Conn. 2004) (allowing an action initiated by a manufacturer’s sales 
representative against more than 100 hospitals that had received payments for services to patients 
enrolled in clinical trials of numerous different investigational devices not eligible for Medicare 
reimbursement); Reed Abelson, Possible Conflicts for Doctors Are Seen on Medical Devices, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 22, 2005, at A1; Mary W. Walsh, Senate Panel Weighs Tighter Rules for Hospital 
Suppliers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2004, at C4. 
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to exercise that expertise—to say nothing of their active role in storage 
and handling. 
In the early 1980s, because of concerns about the difficulty of 
sterilizing increasingly sophisticated medical devices and surgical 
instruments after use (and no doubt also to promote repeat sales), 
manufacturers began to label these devices as “disposable” or “single-use 
devices” (SUDs). Many hospitals responded, however, by reusing certain 
SUDs in order to cut costs. This practice became widespread and can 
have frightening results. For example, some hospitals reused surgical 
instruments after operations on patients with Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, 
but, because ordinary sterilization procedures do not destroy the prions 
that cause this fatal condition, subsequent patients may have been 
exposed.379 The FDA now regulates hospitals engaged in reprocessing in 
the same manner as original equipment manufacturers.380 Such 
reprocessing and reuse of SUDs might, of course, make hospitals 
vulnerable to negligence claims,381 but why not apply rules of products 
liability in such cases (even if that meant the more forgiving rules 
governing used products)?382 
V. CONCLUSION 
At least the medical technology industry got its own blackletter 
rules this time around. In contrast to some of the other special provisions 
in the Products Liability Restatement (e.g., food), section 6 has attracted 
substantial attention. Given the expansion in litigation concerning drugs 
  
 379 See Alec Klein, Reused Devices, Surgery’s Deadly Suspects: Patients May Be Exposed 
to Rare Brain Disease from Prior Operations, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2005, at A3 (“Over the past 
five years, dozens of patients in at least four U.S. hospitals have been potentially exposed to the 
disease because their surgeons reused medical instruments first used on patients who had the rare 
brain disorder . . . .”). 
 380 Responding to concerns about inadequate sterilization and material degradation, the 
FDA announced plans to regulate hospitals as device manufacturers when they engage in such 
reprocessing. See John J. Smith & Jennifer A. Agraz, Federal Regulation of Single-Use Medical 
Devices: A Revised FDA Policy, 56 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 305 (2001); Diane Carey, Comment, 
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and medical devices, it has the potential to have a substantial practical 
impact; it also raises intriguing doctrinal questions and provides some 
interesting contrasts with the core of products liability. Unfortunately 
(whether from a failure to appreciate some of the tricky regulatory or 
medical practice issues, a narrow focus on only one of the subsections, or 
a preoccupation with taking sides), much of the published literature has 
done a poor job of grappling with the genuinely difficult questions 
presented by section 6. This Article has tried to explore those issues and 
offer an overview of the interrelationships between different facets of 
this special provision.  
